One of the great flaws of Keynesian economics is that proponents assume policy makers are angels who are motivated solely by a desire to help people by boosting the economy when there’s a downturn.
Needless to say, that’s an absurd assumption. To cite just one real-world example, we can see how Obama’s stimulus scheme was simply an opportunity for politicians and interest groups to do what they like doing regardless of the economy’s performance, which is to have fun with other people’s money. Think scams like Solyndra, but expanded to almost all parts of the federal budget.
This sober-minded assessment of how government really works is sometimes categorized as being part of “public choice economics.”
Here’s what I wrote about this theory earlier this year, as part of a column explaining why politicians will keep spending even if they know it will lead to disaster.
…there’s an entire school of thought in economics, known as “public choice,” which is based on making real-world assumptions about the self-interested behavior of politicians and interest groups.
…In other words, both voters and politicians can have an incentive for ever-larger government, even if the end result is Greek-style fiscal chaos because taxes and spending reach ruinous levels. I call this “Goldfish Government” because some think that a goldfish lacks the ability to control its appetite and therefore will eat itself to death when presented with unlimited food. …America’s Founding Fathers had the right solution. They set up a democratic form of government, but they strictly limited the powers of the central government. This system worked remarkably well for a long period, but then the Supreme Court decided that the enumerated powers listed in the Constitution were just a suggestion.
One of the key insights of public choice theory is that we often get excessive government because the people getting handouts from any particular program have a very strong incentive to lobby for those goodies while the average taxpayer often does not have the time, knowledge, energy, or incentive to to either learn what’s happening or to figure out how best to fight against the various counterproductive redistribution programs.
Here’s a video from Learn Liberty that explains how “concentrated benefits” and “dispersed costs” produce bad outcomes (and if you have any doubts that this is true, just think about the Export-Import Bank or farm subsidies).
By the way, I hope everyone noticed, in the hypothetical law that was discussed, that half the money collected from taxpayers would be burned.
This is an under-appreciated reason why redistribution is so damaging. I’ve tried to make this point by talking about how federal spending involves taxing people around the nation, carrying the money in a leaky bucket to Washington, pouring some of it down a toilet, and then carrying it in a leaky bucket back to interest groups in various parts of the nation.
Building on these concepts, Professor Ben Powell uses the example of farm subsidies to explain how we get bad policy (think ethanol).
Kudos to Ben (who also narrated a great video on “sweatshops”). I particularly like his explanation of how interest groups recycle money back to politicians.
Indeed, it’s no exaggeration to say that the federal government is a racket that lines the pockets of insiders at the expense of taxpayers.
Last but not least, here’s Professor Mark Pennington from the University of London discussing public choice, market failure, and government failure.
If you’re interested, I recommend that you also watch Part II, Part III, and Part IV of Mark’s presentation.
At this stage, you may be thinking that fixing the mess in Washington is hopeless. After all, if it’s in the self interest of politicians to expand the burden of government to buy votes and win their next elections, then aren’t we doomed to have “goldfish government”?
That’s certainly what’s happened in nations such as Greece that presumably have reached and surpassed a “tipping point” of too much government dependency.
But here’s why I think there’s still hope for the United States.
…asking politicians to reduce government is like asking burglars to be in favor of armed homeowners. …we know politicians generally have bad incentives. But it’s not hopeless. While I certainly enjoy mocking politicians, they’re not totally immoral or even amoral people. Many of them do understand there’s a problem. Indeed, I would argue that recent votes for entitlement reform are an example of genuine patriotism – i.e., doing the right thing for the country. So is there a potential solution? Maybe. Let’s use an analogy from Greek mythology. Many politicians generally can’t resist the siren song of a go-along-to-get-along approach.
But like Ulysses facing temptation from sirens, they recognize that this is a recipe for a bad outcome. So they realize that some sort of self-imposed constraint is desirable. And that’s why I’m somewhat hopeful that we can get them to impose binding spending caps. We know there are successful reforms by looking at the evidence. And we know there is growing support from fiscal experts. And we even see that normally left-leaning international bureaucracies such as theOECD and IMF acknowledge that spending caps are the only effective fiscal rule. So if Ulysses can bind himself to the mast and resist the sirens, perhaps we can convince politicians to tie their own hands with a Swiss-style spending cap.
P.S. Though whenever I think about the 2016 election, I confess that’s it’s hard to be optimistic.
