But I was only looking at the growth of inflation-adjusted spending during the fiscal years when various presidents were in office.
What about long-run estimates of how various presidents have changed America’s (depressing) fiscal trajectory.
Glenn Kessler of the Washington Post did something like this, though he focused on red ink rather than the spending burden.
That being said, he found somewhat similar results. Only he reports that LBJ was the worst with Nixon being the second worst.
Policy choices made long ago are more responsible for the fiscal state of the nation. Assigning a particular president responsibility for a debt increase is rarely productive, because so much depends on factors beyond a president’s control — an economic crisis such as the Great Recession or the pandemic, for example. …Which president has contributed the most to the nation’s long-term fiscal imbalance? That would be Lyndon B. Johnson… Through an exhaustive study of Congressional Budget Office and Office of Management and Budget reports, …LBJ’s share of the fiscal imbalance is 29.7 percent. Close behind is Richard M. Nixon, with 29.2 percent. Johnson enacted Medicare and Medicaid in the mid-1960s, and then Nixon in the early 1970s expanded both programs and also enhanced Social Security so that benefits were indexed to inflation. …almost two-thirds of the nation’s long-term fiscal imbalance is a result of policy choices made more than 50 years ago.
By the way, Kessler did not do his own calculations.
Instead, he relied on some research by Charles Blahous. Here’s the relevant table from that study, which was published in late 2021.
I’m not surprised that Reagan was the best president.
P.S. Biden was not included since he has just entered office when the research was conducted. If there is a similar study 10 years from now, I’m guessing he will be like Obama with bad but not horrible results. Yes, Biden has an awful fiscal agenda, but his failed stimulus and the watered-down (and absurdly misnamed) Inflation Reduction Act may wind up being the only significant damage he imposes.
Regarding the debt ceiling, the hysterical headlines about default and an economic apocalypse are silly because the Treasury Department surely will “prioritize” if Republicans and Democrats don’t reach an agreement.
I wasn’t intending to write about this topic, but it’s getting a lot of attention now that the deadline is approaching.
If you want to understand the real issue, there is an excellent column in the Wall Street Journal by former Senator Phil Gramm and his long-time aide, Mike Solon.
They explain that the fight is between House Republicans, who want domestic discretionary spending to grow at a slower rate and Democrats in the Senate and White House who want it to grow at a faster rate.
Here’s some of what they wrote.
Of the $5 trillion of stimulus payments between 2020 and 2022, some $362 billion has yet to be spent. The House debt-limit bill proposes to claw back $30 billion—or some 8% of the unspent balance. Only in Mr. Biden’s White House and Mr. Schumer’s Senate Democratic Caucus could such a modest proposal be considered extreme. …The most recent CBO estimate projects that fiscal 2024 discretionary spending will clock in at $1.864 trillion—a 10% real increase from the pre-pandemic estimate. …This growth in nondefense discretionary spending is the post-pandemic bow wave that Mr. McCarthy’s debt-limit plan seeks to mitigate. Even if the House GOP’s proposed reductions in discretionary-spending growth took effect, total discretionary spending would still be 2.4% more in inflation-adjusted dollars than the CBO’s 2020 projection for fiscal 2024. …A clean debt-ceiling hike would give us more government spending, and the House GOP’s proposal would allow more private spending. Only in Washington is that a hard choice.
But a slower increase is better than a faster increase. And I reckon any support for fiscal restraint by Republicans is welcome after the reckless profligacy of the Trump years.
As I point out in the video, balanced budget requirements and anti-deficit rules have not produced good results in American states or EU nations.
The takeaway is that good policymakers should push for spending caps for theoretical reasons and practical reasons.
P.S. I was very pleasantly surprised when the German government recently endorsed EU-wide spending caps.
P.P.S. Remarkably, there are pro-spending-cap studies from left-leaning bureaucracies such as the International Monetary Fund (here and here) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (here and here). There are also similar studies from the European Central Bank (here and here).
After all, improper spending saps economic vitality, regardless of whether it is financed with taxes, borrowing, or money printing.
But I’m writing about debt today because something very interesting has happened in the past few years.
From early 2020 to late 2022, profligate politicians increased the national debt by about $3 trillion, yet government debt actually declined when measured as a share of economic output.
Here’s a chart from the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank, which shows that over the past couple of years that debt has dropped from nearly 135 percent of GDP down to about 120 percent of GDP.
So what happened? How can debt explode, yet the debt burden simultaneously fall?
There’s one good answer and one very bad answer.
The good answer is that the economy fell into a terrible recession when the Coronavirus pandemic first began. And since GDP was falling while deficit spending was skyrocketing, that explains why debt spiked upwards in early 2020.
But as that downturn has faded, overall economic output (GDP) has recovered. And because GDP increased during that period faster than debt increased, it means less debt as a share of GDP.
In the short run, as explained by Veronique de Rugy of the Mercatus Center, this has made the debt burden appear smaller.
Government debt as a share of the U.S. economy is falling. This must mean President Joe Biden’s administration and Congress are practicing fiscal responsibility, right? No, it doesn’t. The main driver behind the reduction is inflation… The missing debt is nothing to celebrate when it’s due to inflation, something especially harmful for poorer Americans who see their living standards erode. …the inflation, which came as a surprise to so many, …led to the decrease in the debt-to-GDP ratio. According to an International Monetary Fund (IMF) fiscal monitor study, in countries with debt-to-GDP over 50 percent, for every 1 percentage point of unexpected inflation, the debt ratio will be reduced by 0.6 percentage points. This perfectly explains most of the debt-ratio decline. …The Biden administration has inadvertently reduced the debt-to-GDP ratio. But it has done it in the worst possible way, refusing to heed warnings of an inflation debacle and instill some fiscal common sense. This has made the work of the Fed harder, if not impossible, and life more difficult for rich and poor Americans alike.
There’s some wonkiness in the above excerpt, but all you really need to know is that high rates of inflation can reduce the value of financial assets. Especially assets (like government bonds) that pay low rates of interest.
Because the burden of government spending, which already was excessive, increased even further.
And with taxes already very onerous in those countries, much of that new spending was financed with borrowing.
Investors then realized it was very risky to finance the various spending sprees. And when they stopped buying bonds from these governments (or started demanding higher interest rates to compensate for risk), that triggered the crises.
One would think that the nations most affected – Portugal, Italy, Greece, and Spain (the PIGS) – would have learned a lesson.
As you can see from this IMF data, those governments did not use the post-crisis recovery as an opportunity to get debt under control. Instead, every nation has more debt today than it did when the crisis occurred.
And why do these nations have higher debt levels?
For the simple (and predictable) reason that they have not reduced the burden of government spending.
To make a bad situation even worse, the European Central Bank cranked up the figurative printing press starting in 2020 by massively expanding its balance sheet.
Dumping all that money into the system quite predictably caused prices to soar. And now that the ECB is belatedly trying to undo its mistake.
That puts the PIGS under more pressure, as Desmond Lachman explained for National Review.