[…] hate being right, but it’s always safe to predict that politicians and bureaucrats will embrace policies that give more power to […]
[…] hate being right, but it’s always safe to predict that politicians and bureaucrats will embrace policies that give more power to […]
[…] The hard part about being a libertarian is that there are endless opportunities to be frustrated. Especially if you’re job is trying to convince politicians to restrain the size and scope of government when that’s not in their self interest. […]
[…] and bureaucrats are (self-interested) conduits for taking money from one group of people and giving it to another group of […]
[…] since politicians like getting votes from those beneficiaries, it’s very difficult to derail […]
[…] hate being right, but it’s always safe to predict that politicians and bureaucrats will embrace policies that give more power to […]
[…] hate being right, but it’s always safe to predict that politicians and bureaucrats will embrace policies that give more power to […]
[…] since politicians like getting votes from those beneficiaries, it’s very difficult to derail […]
[…] there was a critical mass of lawmakers who were willing to do the right thing in spite of the usual incentives in Washington to do the wrong […]
[…] hate being right, but it’s always safe to predict that politicians and bureaucrats will embrace policies that give more power to […]
[…] there was a critical mass of lawmakers who were willing to do the right thing in spite of the usual incentives in Washington to do the wrong […]
[…] you might expect, there are plenty of politicians who try to buy votes with an agenda of “positive rights.” Bernie Sanders, for instance, constantly argued that […]
[…] you might expect, there are plenty of politicians who try to buy votes with an agenda of “positive rights.” Bernie Sanders, for instance, constantly argued that […]
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[…] easy being a libertarian, especially when your job is to protect economic liberty. Politicians have a natural incentive to increase the size, scope, and power of […]
[…] I try to be optimistic (notwithstanding forcesand evidence to the contrary), let’s start with the good […]
[…] I try to be optimistic (notwithstanding forces and evidence to the contrary), let’s start with the good […]
[…] there was a critical mass of lawmakers who were willing to do the right thing in spite of the usual incentives in Washington to do the wrong […]
[…] there was a critical mass of lawmakers who were willing to do the right thing in spite of the usual incentives in Washington to do the wrong […]
[…] you might expect, there are plenty of politicians who try to buy votes with an agenda of “positive rights.” Bernie Sanders, for instance, constantly argued that […]
[…] should-be-obvious observation that politicians don’t actually care about net job creation. They care about buying votes with other people’s […]
[…] you might expect, there are plenty of politicians who try to buy votes with an agenda of “positive rights.” Bernie Sanders, for instance, constantly argued that […]
[…] you might expect, there are plenty of politicians who try to buy votes with an agenda of “positive rights.” Bernie Sanders, for instance, constantly argued that […]
[…] you might expect, there are plenty of politicians who try to buy votes with an agenda of “positive rights.” Bernie Sanders, for instance, constantly argued that […]
[…] do good people get corrupted after getting into […]
[…] you might expect, there are plenty of politicians who try to buy votes with an agenda of “positive rights.” Bernie Sanders, for instance, constantly argued that […]
[…] Because politicians and bureaucrats give away money on the basis of what makes political sense, not on the basis of what makes economic […]
[…] politicians have built-in incentives to expand the size and scope of government, it is very rare to find elected officials who actually […]
[…] politicians have built-in incentives to expand the size and scope of government, it is very rare to find elected officials who actually […]
[…] about what to expect from politics. Simply stated, politicians generally have incentives to maximize their short-run status, not to maximize the nation’s long-run […]
[…] about what to expect from politics. Simply stated, politicians generally have incentives to maximize their short-run status, not to maximize the nation’s long-run […]
[…] the White House and Congress are engaged in a naked vote-buying […]
[…] predicted by “public choice,” their preferred approach is kicking the can down the […]
[…] a practice known as cronyism, and it is absurd to think that selfish, election-focused politicians somehow correctly identify and subsidize the technologies of […]
[…] hate being right, but it’s always safe to predict that politicians and bureaucrats will embrace policies that give more power to […]
[…] of their despicable tendency to buy voteswith our money, I view politicians with considerabledisdain. But when a politician goes above and […]
[…] of their despicable tendency to buy votes with our money, I view politicians with considerable disdain. But when a politician goes above and […]
[…] P.S. Developing nations do a bad job of providing rule of law, but I have near-zero faith that more government spending will lead to improvements. Instead, more spending will be a vehicle for ruling elites to cement their power by buying votes. […]
[…] hate being right, but it’s always safe to predict that politicians and bureaucrats will embrace policies that give more power to […]
[…] Politicians mostly care about getting reelected and wielding power, so they pay attention to polls because they want to know what to say. […]
[…] fear is that politicians and bureaucrats will have self-interested reasons to retain the additional power they grabbed during the pandemic. But I’ll keep my fingers […]
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[…] such, we should never be surprised when politicians push bad […]
[…] hate being right, but it’s always safe to predict that politicians and bureaucrats will embrace policies that give more power to […]
[…] IMF and OECD officials get very comfortable (and tax-free!) salaries, so they have a “public choice” incentive to reflect the wishes of the politicians who control their purse […]
[…] you might expect, there are plenty of politicians who try to buy votes with an agenda of “positive rights.” Bernie Sanders, for instance, constantly argued that […]
[…] theory of “public choice” suggests we shouldn’t be […]
[…] observation that politicians don’t actually care about net job creation. They care about buying votes with other people’s […]
[…] be sure, punting is the easy route from a “public choice” perspective. Politicians like offering freebies to voters and many voters like getting […]
[…] be sure, punting is the easy route from a “public choice” perspective. Politicians like offering freebies to voters and many voters like getting […]
[…] Politicians mostly care about getting reelected and wielding power, so they pay attention to polls because they want to know what to say. […]
[…] mostly care about getting reelected and wielding power, so they pay attention to polls because they want to know what to […]
[…] I mentioned “public choice” at the end of that clip. You can click here to learn more about the economic analysis of political […]
[…] hate being right, but it’s always safe to predict that politicians and bureaucrats will embrace policies that give more power to […]
[…] hate being right, but it’s always safe to predict that politicians and bureaucrats will embrace policies that give more power to […]
[…] I mentioned “public choice” at the end of that clip. You can click here to learn more about the economic analysis of political […]
[…] I mentioned “public choice” at the end of that clip. You can click here to learn more about the economic analysis of political […]
[…] all intents and purposes, Friedman is pointing out that there’s a “public choice” incentive for government to […]
[…] many politicians lack common sense (or, more accurately, they are motivated by short-run political ambition rather than what’s in the long-run best interest of their […]
[…] (as we saw during the pandemic). And when politicians and bureaucrats do act, they often respond to political incentives that lead them to make things […]
[…] are used to finance genuine “public goods” are justifiable. Taxes used to finance the schemes of vote-buying politicians are […]
[…] but not least, there’s some discussion of “public choice,” which explains why politicians and bureaucrats have incentives to expand the size and scope of […]
[…] in government are not opposed to clean and safe parks, of course, but they often make decisions on the basis of political factors (rewarding certain contractors, providing patronage jobs, […]
[…] hate being right, but it’s always safe to predict that politicians and bureaucrats will embrace policies that give more power to […]
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[…] not that they’re evil or bad people, but their incentive structure generally leads them to make shallow, short-run, and self-serving […]
[…] goods.” Today’s topic is “rent seeking,” which is part of “public choice” and is described by Professor Alex Tabarrok of George Mason […]
[…] That being said, Gerard Baker of the Wall Street Journal writes that America may be on the verge of a “libertarian moment.” He starts by presenting a grim hypothesis consistent with public-choice theory. […]
[…] of the (many) unfortunate tendencies of politicians is that they focus on the short run (i.e., their upcoming reelection […]
[…] all intents and purposes, Friedman is pointing out that there’s a “public choice” incentive for government to […]
[…] hate being right, but it’s always safe to predict that politicians and bureaucrats will embrace policies that give more power to […]
[…] since I understand the economics of “public choice” (something Thomas Jefferson also implicitly understood) it’s always easier to envision the […]
[…] since I understand the economics of “public choice” (something Thomas Jefferson also implicitly understood) it’s always easier to envision […]
[…] but not least, there’s some discussion of “public choice,” which explains why politicians and bureaucrats have incentives to expand the size and scope of […]
[…] But the crowd in Washington has a different perspective. Most of them like the IRS because it’s the bureaucracy that generates the money that they use to buy votes. […]
[…] in government are not opposed to clean and safe parks, of course, but they often make decisions on the basis of political factors (rewarding certain contractors, providing patronage jobs, […]
[…] in government are not opposed to clean and safe parks, of course, but they often make decisions on the basis of political factors (rewarding certain contractors, providing patronage jobs, […]
[…] in government are not opposed to clean and safe parks, of course, but they often make decisions on the basis of political factors (rewarding certain contractors, providing patronage jobs, […]
[…] that’s a smart way of buying votes, but it will erode societal […]
[…] hate being right, but it’s always safe to predict that politicians and bureaucrats will embrace policies that give more power to […]
[…] but not least, there’s some discussion of “public choice,” which explains why politicians and bureaucrats have incentives to expand the size and scope of […]
[…] but not least, there’s some discussion of “public choice,” which explains why politicians and bureaucrats have incentives to expand the size and scope […]
[…] But the crowd in Washington has a different perspective. Most of them like the IRS because it’s the bureaucracy that generates the money that they use to buy votes. […]
[…] (as we saw during the pandemic). And when politicians and bureaucrats do act, they often respond to political incentives that lead them to make things […]
[…] (as we saw during the pandemic). And when politicians and bureaucrats do act, they often respond to political incentives that lead them to make things […]
[…] Politicians are not necessarily or automatically evil. Instead, they screw up in large part because of perverse incentives. […]
[…] worry about that collateral damage so long as their primary objective – getting more money to buy more votes – is […]
[…] worry about that collateral damage so long as their primary objective – getting more money to buy more votes – is […]
[…] he was also behaving exactly as “public choice” theory […]
[…] he was also behaving exactly as “public choice” theory […]
[…] worry about that collateral damage so long as their primary objective – getting more money to buy more votes – is […]
[…] worry about that collateral damage so long as their primary objective – getting more money to buy more votes – is […]
[…] theory of “public choice” suggests we shouldn’t be […]
[…] The moral of the story is that smaller government is part of the recipe for greater prosperity, even if that’s not the approach preferred by vote-buying politicians. […]
[…] hate being right, but it’s always safe to predict that politicians and bureaucrats will embrace policies that give more power to […]
[…] that’s a smart way of buying votes, but it will erode societal […]
[…] again, politicians and bureaucrats probably have incentives to not produce that kind of […]
[…] since politicians like getting votes from those beneficiaries, it’s very difficult to derail […]
[…] not that they’re evil or bad people, but their incentive structure generally leads them to make shallow, short-run, and self-serving […]
[…] not that they’re evil or bad people, but their incentive structure generally leads them to make shallow, short-run, and self-serving […]
[…] Greedy politicians can’t resist the temptation to over-tax anything and everything in hopes of getting their hands on more money to buy more votes. […]
[…] since politicians like getting votes from those beneficiaries, it’s very difficult to derail […]
[…] for the “public choice” scholars to […]
[…] it doesn’t matter whether they are driven by ideology or “public choice.” The bottom line is that helping people climb the economic ladder is – at best – a secondary […]