Christine Lagarde, the president of the European Central Bank (ECB)…has to raise interest rates at a time when governments in the euro zone’s economic periphery are more indebted today than they were at the time of the 2010 euro zone sovereign-debt crisis. This more hawkish interest-rate policy, coupled with a shift to quantitative tightening, now risks triggering another round of the euro zone debt crisis. …One of the ECB’s problems in having to raise interest rates aggressively to contain inflation is that such a course risks exacerbating the cracks that are now emerging in the European banking system. …if current trends continue, then another round of euro zone sovereign-debt crisis, where investors lose faith in the government’s ability to repay its debt, could be just around the corner. …This is especially true for Italy, where until recently the ECB had been buying Italian government bonds equivalent to that government’s net borrowing needs.
By the way, Lachman seems to think the Fed should allow continued inflation in order to help bail out Italy and the other PIGS.
That would be a big mistake. The long-run damage of that approach would be much greater than the long-run damage (actually, long-run benefits) of letting Italy and the others go bankrupt.
There is a lot of data in the Report. But the most important set of numbers can be found in Table VI.G9.
As you can see from this chart, these numbers show the amount of revenue coming into the program each year, adjusted for inflation, as well as the amount of yearly spending. Both are rising rapidly.
Since the orange line (spending) is climbing faster than the blue line (revenue), the obvious takeaway is that Social Security has a deficit.
But that would be an understatement.
As you can see from the second chart, the cumulative deficit over the next 77 years is more than $60 trillion.
You’ll notice, of course, that I added a bit of editorializing to both charts.
The simple message is that budget deficits are not necessarily inflationary. It depends how budget deficits are financed.
If a government finances its budget deficits by selling bonds to private savers and investors, there is no reason to expect inflation.**
But if a government finances its budget deficits by having its central bank create money, there is every reason to expect inflation.
So why would politicians ever choose the second option? For the simple reason that private savers and investors are reluctant to buy bonds from some governments.
Consider the example of Japan. It has been running large deficits for decades, resulting in an enormous accumulation of debt. But Japan has very little inflation by world standards. Why? Because governments bonds are financed by private savers and investors, who are very confident that the Japanese government will not default..
Consider the example of Argentina. It has been running large deficits for decades. But even though its overall debt level if much lower than Japan’s, Argentina suffers from high inflation. Why? Because the nation’s central bank winds up buying the bonds because private savers and investors are reluctant to lend money to the government.
If you want some visual evidence, I went to the International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlookdatabase.
Here’s the data for 1998-2022 showing the average budget deficit and average inflation rate in both Japan and Argentina.
The bottom line is that prices are very stable in Japan because the central bank has not been financing Japan’s red ink by creating money.
In Argentina, by contrast, the central bank is routinely used by politicians as a back-door way of financing the government’s budget.
*To make sure that my libertarian credentials don’t get revoked, I should probably point out that all governments are untrustworthy. But some are worse than others, and rule-of-law rankings are probably a good proxy for which ones are partially untrustworthy versus entirely untrustworthy.
**Borrowing from the private sector is economically harmful because budget deficits “crowd out” private investment. Though keep in mind that all the ways of financing government (taxes, borrowing, and money creation) are bad for prosperity.
And you can see from this chart that the fiscal burden of the federal government is projected to grow at a very rapid pace over the next decade.
Other fiscal experts fret that deficits and debt are increasing between now and 2033, but the above chart shows that the real problem is that the spending burden is rising faster than the tax burden.
The real fiscal fight in Washington is how to close the gap between the red spending line and the green revenue line (supporters of Modern Monetary Theory say we can just print money to finance big government, but let’s ignore them for purposes of today’s column).
Since I think Washington is spending far too much, I want to close the gap by restraining the growth of government.
So here’s a second chart illustrating what would happen if there was some sort of spending cap. As you can see, a spending freeze (like we had from 2009-2014) would balance the budget by 2030.
And spending would have to be limited to 1.3 percent annual growth if the goal is to balance the budget within 10 years,
And, even if they did want to do the right thing, adhering to a 1.3 percent spending cap would require serious entitlement reform. So don’t hold your breath hoping for immediate progress.
P.S. The numbers are out of date, but here’s a video that explains how spending restraint is the key to fiscal balance. And here’s a video on how some other nations made enormous progress with multi-year spending restraint.
So let’s start today’s column with the simple observation that America’s current fiscal trajectory is unsustainable.
The burden of federal spending is projected to jump over the next several decades up to 30 percent of GDP while taxes “only” increase to about 19 percent of GDP.
It is inconceivable that all that new spending will be – or can be – financed by borrowing. Simply stated, domestic and international investors will decide that bonds from Uncle Sam are too risky.
He’s not overtly admitting that agenda, but that’s the unavoidable outcome based on what Joshua Green of Bloomberg recently reported about his opposition to entitlement reform.
Trump is hoping to reverse his fortunes and revive his moribund presidential campaign with a…short video message. …he looks straight to camera and declares, “Under no circumstances should Republicans vote to cut a single penny from Medicare or Social Security.” …In fact, he has been remarkably consistent and outspoken over the years in his attacks on Republican efforts to cut Social Security and Medicare. …he was viewed as the least conservative Republican nominee in decades. He favored lots of infrastructure spending…and he made a big deal about protecting Social Security and Medicare.
The story also explains that Trump was the big-government candidate among Republicans in 2016 (as I noted at the time) and suggests he will hold to that position as the 2024 race develops.
Trump’s position set him apart from the other 16 Republican presidential candidates, who generally shared Ryan’s belief, prevalent among House Republicans, that cutting Social Security and Medicare was a fiscal imperative. That’s where DeSantis comes in. …DeSantis was also one of the founding members of the House Freedom Caucus, which drove the effort to cut entitlements when he was in Congress. DeSantis voted repeatedly — in 2013, 2014, and 2015 — for budgets that slashed spending on Social Security and Medicare
By the way, the article is flat-out wrong on a few points.
It is grossly inaccurate to assert that the Ryan budgets “slashed spending.” Overall spending increased in the budgets that Ryan, DeSantis, and other Tea Party Republicans supported back in 2013, 2014, and 2015.
All that happened is that spending would not have been allowed to grow as fast as previously planned.
When leftists (or misguided rightists) tell me that Americans are under-taxed and that the government has lots of red ink because of insufficient revenue, I sometimes will direct them to the Office of Management and Budget’s Historical Tables in hopes of changing their minds.
I’ll specifically ask them to look at the data in Table 1-3 so they can see what’s happened to federal tax revenue over time. As you can see from this chart, nominal tax revenues have skyrocketed.
The reason that I send them to Table 1-3 is that they can also peruse the numbers after adjusting for inflation.
On that basis, we see the same story. Inflation-adjusted federal tax revenues have grown enormously.
The two charts we just examined are very depressing.
So now let’s peruse at a chart that is just mildly depressing.
If you look at federal tax revenues as a share of economic output, you’ll see that Uncle Sam currently is collecting slightly more than 18 percent of economic output. Since the long-run average is about 17 percent of GDP, that’s not a horrific increase.
However, there are still some reasons to be quite concerned.
That means that politicians in DC not only are getting more money because of inflation, but also because the economy is expanding.
Third, not only are politicians getting more money because the economy expanding, they’re slowly but surely expanding their share.
That’s very bad news for those of us who don’t like higher taxes and bigger government.
Some people, however, have a different perspective
In one of his columns for the New York Times, Binyamin Appelbaum argues that Americans are undertaxed.
…the United States really does have a debt problem. …Americans need more federal spending. The United States invests far less than other wealthy nations in providing its citizens with the basic resources necessary to lead productive lives. …Measured as a share of G.D.P., public spending in the other Group of 7 nations is, on average, more than 50 percent higher than in the United States. …There is another, better way to fund public spending: collecting more money in taxes. …If the debt ceiling serves any purpose, it is the occasional opportunity for Congress to step back and consider the sum of all its fiscal policies. The nation is borrowing too much but not because it is spending too much. The real crisis is the need to collect more money in taxes.
I give Appelbaum credit for honesty. He openly advocates for higher taxes and bigger government, explicitly writing that “Americans need more federal spending.”
And he is envious that spending in other major nations is “more than 50 percent higher than in the United States.”
But this raises the very obvious point about whether we should copy other nations with their bigger welfare states and higher tax burdens. After all, European nations suffer from weaker economic performance and lower living standards.
Does Appelbaum think we’ll have “productive lives” if our living standards drop by 50 percent?
The bottom line is that I’m completely confident that Appelbaum would be stumped by the never-answered question.
P.S. Dishonest leftists claim tax increases will lead to less red ink while honest leftists like Appelbaum admit the real goal is a bigger burden of government.
Near the end of my testimony (about 4:55) I discuss “prioritization,” which is what would happen if the debt limit is not raised and the Treasury Department has to decide which payments are made (and which payments are delayed).
I then pointed out that federal tax revenues in 2017 were expected to be 11 times greater than annual interest payments.
As such, there obviously would have been plenty of cash available to make interest payments, as well as to finance other economically or politically sensitive items (I assume, for instance, that Treasury would have prioritized monthly Social Security benefits as well).
Would this have been messy? Yes. Would it have been uncharted territory not covered by the law? Yes. But would it have been better than default, which would have caused turmoil in financial markets? Another yes.
Which now brings us to the present day. We’re now in another debt limit fight, so I decided to look at the most-recent data from the Congressional Budget Office to see whether the federal government will still have plenty of cash so that interest payments on the debt can be prioritized.
Lo and behold, annual tax revenue this fiscal year is going to be more than 11 times greater than annual interest payments. Just like in 2017.
In other words, we presumably can sleep easy. There’s plenty of money to pay interest on the debt.
There would only be a default if Joe Biden or Janet Yellen (the Treasury Secretary) deliberately chose not to prioritize. And the odds of that happening presumably are way below 1 percent.
Some people may wonder why we should accept even that small risk? Why not simply increase the debt limit so that the odds of a default are 0 percent?
That’s a fair point, but it must be balanced by the recognition that the United States is on a path to long-run economic and fiscal chaos. So I can also understand why some lawmaker say the debt limit should only be raised if accompanied by some much-need spending restraint.
And, for those who care about real-world evidence, that’s what has happened in the past. Indeed, Brian Riedl notes that it’s the only plausible vehicle for altering the nation’s fiscal trajectory.
I’ll close by expressing pessimism that House Republicans will achieve anything in the current fight over the debt limit.
We won’t get something really good, like a spending cap. But I start with very low expectations, so I guess I’m happy that Republicans are at least pretending to care once again about excessive government spending.
A journey of a thousand miles begins with a first step!
P.S. I partially disagree with Brian Riedl’s list. The 1990 Bush tax increase was not a “deficit-reduction law.” And it was post-1994 spending restraint that produced a balanced budget, not Clinton’s 1993 tax increase.
And if you understand those three things, then you realize that the real problem is spending.
At the risk of over-simplifying, taxes, borrowing, and printing money should be viewed as different ways of doing a bad thing.
Since I mentioned over-simplifying, I’ll close with a couple of observations that are somewhat contradictory.
First, I don’t worry very much about whether there is a surplus or a deficit in any particular year, but it is a good idea to have long-run fiscal balance (compared to the alternatives of financing the budget with borrowing or printing money).
Second, while taxes are the most appropriate way to finance spending, tax increases are a reckless and irresponsible option because we have so much evidence that politicians will respond with additional spending and additional debt.
To be sure, it is not a good idea to have too much debt-financed spending. But it’s also not a good idea to have too much tax-financed spending. Or too much spending financed by printing money.
Other people, however, do fixate on budget deficits. And I get drawn into those debates.
For instance, I wrote back in July that Biden was spouting nonsense when he claimed credit for a lower 2022 deficit. But some people may have been skeptical since I cited numbers from Brian Riedl and he works at the right-of-Center Manhattan Institute.
So let’s revisit this issue by citing some data from the middle-of-the-road Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget (CRFB). They crunched the numbers and estimated the impact, between 2021 and 2031, of policies that Biden has implemented since becoming president.
The net result: $4.8 trillion of additional debt.
By the way, this is in addition to all the debt that will be incurred because of policies that already existed when Biden took office.
If you want to keep score, the Congressional Budget Office projects additional debt of more than $15 trillion over the 2021-2031 period, so Biden is approximately responsible for about 30 percent of the additional red ink.
Some readers may be wondering how Biden’s 10-year numbers are so bad when the deficit actually declined in 2022.
But we need to look at the impact of policies that already existed at the end of 2021 compared to policies that Biden implemented in 2022.
As I explained back in May, the 2022 deficit was dropping simply because of all the temporary pandemic spending. To be more specific, Trump and Biden used the coronavirus as an excuse to add several trillion dollars of spending in 2020 and 2021.
That one-time orgy of spending largely ended in 2021, so that makes the 2022 numbers seem good by comparison.
Sort of like an alcoholic looking responsible for “only” doing 7 shots of vodka on Monday after doing 15 shots of vodka every day over the weekend.
If that’s not your favorite type of analogy, here’s another chart from the CRFB showing the real reason for the lower 2022 deficit.
I’ll close by reminding everyone that the real problem is not the additional $4.8 trillion of debt Biden has created.
P.S. If you want to watch videos that address the growth-maximizing size of government, click here, here, here, here, and here.
P.P.S. Surprisingly, the case for smaller government is bolstered by research from generally left-leaning international bureaucracies such as the OECD, World Bank, ECB, and IMF.
Moreover, there’s plenty of evidence that we can quickly get rid of deficits with some long-overdue spending restraint. In other words, deal with the underlying disease of excessive government and the symptom of red ink goes away.
But since many people focus first and foremost on fiscal balance, let’s take a look at why budget surpluses at the turn of the century have turned into big budget deficits.
I’m motivated to address this issue because of this chart from Brian Riedl’s impressive collection. It shows spending increases are responsible for 97.5 percent of the shift.
Some of you may be wondering if the chart is accurate. I can easily imagine my friends on the left exclaiming, “What about the Bush tax cuts and the Trump tax cuts?!?”
Those tax cuts did happen, but they were mostly offset by Obama’s “fiscal cliff” tax increase and real bracket creep (the tax burden tends to increase over time since even small increases in economic growth will push households into higher tax brackets).