[…] it doesn’t matter whether they are driven by ideology or “public choice.” The bottom line is that helping people climb the economic ladder is – at best – […]
[…] theory of “public choice” suggests we shouldn’t be […]
[…] may be a good vote-buying strategy, but it has horrible consequences. Both morally and […]
[…] may be a good vote-buying strategy, but it has horrible consequences. Both morally and […]
[…] theory of “public choice” suggests we shouldn’t be […]
[…] theory of “public choice” suggests we shouldn’t be […]
[…] that’s a smart way of buying votes, but it will erode societal […]
[…] that’s a smart way of buying votes, but it will erode societal […]
[…] this research, we’ll be in good shape (actually, since those two are poster children for the theory of Public Choice, who am I […]
[…] hate being right, but it’s always safe to predict that politicians and bureaucrats will embrace policies that give more power to […]
[…] hate being right, but it’s always safe to predict that politicians and bureaucrats will embrace policies that give more power to […]
[…] and bureaucrats are (self-interested) conduits for taking money from one group of people and giving it to another group of […]
[…] 21, 2021 (International Liberty) – Politicians and bureaucrats are (self-interested) conduits for taking money from one group of people and giving it to another group of […]
[…] and bureaucrats are (self-interested) conduits for taking cash from one crew of other people and giving it to every other crew of other […]
[…] since politicians like getting votes from those beneficiaries, it’s very difficult to derail […]
[…] since politicians like getting votes from those beneficiaries, it’s very difficult to derail […]
[…] But the crowd in Washington has a different perspective. Most of them like the IRS because it’s the bureaucracy that generates the money that they use to buy votes. […]
[…] But the crowd in Washington has a different perspective. Most of them like the IRS because it’s the bureaucracy that generates the money that they use to buy votes. […]
[…] and bureaucrats are (self-interested) conduits for taking money from one group of people and giving it to another group of […]
[…] and bureaucrats are (self-interested) conduits for taking money from one group of people and giving it to another group of […]
[…] and bureaucrats are (self-interested) conduits for taking cash from one group of individuals and giving it to a different group of […]
[…] and bureaucrats are (self-interested) conduits for taking money from one group of people and giving it to another group of […]
[…] Mitchell, International Liberty) Politicians and bureaucrats are (self-interested) conduits for taking money from one group of people and giving it to another group of […]
[…] and bureaucrats are (self-interested) conduits for taking money from one group of people and giving it to another group of […]
[…] and bureaucrats are (self-interested) conduits for taking money from one group of people and giving it to another group of […]
[…] and bureaucrats are (self-interested) conduits for taking money from one group of people and giving it to another group of […]
[…] and bureaucrats are (self-interested) conduits for taking money from one group of people and giving it to another group of […]
[…] and bureaucrats are (self-interested) conduits for taking money from one group of people and giving it to another group of […]
[…] and bureaucrats are (self-interested) conduits for taking money from one group of people and giving it to another group of […]
[…] maximizing liberty and prosperity. The challenge is that politicians 1) usually want more money so they can buy more votes, but 2) sometimes let envy trump their desire for more […]
[…] maximizing liberty and prosperity. The challenge is that politicians 1) usually want more money so they can buy more votes, but 2) sometimes let envy trump their desire for more […]
[…] you might expect, there are plenty of politicians who try to buy votes with an agenda of “positive rights.” Bernie Sanders, for instance, constantly argued that […]
[…] the question. Or to understand economics. Heck, I don’t even expect him to care. He’s just trying to buy votes, using other people’s […]
[…] question. Or to understand economics. Heck, I don’t even expect him to care. He’s just trying to buy votes, using other people’s […]
[…] The bottom line is that government has created a bad system. It doesn’t matter that most teachers have noble intentions. It doesn’t matter that most kids are capable of higher achievement. Monopolies simply don’t perform, especially when mixed with special-interest politics. […]
[…] sector, whereas people in Washington are governed by the perverse incentives described by “public choice” […]
[…] and the IRS are feeding us garbage data for self-interested reasons (a classic case of “public choice” in […]
[…] you might expect, there are plenty of politicians who try to buy votes with an agenda of “positive rights.” Bernie Sanders, for instance, constantly argued that […]
[…] phenomenon of bootleggers and baptists is run-of-the-mill government corruption, an example of “public choice” in […]
[…] of bootleggers and baptists is run-of-the-mill government corruption, an example of “public choice” in […]
[…] Call me crazy, but I don’t want ordinary people to lose jobs simply because greedy politicians want more money so they can try to buy more votes. […]
[…] Call me crazy, but I don’t want ordinary people to lose jobs simply because greedy politicians want more money so they can try to buy more votes. […]
[…] will require genuine reform to deal with the entitlement crisis. Given the insights of “public choice” theory, it will be a challenge to find politicians willing to save the […]
[…] will require genuine reform to deal with the entitlement crisis. Given the insights of “public choice” theory, it will be a challenge to find politicians willing to save the […]
[…] will require genuine reform to deal with the entitlement crisis. Given the insights of “public choice” theory, it will be a challenge to find politicians willing to save the […]
[…] things, of course, but they are making calculated decisions that it’s okay to hurt the economy if they achieve some political benefit. That’s immoral, but not […]
[…] of course, but they are making calculated decisions that it’s okay to hurt the economy if they achieve some political benefit. That’s immoral, but not […]
[…] next cartoon strip is for afficianados of “public choice,” which is he school of thought that studies how politicians care primarily about advancing […]
[…] The bottom line is that government has created a bad system. It doesn’t matter that most teachers have noble intentions. It doesn’t matter that most kids are capable of higher achievement. Monopolies simply don’t perform, especially when mixed with special-interest politics. […]
[…] you might expect, there are plenty of politicians who try to buy votes with an agenda of “positive rights.” Bernie Sanders, for instance, constantly argued that […]