So the net result of all these factors is that there has been a very small reduction (0.2 percentage points) in tax revenue as a share of economic output.
Others of you may be wondering if the spending numbers may be exaggerated because of pandemic-related spending.
That is a fair question since the crowd in Washington used the opportunity to spend a couple of trillion dollars. But the silver lining to that dark cloud is that it was almost entirely one-time spending that took place in 2020 and 2021 (for what it’s worth, budget experts have mocked Biden’s claim of deficit reduction this year since it is simply a result of expiring emergency outlays).
There is some one-time spending in 2022. As noted in the chart, Biden’s reckless student loan bailout is a big chuck of the increase in “other mandatory spending.”
As such, I suppose I should say that higher spending is “only” responsible for 96.8 percent of today’s higher deficits, not 97.5 percent.
P.S. According to the long-run forecast from the Congressional Budget Office, a bad situation will get even worse over the next 30 years. And more than 100 percent of that future decline will be the result of excessive spending (something that’s been true for many years).
But I want to end the week on an optimistic note, so let’s take a look at Switzerland‘s spending cap.
Known as the “debt brake,” the rule was approved by 84.7 percent of voters back in 2001 and took effect with the 2003 fiscal year.
And if you want to know whether it has been successful, here’s a comparison of average spending increases before the debt brake and after the debt brake.
The above data comes directly from the database of the IMF’s World Economic Outlook.
There are some caveats, to be sure.
The IMF data cited above is not adjusted for inflation, though inflation has not been a problem in Switzerland.
The IMF numbers also show total government spending rather than just the outlays of the central government, but most cantons also have spending caps.
The bottom line is that Swiss fiscal policy dramatically improved after the spending cap took effect.
The debt brake is a simple mechanism for managing federal expenditure. …Expenditure is limited to the level of structural, i.e. cyclically adjusted, receipts. This allows for a steady expenditure trend and prevents a stop-and-go policy. …The debt brake has passed several tests since its introduction in 2003… The binding guidelines of the debt brake helped to swiftly balance the federal budget when it was introduced. The debt brake prevented the high tax receipts from the pre-2009 economically strong years from being used for additional expenditure. Instead, it was possible to build up surpluses and reduce debt. …s public finances are well positioned when compared internationally. Aside from the Confederation, most of the cantons have a debt brake too.
Here’s a chart from the report. It shows that debt is on a downward trajectory, especially when measured as a share of economic output (the right axis).
For what it’s worth, I’m glad the debt brake reduced debt, but I care more about controlling government spending. That being said, the Swiss spending cap also is a success on that basis.
The burden of spending as a share of GDP was increasing before the debt brake was approved. And since 2003, it’s been on a downward trajectory.
Here’s what Avenir Suisse, a Swiss think tank, wrote back in 2017.
Since the early 2000’s, Switzerland’s fiscal institutions have been successful in keeping the overall levels of taxation and spending at moderate levels. The country’s high fiscal strength is based on…Switzerland’s debt brake, a key institutional mechanism for managing public finances which subjects the Confederation’s fiscal policy to a binding rule…and contributes significantly to the country’s fiscal discipline. …Switzerland’s spending cap has helped the country avoid the fiscal crisis affecting so many other European nations. …The Swiss debt brake is the ideal model for other countries lacking fiscal discipline to embrace. …The Swiss debt brake’s most important contribution, however, cannot be measured in figures… In the early 1990s fiscal policy was oriented more towards the demands of the public sector… Today, however, the administration, the government and the parliaments believe it is self-evident that expenditures must develop in the medium term in line with revenue. Fiscal federalism, as an important element in the cantons, protects against overcrowding access to the tax side.
That last sentence deserves some elaboration. The authors are noting (“overcrowding access to the tax side”) that it is possible to increase spending by increasing taxes, but that’s not an easy option in Switzerland because voters can use direct democracy to reject tax hikes (as they have in the past).
P.S. The Debt Brake has an opt-out clause that allows more spending in an emergency. And, during the pandemic, spending did jump by more than 12 percent in just one year. But there’s also a claw-back provision that requires lawmakers to be extra frugal in subsequent years. And that policy seems to be successful. The big spending surge in 2020 was followed by two years of zero spending growth (with another year of no spending growth projected for 2023).
P.P.S. Look at this map if you want to see how much better Switzerland is than the rest of Europe.
P.P.P.S. Look at these charts if you want to see how Switzerland is doing better than the United States.
Today, here are my thoughts on why there should not be a bailout if/when a crisis occurs.
I have moral objections to bailouts, but let’s focus in this column on the practical impact.
And let’s start with this chart, which shows debt levels in Portugal, Italy, Greece, and Spain (the so-called PIGS) ever since the misguided bailout of Greece about a dozen years ago.
As you can see, OECD data reveals that there’s been no change in these poorly governed nations. They have continued to over-spend and accumulate ever-higher levels of debt.
Defenders of bailouts assert that Greece was forced to engage in “austerity” as a condition of getting a bailout.
I have two problems with that argument.
First, notice how Greece’s debt has continued to go up. If that’s a success, I would hate to see an example of failure.
Second, the main effect of the so-called austerity is a much higher tax burden and a somewhat higher spending burden.
If there’s a bailout of Italy (or any other nation), I suspect we’ll see the same thing happen. Higher taxes, higher spending, and higher debt.
I’ll close by acknowledging that there are costs to my approach. If Italy is not given a bailout, the country may have a “disorderly default,” meaning the government simply stops honoring its commitments to pay bondholders.
That is bad for individual bondholders, but it also could hurt – or even bankrupt – financial institutions that foolishly decided to buy a lot of Italian government bonds.
But there should be consequences for imprudent choices. Especially if the alternative is bailouts that misallocate global capital and encourage further bad behavior.
The bottom line is that the long-run damage of bailouts is much greater than the long-run damage of defaults.
I’m in Europe to give a couple of speeches about fiscal policy, so I’m going to spend all week commenting on the continent’s (mostly miserable) fiscal policy.
Let’s start with comments about Italy, the nation most likely to suffer a crisis.
But I’ve also noted that governments sometimes spend so much money and incur so much debt that investors decide it is very risky to buy or hold debt from those governments. In other words, they begin to fear default.
When investors (sometimes known as “bond vigilantes”) reach that stage, they probably try to get rid of their holdings and definitely refuse to buy more debt. The net result is that profligate governments have to offer much higher interest rates to compensate for the risk of a possible default.
And if peruse this data from the OECD, you find that Italian government debt has jumped to levels that may be unsustainable.
So why has Italy avoided a crisis?
As noted in this article by Desmond Lachman, published by Inside Sources, the nation is being propped up by the European Central Bank.
In Europe, when the European Central Bank (ECB) soon dials back its bond-buying program, we are likely to find out that it is the Italian economy that has been swimming naked. This should be of deep concern for the Eurozone and world economies. While the Italian economy might be too large for its Eurozone partners to allow it to fail, it also might prove to be too large for them to bail it out. …The main factor that has allowed the Italian government to finance its ballooning budget deficit on favorable terms has been the ECB’s massive government bond-buying…the ECB used its emergency bond-buying program to more than fully finance the Italian government’s borrowing needs. …it must be only a matter of time before we have another round of the Italian sovereign debt crisis. …no longer being able to count on ECB bond-buying, the Italian government will have to increasingly finance itself in the market. It will have to do so with its public finances in a worse state than they were in during the 2012 debt crisis.