[…] you might expect, there are plenty of politicians who try to buy votes with an agenda of “positive rights.” Bernie Sanders, for instance, constantly argued that […]
[…] am I so pessimistic? Because I understand “public choice,” which is the application of micro-economic analysis (things like incentives) to the […]
[…] you might expect, there are plenty of politicians who try to buy votes with an agenda of “positive rights.” Bernie Sanders, for instance, constantly argued that […]
[…] will want to follow that advice because it tells them that their vice (buying votes with other people’s money) is a virtue (more spending magically can boost […]
[…] much spending, regulation, and taxing, we also have far too many politicians and bureaucrats who behave as if they’re motivated by personal interest rather than the national […]
[…] like having some level of power and control over various sectors of the economy, for the simple public choice-driven reason that they can then extort bribes, campaign cash, and other […]
[…] politicians rarely favor this light-touch approach, in part because of unseemly “public choice” incentives and in part because they focus only on the benefit side of the cost-benefit […]
[…] politicians rarely favor this light-touch approach, in part because of unseemly “public choice” incentives and in part because they focus only on the benefit side of the cost-benefit […]
[…] The bad thing about being a libertarian is that politicians very rarely care about – or act upon – our ideas for better policy (thank you, public choice). […]
[…] you might expect, there are plenty of politicians who try to buy votes with an agenda of “positive rights.” Bernie Sanders, for instance, constantly argued that […]
[…] you might expect, there are plenty of politicians who try to buy votes with an agenda of “positive rights.” Bernie Sanders, for instance, constantly argued […]
[…] James Buchanan won a Nobel Prize for developing the theory of “public choice,” which looks at how politicians, bureaucrats, and voters seek to maximize their self […]
[…] Thatcher was right, but they still push endless redistribution because they care more about short-run political power rather than the long-run interests of the […]
[…] James Buchanan won a Nobel Prize for developing the theory of “public choice,” which looks at how politicians, bureaucrats, and voters seek to maximize their self […]
[…] answer is “public choice.” Top IMF officials are selected by politicians and are given very generous salaries, and […]
[…] people run for political office, but then slowly but surely get corrupted because of “public choice” […]
[…] all intents and purposes, Friedman is pointing out that there’s a “public choice” incentive for government to […]
[…] they responding to “public choice” […]
[…] fear the same thing will happen with the so-called public option. Politicians (in their never-ending efforts to but votes) will keep increasing the subsidies. That will make employer-based health plans seem less […]
[…] people run for political office, but then slowly but surely get corrupted because of “public choice” […]
[…] The unanswered question, of course, is how to convince self-interested politicians to choose spending restraint instead of buying votes with other people’s money. A spending […]
[…] went to George Mason University for my Ph.D. specifically because of my interest in both “public choice” and “Austrian […]
[…] went to George Mason University for my Ph.D. specifically because of my interest in both “public choice” and “Austrian […]
[…] Golden Rule. Sadly, that doesn’t happen very often because politicians focus mostly on buying votes in the short run rather than increasing national prosperity in the long […]
[…] the politicians who fund and control such bureaucracies doubtlessly appreciate the […]
[…] people run for political office, but then slowly but surely get corrupted because of “public choice” […]
[…] The hard part about being a libertarian is that there are endless opportunities to be frustrated. Especially if you’re job is trying to convince politicians to restrain the size and scope of government when that’s not in their self interest. […]
[…] https://danieljmitchell.wordpress.com/2016/10/08/a-videos-primer-on-public-choice-economics/ […]
[…] think this is a great introduction to the issue, particularly since you learn how “public choice” (i.e., politicians engaging in self-serving behavior) played a key role in the development […]
[…] close with a serious point. Do bad people naturally gravitate to politics, or do the perverse incentives of politics turn good people into bad […]
[…] If you want to understand how government really works, learn about “public choice.” […]
[…] dislike about Keynesian economics, most notably that it tells politicians that their vice – buying votes by spending other people’s money – is somehow a […]
[…] reforms have been proposed for the United States. Unfortunately, too many American politicians and consumed by self-interest and don’t think past the next […]
[…] what it’s worth, I’m sure the answer to both questions is yes. Politicians are a very self-interested group and I’m sure there were dozens of provisions in the legislation that qualified for that type […]
[…] bureaucrats are not the only ones to blame. A big reason for the CDC’s lack of focus is that headline-seeking and vote-buying politicians created new roles and responsibilities. The CDC was happy to get more power, staff, and money, of […]
[…] if politicians make some of that spending permanent (which will be in their self-interest), then we’ll be traveling even faster in the wrong […]
[…] and Boudreaux use insights from “public choice” to describe the process that produces ever-larger […]
[…] The bottom line is that government has created a bad system. It doesn’t matter that most teachers have noble intentions. It doesn’t matter that most kids are capable of higher achievement. Monopolies simply don’t perform, especially when mixed with special-interest politics. […]
[…] a rationale for short-run emergency legislation, but we should be very concerned that self-interested politicians and power-hungry bureaucracies will use the coronavirus crisis as an excuse to permanently expand […]
[…] Chapter 7, you’ll learn some “public choice” insights about getting things done in Washington (whether that’s a good idea is an […]
[…] Including in the legislation recently approved in Washington (not that anyone should be surprised). […]
[…] Including in the legislation recently approved in Washington (not that anyone should be surprised). […]
[…] being said, I worry that self-interested politicians will use the crisis as an excuse to shovel goodies to their friends and […]
[…] This isn’t because governments are run by bad people. Some of them probably are that way, of course, but the real problem is that politicians and bureaucrats are dealing with a perverse incentive system. […]
[…] the “slippery slope” because we’re paranoid. We fear it because we understand the perverse incentive structure of […]