In the article, Lachman thinks a crisis is all but inevitable because the ECB is unwinding its pandemic-era money creation.
I agree about the ECB’s harmful role, but I fear the central bankers in Frankfurt will continue to do the wrong thing.
Yesterday’s column analyzed some depressing data in the new long-run fiscal forecast from the Congressional Budget Office.
Simply stated, if we leave fiscal policy on auto-pilot, government spending is going to consume an ever-larger share of America’s economy. Which means some combination of more taxes, more debt, and more reckless monetary policy.
Today, let’s show how that problem can be solved.
My final chart yesterday showed that the fundamental problem is that government spending is projected to grow faster than the private economy, thus violating the “golden rule” of fiscal policy.
Here’s a revised version of that chart. I have added a bar showing how fast tax revenues are expected to grow over the next 30 years, as well as a bar showing the projection for population plus inflation.
As already stated, it’s a big problem that government spending is growing faster (an average of 4.63 percent per year) than the growth of the private economy (an average of 3.75 percent per years.
But the goal of fiscal policy should not be to maintain the bloated budget that currently exists. That would lock in all the reckless spending we got under Bush, Obama, and Trump. Not to mention the additional waste approved under Biden.
Ideally, fiscal policy should seek to reduce the burden of federal spending.
If government spending can only grow as fast as inflation plus population, we avoid giant future deficits. Indeed, we eventually get budget surpluses.
But I’m not overly concerned with fiscal balance. The proper goal should be to reduce the burden of spending, regardless of how it is financed.
And a spending cap linked to population plus inflation over the next 30 years would yield impressive results. Instead of the federal government consuming more than 30 percent of the economy’s output, only 17.8 percent of GDP would be diverted by federal spending in 2052.
P.S. A spending cap also could be modeled on Switzerland’s very successful “debt brake.”
P.P.S. Some of my left-leaning friends doubtlessly will think a federal budget that consumes “only” 17.8 percent of GDP is grossly inadequate. Yet that was the size of the federal government, relative to economic output, at the end of Bill Clinton’s presidency.
We’ll start with projections over the next three decades for taxes and spending, measured as a share of economic output (gross domestic product). As you can see, the tax burden is increasing, but the spending burden is increasing even faster.
By the way, some people think America’s main fiscal problem is the gap between the two lines. In other words, they worry about deficits and debt.
But the real problem is government spending. And that’s true whether the spending burden is financed by taxes, borrowing, or printing money.
So why is the burden of government spending projected to get larger?
As you can see from Figure 2-2, entitlement programs deserve the lion’s share of the blame. Social Security spending is expanding as a share of GDP, and health entitlements (Medicare, Medicaid, and Obamacare) are expanding even faster.
Now let’s confirm that the problem is not on the revenue side.
As you can see from Figure 2-7, taxation is expected to consume an ever-larger share of economic output in future decades. And that’s true even if the Trump tax cuts are made permanent.
Having shared three charts from CBO’s report, it’s now time for a chart that I created using CBO’s long-run data.
My chart shows that America’s main fiscal problem is that we are not abiding by fiscal policy’s Golden Rule. To be more specific, the burden of government is projected to grow faster than the economy.
To see the magnitude of the problem, let’s peruse the Budget and Economic Outlook, which was released yesterday by the Congressional Budget Office has some.
Most people are focusing on how deficits are going to climb from $1 trillion to $2 trillion-plus over the next 10 years.
That’s not good news, but we should be far more worried about the fact that the burden of government spending is growing faster than the private economy. As a result, government will be consuming an ever-larger share of national output.
The budget wonks who (mistakenly) focus on red ink say the problem is so serious that we need higher taxes.
They look at this chart, which is based on CBO’s baseline forecast (what will happen if taxes and spending are left on autopilot), and assert we have no choice but to raise taxes.
They point out that the annual deficit in 2032 will be almost $2.3 trillion and that it’s impossible cut spending by that much.
Needless to say, it would be a near-impossible political undertaking to cut $2.3 trillion in one year (though it would fulfill libertarian fantasies).
But what if, instead of kicking the can down the road, policymakers imposed some sort of overall spending cap to avoid a giant deficit in 10 year.
This second chart displays that scenario. I took CBO’s baseline (autopilot) numbers and assumed that spending could only increase by 1.4 percent annually starting in 2024.
As you can see, that modest bit of fiscal discipline completely eliminates the project $2.3 trillion annual deficit in 2032.
I’ll close by noting that there’s no need to fixate on whether the budget is balanced by 2032. What matters is trend lines.
It’s not good for government to grow faster than the private economy in the long run. And it’s not good for deficits and debt to climb as a share of economic output in the long run.
Both of those outcomes can be avoided if we have some sort of spending cap so that outlays grow slower than the private sector.
I prefer actual cuts (a requirement to reduce nominal spending each year).
I would be happy with a hard freeze (like we had for a few years after the Tea Party revolt).
As noted above, a 1.4 percent spending cap balances the budget by 2032.
But we would make progress, albeit slow progress, even if the spending cap allowed the budget to grow by 2.0 percent of 2.5 percent per year.
P.S. I start the spending cap in 2024 because spending is not projected to grow by very much between 2022 and 2023. That’s not because today’s politicians are being responsible, however. It’s simply a result of one-time pandemic emergency spending coming to an end. But since that one-time spending has a big impact on short-run numbers, I delayed the spending cap for one year.
P.P.S. The blue revenue line has a kink in 2025 because the baseline forecast assumes that many of the Trump tax cuts expire that year. If those tax cuts are extended or made permanent, revenues would be about $400 billion lower in 2032. As such, balancing the budget by that year would require a spending cap that allows annual outlays to increase by less than 0.9 percent per year.
The Federal Reserve is not the only central bank to make this mistake.
Here’s the balance sheet for the Eurosystem (the European Central Bank and the various national central banks that are in charge of the euro currency). As you can see, there’s also been a dramatic increase in liquidity on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean.
Why should American readers care about what’s happening with the euro?
But this is more than a lesson about monetary policy. What’s happened with the euro may have created the conditions for another European fiscal crisis (for background on Europe’s previous fiscal crisis, click here, here, and here).
In an article for Project Syndicate, Willem Buiter warns that the European Central Bank sacrificed sensible monetary policy by buying up the debt of profligate governments.
…major central banks have engaged in aggressive low-interest-rate and asset-purchase policies to support their governments’ expansionary fiscal policies, even though they knew such policies were likely to run counter to their price-stability mandates and were not necessary to preserve financial stability. The “fiscal capture” interpretation is particularly convincing for the ECB, which must deal with several sovereigns that are facing debt-sustainability issues. Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain are all fiscally fragile. And France, Belgium, and Cyprus could also face sovereign-funding problems when the next cyclical downturn hits.
Mr. Buiter shares some sobering data.