[…] Panama are prone to populist measures, but bad policies are adopted for vote-buying reasons (i.e., public choice) rather than ideology. Indeed, there is not a successful left-wing party in the […]
[…] motivated by “public choice” insights about self-interested behavior, I want to make an important point about how […]
[…] those not familiar with the term, “public choice” refers to research on the self-interested behavior of people in […]
[…] McArdle pointed out that Chicago is a mess because of “public choice” – i.e., politicians make short-sighted and irresponsible decisions in order to […]
[…] of “public choice,” there are no real-world examples in the top-right quadrant. Why would politicians collect […]
[…] taxes and high rates, but politicians eventually would have concocted other reasons (based on their self interest) to extract lots of […]
[…] is justifiably concerned that a strong government inevitably will misbehave, presumably for “public choice” […]
[…] Most important, it’s extremely difficult to convince politicians to reduce spending during a recession since that’s when they feel extra pressure to spend more money (whether for Keynesian reasons of public-choice reasons). […]
[…] necessary ones or useless ones), does that create the risk of giving other parts of the nation a “public-choice” incentive to lobby for big government since they’ll be recipients of federal largesse? Will we […]
[…] The hard part about being a libertarian is that there are endless opportunities to be frustrated. Especially if you’re job is trying to convince politicians to restrain the size and scope of government when that’s not in their self interest. […]
[…] The bottom line is that government has created a bad system. It doesn’t matter that most teachers have noble intentions. It doesn’t matter that most kids are capable of higher achievement. Monopolies simply don’t perform, especially when mixed with special-interest politics. […]
[…] The authors consider some of the theoretical reasons why state-run firms might not be very efficient, including “public choice.” […]
[…] The bottom line is that government has created a bad system. It doesn’t matter that most teachers have noble intentions. It doesn’t matter that most kids are capable of higher achievement. Monopolies simply don’t perform, especially when mixed with special-interest politics. […]
[…] The hard part about being a libertarian is that there are endless opportunities to be frustrated. Especially if you’re job is trying to convince politicians to restrain the size and scope of government when that’s not in their self interest. […]
[…] know the recipe for growth and prosperity. The challenge is convincing self-interested politicians to reduce their power and control over the […]
[…] that’s hardly a comforting observation since there would be “public choice” pressures to adopt at least some bad policy if she got to the White […]
[…] an entire field of economics called “public choice” that analyzes the (largely perverse) incentive structures of politicians and […]
[…] All these theorems are actually just elements of “public choice,” which is the common-sense economic theory that people in the public sector largely are […]
[…] Donald Trump and Nancy Pelosi should have extra money to squander (my two cents is that they’re the ones with the worst incentive to use money […]
[…] even if politicians understand that the policy will backfire, their desire to get votes will trump common sense. Especially if they assume they can blame “greedy landlords” […]
[…] I suppose I shouldn’t be surprised. This is what the theory of “public choice” tells us to […]
[…] other words, “public choice” in […]
[…] The problem is that they put the interests of teacher unions ahead of the interests of those kids. Public Choice […]
[…] why would public choice-motivated lawmakers actually allow a serious and comprehensive spending cap to become part of the […]
[…] even decide that it’s time to jettison some federal programs. But since I understand “public choice,” I won’t be holding my breath awaiting that […]
[…] that politicians in D.C. are the worst people in the country. But I will assert that they’re the ones with the worst incentive to use money […]
[…] the same “public choice” reason that we maintain policies – such as agriculture subsidies the Export-Import […]
[…] other words, this is a perfect plan for a politician who understands “public choice” theory. The people think they’re getting a freebie, but the benefits actually go to those […]
[…] in Washington generally aren’t interested in sensible fiscal policy. They have a “public choice” incentive to spend more money in hopes of buying more […]
[…] stated, politicians have a “public choice” incentive for never-ending expansions of government, even if they actually understand such […]
[…] such a target-rich environment. But I’m also hoping that humor is a way of debunking this wretched ideology. I’m worried, after all, that socialism may triumph thanks to a combination of “public […]
[…] the answer has a lot to do with politicians having a vote-buying and power-grabbing incentive to produce a never-ending supply of bad […]
[…] that it would make much difference since their decisions are guided by “public choice” no matter what principles they see at their desk, but it’s nice to […]
[…] En otras palabras, este es un plan perfecto para un político que entiende la teoría de la «elección pública». […]
[…] will support the reforms that will be necessary once the current regime is deposed (and given the perverse incentives of politicians, I’m even more worried whether a new government will implement those […]
[…] could be developed for just about every action by every government. Academics call this “public choice” while ordinary people realize it’s just common […]
[…] The recipe for prosperity is the same all over the world. The challenge is getting politicians to do what’s best for citizens rather than what’s best for themselves. […]
[…] could be developed for just about every action by every government. Academics call this “public choice” while ordinary people realize it’s just common […]
[…] other words, this is a perfect plan for a politician who understands “public choice” […]
[…] other words, this is a perfect plan for a politician who understands “public choice” […]
[…] know the right answer to this problem, but real solutions are contrary to the selfish interests of […]
[…] know the right answer to this problem, but real solutions are contrary to the selfish interests of […]
[…] bad people. When people ask me what motivates politicians, I sometime explain the theory of “public choice.” In other cases, I tell the simple story of the guy who is endlessly conflicted between an […]
[…] part, that’s for the typical “public choice” reasons (i.e., special interests getting into bed with politicians to manipulate the […]
[…] the good news. The bad news is that politicians have a “public choice” incentive to instead raise taxes. That game doesn’t end […]
[…] the good news. The bad news is that politicians have a “public choice” incentive to instead raise taxes. That game doesn’t end […]