All told, the Eurosystem’s holdings of public-sector securities under the PEPP at the end of March 2022 amounted to more than €1.6 trillion ($1.7 trillion), or 13.4% of 2021 eurozone GDP, and cumulative net purchases of Greek sovereign debt under the PEPP were €38.5 billion (21.1% of Greece’s 2021 GDP). For Portugal, Italy, and Spain, the corresponding GDP shares of net PEPP purchases were 16.4%, 16%, and 15.7%, respectively. The Eurosystem’s Public Sector Purchase Program (PSPP) also made net purchases of investment-grade sovereign debt. From November 2019 until the end of March 2022, these totaled €503.6 billion, or 4.1% of eurozone GDP. In total, the Eurosystem bought more than 120% of net eurozone sovereign debt issuances in 2020 and 2021.
Other experts also fear Europe’s central bank has created more risk.
Two weeks ago, Desmond Lachman of the American Enterprise Institute expressed concern that Italy had become dependent on the ECB.
…the European Central Bank (ECB) is signaling that soon it will be turning off its monetary policy spigot to fight the inflation beast. Over the past two years, that spigot has flooded the European economy with around $4 trillion in liquidity through an unprecedented pace of government bond buying. The end to ECB money printing could come as a particular shock to the Italian economy, which has grown accustomed to having the ECB scoop up all of its government’s debt issuance as part of its Pandemic Emergency Purchase Program. …the country’s economy has stalled, its budget deficit has ballooned, and its public debt has skyrocketed to 150 percent of GDP. …Italy has had the dubious distinction of being a country whose per capita income has actually declined over the past 20 years. …All of this is of considerable importance to the world economic outlook. In 2010, the Greek sovereign debt crisis shook world financial markets. Now that the global economy is already slowing, the last thing that it needs is a sovereign debt crisis in Italy, a country whose economy is some 10 times the size of Greece’s.
Over the past two years, the ECB’s bond-buying programs have kept countries in the eurozone’s periphery, including most notably Italy, afloat. In particular, under its €1.85 trillion ($2 trillion) pandemic emergency purchase program, the ECB has bought most of these countries’ government-debt issuance. That has saved them from having to face the test of the markets.
The ECB engaged in a large-scale bond-buying program over the past two years…, as did the U.S. Federal Reserve. The size of the ECB’s balance sheet increased by a staggering four trillion euros (equivalent to $4.4 billion), including €1.85 trillion under its Pandemic Emergency Purchasing Program. …The ECB’s massive bond buying activity has been successful in keeping countries in the eurozone’s periphery afloat despite the marked deterioration in their public finances in the wake of the pandemic.
Unlike bailouts and easy money, which exacerbate the underlying problems.
P.S. For what it is worth, I do not think a common currency is necessarily a bad idea. That being said, I wonder if the euro can survive Europe’s awful politicians.
P.P.S. While I think Mr. Buiter’s article in Project Syndicate was very reasonable, I’ve had good reason to criticize some of his past analysis.
I’ve identified seven reasons to oppose tax increases, but explain in this interview that the biggest reason is that it would be a mistake to give politicians more money to finance an ever-larger burden of government spending.
I had two goals when responding this question (part of a longer interview).
First, I wanted to help viewers understand that America’s fiscal problem is too much government spending and that red ink is simply a symptom of that problem.
Over the years, I’ve concocted all sorts of visuals to make this point. Like this one.
We also have decades of evidence from Europe. There’s been a huge increase in the tax burden in Western Europe since the 1960s (largely enabled by the enactment of value-added taxes).
Did that massive increase in revenue lead to less red ink?
Nope, just the opposite, as I showed in both 2012 and 2016.
P.S. Some people warn that endlessly increasing debt is a recipe for an eventual crisis. They’re probably right. Which is why it is important to oppose tax-increase deals that wind up saddling us with more red ink. Besides, the long-run damage of tax-financed spending is very similar to the long-run damage of debt-financed spending.
P.P.S. As I mention in the interview, the only real solution is spending restraint. And a spending cap is the best way of enforcing that approach.
This is a topic I’ve written about many times, noting that even left-leaning international bureaucracies like the IMF and OECD have reached the same conclusion.
For today’s discussion, I want to focus on a wonky but important observation. I mentioned in the presentation that the European Union’s “Maastricht Criteria” – which focus on controlling red ink – have not worked.
Those interested can click here for further background on these rules, but the key thing to understand is that eurozone nations agreed back in 1992 to limit deficits to 3 percent of economic output and to limit debt to 60 percent of GDP.
Has this approach worked?
Here’s the data, from a 2019 European Parliament report, on government debt for eurozone nations. Incidentally, the euro currency officially began in 2002, though nations were supposed to comply with the Maastricht Criteria starting back in 1993.
As you can see, debt has increased in most European nations. In may cases, debt is more than twice as high as the supposed maximum specified in the Maastricht Criteria.
And these are the “good” numbers. I deliberately chose data from a few years ago to make clear that the failure to comply with the Maastricht Criteria has nothing to do with the coronavirus pandemic.
What went wrong? Why did anti-red ink rules produce more red ink?
A big part of the answer is that politicians use anti-deficit and anti-debt rules as an excuse to raise taxes (which is what happened during Europe’s prior debt crisis).
We’ll start with this video from Kite and Key Media, which correctly observes that entitlement programs are the main cause of red ink.
I like that the video pointed out how tax-the-rich schemes wouldn’t work, though it would have been nice if they added some information on how genuine entitlement reform could solve the problem (as you can see here and here, I’ve also nit-picked other debt-themed videos).
But my main message, which I’ve shared over and over again, is that deficits and debt are merely a symptom. The underlying disease is excessive government spending.
Now let’s look at some recent articles on the topic.
We’ll start with Eric Boehm’s column for Reason, which explains how red ink has exploded in recent years.
America’s national debt exceeded $10 trillion for the first time ever in October 2008. By mid-September 2017 the national debt had doubled to $20 trillion. …data released by the U.S. Treasury confirmed that the national debt reached a new milestone: $30 trillion. …Entitlements like Social Security and Medicare are in dire fiscal straits and will become even more costly as the average American gets older. Even without another unexpected crisis, deficits will exceed $1 trillion annually, which means the debt will continue growing, both in real terms and as a percentage of the economy. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the federal government will add another $12.2 trillion to the debt by 2031.
As already stated, I think the real problem is the spending and the debt is the symptom.
But it is possible, of course, that debt rises so high that investors (the people who buy government bonds) begin to lose faith that they will get repaid.
At that point, governments have to pay higher interest rates to compensate for perceived risk of default, which exacerbates the fiscal burden.
And if there’s not a credible plan to fix the problem, a country can go into a downward spiral. In other words, a debt crisis.
This is what happened to Greece. And I think it’s just a matter of time before it happens to Italy.
Could the United States also be hit by a debt crisis? Will we reach a “tipping point” that leads to the aforementioned loss of faith?
That’s one of the possibilities mentioned in the New York Timescolumn by Peter Coy.
It’s hard to know how much to worry about the federal debt of the United States. …Either the United States can continue to run big deficits and skate along with no harm done or it’s at risk of losing investors’ confidence and having to pay higher interest rates on its debt, which would suppress economic growth. …the huge increase in federal debt incurred during and after the past two recessions — those of 2007-09 and 2020 — has used up a lot of the “fiscal space” the United States once had. In other words, the federal government is closer to the tipping point where big increases in debt finally start to become a real problem. …any given amount of debt becomes easier to sustain as long as the growth rate of the economy (and thus the growth rate of tax revenue) is higher than the interest rate on the debt. In that scenario, interest payments gradually shrink relative to tax revenue. …but it doesn’t explain how much more the debt can grow. …Past a certain point, there’s a double whammy of more dollars of debt plus higher interest costs on each dollar. …sovereign debt crises tend to be self-fulfilling prophecies: Investors get nervous about a government’s ability to pay, so they demand higher interest rates, which raise borrowing costs and produce the bad outcome they feared. It’s a dynamic that Argentines are familiar with — and that Americans had better hope they never experience.
For what it’s worth, I think other major nations will suffer fiscal crisis before the problem becomes acute in the United States.
I realize this will make me sound uncharacteristically optimistic, but I’m keeping my fingers crossed that this will finally lead politicians to adopt a spending cap so we don’t become Argentina.
P.S. The Wall Street Journal recently editorialized on the issue of government debt and made a very important point about the difference between the $30 trillion “gross debt” and the “debt held by the public,” which is about $6 trillion lower.
…the debt really isn’t $30 trillion. About $6 trillion of that is debt the government owes to itself in Social Security and other IOUs. …The debt held by the public is some $24 trillion, which is bad enough.
As I’ve noted when writing about Social Security, the IOUs in government trust funds are not real.
Indeed, if you want to know whether some is both honest and knowledgeable about budget matters, ask them which measure of the national debt really matters.
As you can see from this exchange of tweets, competent and careful budget people (regardless of whether they favor big government or small government) focus on “debt held by the public,” which is the term for the money government actually borrows from credit markets.
If you want to know the difference between the various types of government debt – including “unfunded liabilities” – watch this video.
There are many reasons to support a spending cap, including the obvious observation that an expenditure limit (as it is sometimes called) directly addresses the actual problem of excessive government.
And addressing the underlying disease works better than rules that focus on symptoms, such as balanced budget requirements or anti-deficit mandates.
You’ll notice toward the end of the video that the narrator cites pro-spending cap research from international bureaucracies, which is remarkable since those institutions normally have a bias for bigger government.
I’ve also written about that research, citing studies by the International Monetary Fund (here and here), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (here and here) and the European Central Bank (here).
Today, let’s look at more evidence from these bureaucracies.
We’ll start with a new study from the European Central Bank. Here’s some of what the authors (Nicholai Benalal, Maximilian Freier,Wim Melyn, Stefan Van Parys, and Lukas Reiss) found when comparing spending limits and anti-deficit rules.
…this paper provides an in-depth assessment of two alternative measures of fiscal consolidation and expansion:the change in the structural balance (dSB) and the expenditure benchmark (EB).Both the dSB and the EB are currently used to assess compliance with the fiscalrules under the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). …The EB wasintroduced as an indicator in 2011, and has gained in importance relative to the dSBsince the European Commission began to put more emphasis on it in 2016. …A comparison of the fiscal performance of euro area countries revealssignificant differences depending on whether the assessment is based on the dSB orthe EB. …this paper finds that the EB has advantages over the dSB as a fiscalperformance indicator. …expenditure rules…provide more predictability in fiscal requirements. …Even more importantly, the EB can be shown to be less procyclical as a fiscal rule than the dSB.
Let’s also review some 2019 research from the International Monetary Fund.
This study (authored by Kodjovi Eklou and Marcelin Joanis) looks at whether fiscal rules can constrain vote-buying politicians.
In order to increase their chances of reelection, politicians are known to undertake fiscal manipulations, especially in election years. These fiscal manipulations typically take the form of increased public expenditure… Many countries, both developed and developing, have adopted fiscal rules in recent decades as an attempt to enforce fiscal discipline. …In this paper, we employ a cross-country panel dataset in order to test whether fiscal rules adopted in developing countries have been effective in constraining political budget cycles. The dataset covers 67 developing countries over the period 1985-2007. …Our dependent variable is the general government’s final consumption expenditure as a share of GDP.
Here’s what the authors concluded about the effectiveness of spending caps.
Our empirical evidence in a sample of 67 developing countries over the period 1985-2007, shows that fiscal rules cause fiscal discipline over the electoral cycle. More specifically, in election years with fiscal rules in place, public consumption is reduced by 1.65% point of GDP as compared to election years without these rules. Furthermore, the effectiveness of these rules depends on their type… In particular, expenditure rules, rules covering the general government and rules characterized by a monitoring body outside the government dampen political budget cycles in government consumption.
Indeed, footnote 12 of the paper specifically notes the superiority of expenditure limits.
…the results show that public consumption is reduced by 2.44% points during election years with expenditure rules in place. The findings on expenditure rules are consistent with Cordes et al. (2015) who show that the compliance rate for these rules are high.
Last but not least, the fiscal experts at the Office of Management and Budget included in Trump’s final budget some very encouraging language at the end of Chapter 10 of the Analytical Perspectives.
…additional efforts to control spending are needed. Several budget process reforms should be considered, including setting spending caps… Outlay caps that are consistent with the historical average as a share of gross domestic product (GDP), post-World War II levels could be enforced with sequestration across programs similar to other budget enforcement regimes. An outlay cap on mandatory spending would complement discretionary caps, which have been in place since 2013. The Budget proposes to continue discretionary caps through 2025 at declining levels and declining levels through 2030.
Trump was a big spender, of course, but at least there were people in his administration who realized there was a problem.
P.S. It’s also interesting that the authors of the IMF study found that fiscal rules work better in democracies.
…estimates focusing on the subsample of democratic elections. The effect of fiscal rules on the political budget cycle is larger… More specifically, public consumption is reduced by 2.46% point of GDP (while it is 1.65% point in the baseline).
This may not bode well for the durability of Hong Kong’s spending cap.
The authors also found that foreign aid makes it less likely that a government will follow sensible policy.
Foreign aid, which relaxes the budget constraint of the government, is negatively correlated with the probability of having fiscal rules.
Politicians like to spend money and they don’t particularly care whether that spending is financed by taxes or financed by borrowing (both bad options).
As Milton Friedman sagely observed, that means they will spend every penny they collect in taxes plus as much additional spending financed by borrowing that the political system will allow.
The IMF published a study on this issue about 10 years ago. The authors (Michael Kumhof, Douglas Laxton, and Daniel Leigh) assert that there’s no way of knowing whether Starve the Beast will lead to good or bad results.
…there is no consensus regarding the macroeconomic and welfare consequences of implementing a starve-the-beast approach, henceforth referred to as STB. …it could be beneficial in the ideal case in which it results in cuts in entirely wasteful government spending. In particular, lower spending frees up resources for private consumption, and the associatedlower tax rates reduce distortions in the economy. On the other hand, …lower government spending may itself entail welfare losses…if it augments theproductivity of private factors of production. …the paper examines whether the principal macroeconomic variables such as GDP and consumption, both in the United States and in the rest of the world, respond positively to this policy. …In addition, the paper assesses how the welfare effects depend on the degree to which government spending directly contributes to household welfare or to productivity.