[…] all intents and purposes, tax competition helps offset the natural tendency (caused by “public choice“) of politicians to create “goldfish government” by over-taxing and […]
[…] Sadly, very few nations follow the instructions because economic liberty is not in the interests of politicians. […]
[…] Sadly, very few nations follow the instructions because economic liberty is not in the interests of politicians. […]
[…] Sadly, very few nations follow the instructions because economic liberty is not in the interests of politicians. […]
[…] Shughart explains that “public choice” and “moral hazard” play a […]
[…] happen in Washington, farm subsidies are especially foolish. They are a classic example of “public choice” in action, with a handful of rich (and well-connected) producers getting big bucks by […]
[…] The bad news is that very few nations follow the recipe since economic liberty means restricting the power of special interests and the political elite. […]
[…] In this scenario, she has no intention of pushing a bad idea, but she thinks it’s a good way of getting votes from […]
[…] this scenario, she has no intention of pushing a bad idea, but she thinks it’s a good way of getting votes from […]
[…] all intents and purposes, he’s explaining that “public choice” will turn a bad idea into a really bad […]
[…] a crazy person would fight against big government when politicians and bureaucrats have a “public choice” incentive to do the wrong […]
[…] politicians don’t care, either because they are motivated by “public choice” or because they lack the cognitive skills to realize that the “seen” jobs that […]
[…] more people thinking it’s okay to live off the government. And let’s not forget “public choice,” the theory that explains why politicians have an incentive to make government […]
[…] cabal running Washington, I tell them that petty corruption, self interest, and “public choice” are much better explanations for the nonsensical policies being imposed on the […]
[…] Corruption – He points out that a government with lots of power and control will be very susceptible to misbehavior as interest groups and politicians figure out ways of scamming the system. Very similar to the […]
[…] Corruption – He points out that a government with lots of power and control will be very susceptible to misbehavior as interest groups and politicians figure out ways of scamming the system. Very similar to the […]
[…] point. Most bureaucrats are no better or no worse than the rest of us. Given the perverse “public choice” incentives inherent in government, however, the good bureaucrats often are lured into bad […]
[…] last segment is the key. Sugar subsidies are a class case of “public choice,” with special interests and politicians both benefiting while ordinary people pay the […]
[…] of the great insights of “public choice” is that politicians engage in self-serving behavior just like everyone […]
[…] of “public choice” are painfully aware that politicians and interest groups are depressingly clever about […]
[…] Mancur Olsen was a very accomplished academic economist who described the unfortunate tendency of vote-seeking governments to behave like “stationary bandits,” seeking to extract the maximum amount of money from […]
[…] Mancur Olsen was a very accomplished academic economist who described the unfortunate tendency of vote-seeking governments to behave like “stationary bandits,” seeking to extract the maximum amount of money […]
[…] in the real world, where I know “public choice” determines political behavior, I have much more limited hopes and […]
[…] it’s 100-percent accurate about the instinctive response of politicians. For “public choice” reasons, the crowd in Washington has an incentive to buy votes with other people’s […]
[…] “Public choice” theory explains how these conventional politicians behave. […]
[…] “Public choice” theory explains how these conventional politicians behave. […]
[…] commitment to principles of limited government, his administration largely surrendered to public choice-driven incentives that resulted in incremental […]
[…] And, once in power, they will do or say anything and everything in hopes of getting reelected. “Public choice” theory explains how these conventional politicians […]
[…] once in power, they will do or say anything and everything in hopes of getting reelected. “Public choice” theory explains how these conventional politicians […]
[…] government while folks on the right advocate lower taxes and smaller government (thanks to “public choice” incentives, many supposedly pro-market politicians don’t follow through on those principles […]
[…] government while folks on the right advocate lower taxes and smaller government (thanks to “public choice” incentives, many supposedly pro-market politicians don’t follow through on those principles […]
[…] government while folks on the right advocate lower taxes and smaller government (thanks to “public choice” incentives, many supposedly pro-market politicians don’t follow through on those […]
[…] Fans of “public choice” doubtlessly will be amused by the IMF’s 2014 flip-flop on […]
[…] the math doesn’t work, people would have less incentive to work, and there would be “public choice” pressures to expand the size of the […]
[…] the math doesn’t work, people would have less incentive to work, and there would be “public choice” pressures to expand the size of the […]
[…] let’s not forget that “Public Choice” teaches us that interest groups will manipulate government to obtain unearned […]
[…] let’s not forget that “Public Choice” teaches us that interest groups will manipulate government to obtain unearned […]
[…] “public choice” school of economics was created to apply economic analysis to political action, and most […]
[…] Read more by Daniel J Mitchell in International Liberty […]
[…] review then shifts to Buchanan’s main intellectual legacy, the “public choice” school of economics (first formally proposed in Calculus of Consent, co-authored with Gordon […]
[…] P.S. I mentioned at the start of this column that it would not be unreasonable to think that the tax code was deliberately designed to maximize economic damage. But even a curmudgeon like me doesn’t think that’s actually the case. Instead, our awful tax system is the result of 104 years of “public choice.” […]
[…] P.S. I mentioned at the start of this column that it would not be unreasonable to think that the tax code was deliberately designed to maximize economic damage. But even a curmudgeon like me doesn’t think that’s actually the case. Instead, our awful tax system is the result of 104 years of “public choice.” […]
[…] spend your days hoping that “Public Choice” can be overcome, which means you’re laboring to fulfill Sisyphean […]
[…] wrote just yesterday that it’s tough to be a libertarian because “public choice” means never-ending pressure for bigger […]
[…] spend your days hoping that “Public Choice” can be overcome, which means you’re laboring to fulfill Sisyphean […]
[…] In other words, it’s “public choice.” […]
[…] guess you could call this a triumph of “public choice” over campaign rhetoric. Politicians did what’s in the best interest of politicians […]
[…] other words, this is a classic “public choice” case study of a couple of interest groups using government coercion to unfairly line their […]
[…] part, this is a classic example of “public choice.” The recipients of the handouts have strong incentives to mobilize and lobby to keep their […]
[…] a liberating force on the global economy. Proponents of the DBCFT are literally ignoring decades of public-choice […]
[…] part, this is a classic example of “public choice.” The recipients of the handouts have strong incentives to mobilize and lobby to keep their […]
[…] a liberating force on the global economy. Proponents of the DBCFT are literally ignoring decades of public-choice […]
[…] the politicians and interest groups won’t care. They are interested in accumulating power and obtaining unearned benefits. To the extent that they would even bother to read the study, they would conclude that they should […]
[…] part, this is a classic example of “public choice.” The recipients of the handouts have strong incentives to mobilize and lobby to keep their […]
[…] it’s always a good idea to “follow the money” when looking at how policy really gets made in […]
[…] it’s always a good idea to “follow the money” when looking at how policy really gets made in […]
[…] wrote last year about a field of economic theory called “public choice” to help explain how and why the […]
[…] competition is a very valuable liberalizing force in the world economy. It partially offsets the public choice pressures on politicians to over-tax and over-spend. If governments no longer had to worry that […]
[…] also should be shared widely. You also should watch their videos on job creation, the price system, public choice, and the Food and Drug […]
[…] also should be shared widely. You also should watch their videos on job creation, the price system, public choice, and the Food and Drug […]
[…] the wrong thing. Not because they are necessarily evil. They’re simply responding to “public choice” […]
[…] ones or useless ones), does that create the risk of giving other parts of the nation a “public-choice” incentive to lobby for big government since they’ll be recipients of federal […]
[…] cap is a threat to their ability to play Santa Claus. They’d much prefer, based on “public choice” incentives, to impose a new form of […]
[…] the fight for libertarian policy, we face several obstacles, including the “public choice” pressure for ever-growing government, as well as the fact that we simply need to learn how […]
[…] you can see, Stossel understands “public choice” and recognizes that making government smaller is the only sure-fire way of reducing public […]
[…] I don’t think this is a hopeless quest. But it will be an uphill battle since populists have a “public choice” incentive to appease interest […]
[…] think this is a hopeless quest. But it will be an uphill battle since populists have a “public choice” incentive to appease interest […]
[…] we know the right solution. Now the challenge is convincing politicians (who are often governed by bad incentives) to tie their own […]
[…] this research, we’ll be in good shape (actually, since those two are poster children for the theory of Public Choice, who am I […]
[…] a problem and solving a problem. It doesn’t really matter if we can identify the “public choice” incentives that lead to bad decisions in government if we can’t then figure out the […]
Zorba:
You make very good points, well beyond the understanding of the common citizen, for whom “free stuff” has such strong appeal.
Public Choice basically argues that while markets may exhibit instances of “market failure”, government also exhibits “government failure”. If government attempts to correct market failures, there is no assurance that government’s involvement will make things better.
However, government interference can be so profitable for a small elite with political influence that government also interferes in markets where there is no market failure. This is certainly true in complicated environments like banking and healthcare.
The case for smaller government is clear. Dan makes the argument that this can only be stopped with spending caps. I would argue that spending caps would be good, but would not stop the spread of regulation. Spending and regulation can only be reduced by eliminating the regulators and bureaucrats first.
I highly recommend that readers view all of Mark Pennington’s videos on Public Policy, they’re excellent.
While concentrate benefits and dispersed costs are a factor in bad policy, I
disagree that it is the main factor.
The main factor is that the benefits of redistribution and spending are immediately visible — but a fixed factor! While the benefits of higher growth are in the future — but compounding and exponential!
Related is the voter’s inability to comprehend the magnitude of a compounding four to five percent structural annual growth rate — compounding to seven hundred percent in fifty years.
The voter is unable to comprehend these magnitudes because everybody– anybody– is unable to predict future growth details. Hence, we are unable to predict the immense life changing technologies and changes inherent in a seven hundred percent compound growth (it is only through technological change that a seven fold increase in prosperity actually happens, since growth and prosperity means far more than the mere accumulation of more capital and money).
Unable to visualize future growth developments and unable to comprehend the arithmetic enormity of high growth compounding, the voter-lemming reaches for the more palpable ten percent fixed improvement to his prosperity through redistribution and communal spending — ferrets out from amongst three hundred million people those politicians who can offer him this dream — and elects them to high office.
Some, few — very few — jurisdictions, almost serendipitously, avoid this standard fate.
My duty to my family is to identify these jurisdictions and steer my children in those geographical directions — like I did when I moved from Europe to America. With America’s Europeanization now written on the wall, it is time for the next generation in my family to make the next move. I suggest to readers of this blog that beyond reading and philosophizing about Liberty they do the same and share their observations, like the very useful comparative analyses that Mr Mitchell provides.
P.S. An effective approach would be to show how public choice and the underlying interests of politics skew public opinion in favor of fixed redistribution and spending over compounding exponential growth. While that might be good for public policy, the most effective personal policy is to move amongst those voters who already understand that.
Dan, you wrote: “an opportunity for politicians and interest groups to do what they like doing regardless of the economy’s performance, which is to have fun with other people’s money.” You are too nice. It should have been, “which is to enrich themselves and their friends with other people’s money.” Of course, I guess that could be a subset of “having fun,” but I think it is more to the point.