The authors don’t really push any particular conclusion. Instead, they show various economic outcomes depending on with assumptions one adopts.
Since plenty of research shows that government spending is not a net plus for the economy (even IMF economists agree on that point), and because I think a less-punitive tax system is possible (and desirable) if there’s a smaller burden of government spending, I think the findings shown in Figure 4 make the most sense.
Now let’s shift from academic analysis to policy analysis.
In a piece for National Review back in July 2020, Jim Geraghty notes that Starve the Beast has an impact on government finances at the state level.
…we’re probably not going to see a massive expansion of government at the state level in the coming year or two. …Thanks to the pandemic lockdown bringing vast swaths of the economy to a halt, state tax revenues are plummeting. …So states will have much less tax revenue, constitutional balanced-budget requirements that are not easily repealed, and a limited amount of budgetary tricks to work around it. State governments could attempt to raise taxes, but that’s going to be unpopular and hurt state economies when they’re already struggling. Add it all up and it’s a tough set of circumstances for a dramatic expansion of government, no matter how ardently progressive the governor and state legislatures are.
Now let’s look at the most unintentional endorsement of Stave the Beast.
A couple of years ago, Paul Krugman sort of admitted that cutting taxes was a potentially effective strategy for spending restraint.
…the same Republicans now wringing their hands over budget deficits…blew up that same deficit by enacting a huge tax cut for corporations and the wealthy. …this has been the G.O.P.’s budget strategy for decades. First, cut taxes. Then, bemoan the deficit created by those tax cuts and demand cuts in social spending. Lather, rinse, repeat. This strategy, known as “starve the beast,” has been around since the 1970s, when Republican economists like Alan Greenspan and Milton Friedman began declaring that the role of tax cuts in worsening budget deficits was a feature, not a bug. As Greenspan openly put it in 1978, the goal was to rein in spending with tax cuts that reduce revenue, then “trust that there is a political limit to deficit spending.” …voters should realize that the threat to programs… Social Security and Medicare as we know them will be very much in danger.
In other words, Krugman doesn’t like Starve the Beast because he fears it is effective (just like he also acknowledges the Laffer Curve, even though he’s opposed to tax cuts).
Let’s close by looking at some very powerful real-world evidence. Over the past 50 years, there’s been a massive increase in the tax burden in Western Europe.
Did all that additional tax revenue lead to lower deficits and less debt?
Nope, the opposite happened. European politicians spent every penny of the new tax revenue (much of it from value-added taxes). And then they added even more spending financed by additional borrowing.
To be fair, one could argue that this was an argument for the view of “Don’t Feed the Beast” rather than “Starve the Beast,” but it nonetheless shows that more money in the hands of politicians simply means more spending. And more red ink.
P.S. I had a discussion last year with Gene Tunny about the issue of “state capacity libertarianism.”
This battle will be decided in next 12 months, hopefully with a defeat for Biden’s dependency agenda.
Regardless of how that fight is resolved, though, we’re eventually going to get to a point where sensible people are back in charge. And when that happens, we’ll have to figure out how to restore the nation’s finances.
That requires figuring out the appropriate goal. Here are two options:
Keeping taxes low.
Controlling debt.
These are both worthy objectives.
But, as a logic teacher might say, they are necessary but not sufficient conditions.
Here’s a chart showing how a policy of low taxes (the orange line) presumably enables faster growth, but also creates the risk of an eventual economic crisis if nothing is done to control spending and debt climbs too high (think Greece).
By contrast, the chart also shows that it’s theoretically possible to avoid an economic crisis with higher taxes (the blue line), but it means less growth on a year-to-year basis.
The economic benefits of this approach are illustrated in this second chart. We enjoy faster year-to-year growth. And, because spending restraint is the best way of controlling debt, the risk of a Greek-style economic crisis is averted.
Now for some caveats.
I made a handful of assumptions in the above charts.
The economy grows 2.0 percent annually for the next 31 years with tax-financed spending
The economy grows 2.5 percent annually with debt-financed spending, but suffers a 10 percent decline in Year 31.
The economy grows 3.0 percent annually for the next 31 years with smaller government (thus enabling low taxes and less debt).
Anyone can create their own spreadsheet and make different assumptions.
So feel free to make your own assumptions about the strength of these effects, but let’s never lose sight of the fact that spending restraint should bethe main goal for post-Biden fiscal policy.
Instead, I pointed out about five years ago that they have allowed the spending burden to rise, as measured by outlays as a share of economic output.
Well, things have since gone even further in the wrong direction, exacerbated by long-run factors such as demographic decline and short-run factors such as the coronavirus pandemic.
So what’s the net result?
Writing for the Hill, Desmond Lachman of the American Enterprise Institute is concerned about the possibility of a new round of fiscal chaos in Europe.
In 2010, the Eurozone experienced a sovereign debt crisis that shook the world economy. Today…, it appears that the Eurozone could be well on the way to another such debt crisis. It is not only that the public finances of several key countries in the Eurozone periphery are considerably worse than they were on the eve of the 2010 sovereign debt crisis. It is also that inflation has risen to a level that will make it difficult for the European Central Bank (ECB) to continue to keep the Eurozone periphery governments afloat by a continuation of bond purchases on the massive scale that it has been doing to date. …Over the past 18 months, in response to the pandemic and with a view to stimulating the European economy, the ECB increased the size of its balance sheet by more than $4 trillion. …The fly in the ointment for countries such as Italy and Spain is that they cannot expect that the ECB will continue to buy their bonds on a large scale forever. …Another reason to fear an early end to the ECB’s massive bond-buying program is the strong resistance to such bond buying by the Eurozone’s northern member countries in general and by Germany in particular. These countries view the ECB’s bond-buying activities as a move to a fiscal union through the backdoor.
Excellent points, particularly with regard to the malignant role of the European Central Bank, which has created the conditions for a much bigger crisis by enabling bigger government and more debt.
If you want to understand how much worse the debt problem is today, here’s a chart based on OECD data for European nations (with the U.S. and Japan added for purposes of comparison.
By the way, that’s not necessarily a disparaging description. A Ponzi Scheme can work if there are always enough new people in the system to pay off the old people.
How serious? The Social Security Administration finally released the annual Trustees Report. This document has a wealth of data on the program’s financial condition, and Table VI.G9 is where the rubber meets the road.
As you can see from this chart, there will be an ever-increasing burden of Social Security taxes and spending over the next 75 years. And these numbers are adjusted for inflation!
The good news (relatively speaking) is that the economy also will be growing over the next 75 years, both in nominal terms and inflation-adjusted terms.
The bad news is that spending on Social Security will grow at a faster rate, so the program will consume a larger share of the economy’s output.
And because Social Security spending is growing faster than the economy (and also faster than tax revenue), this next chart shows there is going to be more and more red ink in the future. Once again, you’re looking at inflation-adjusted data.
As indicated by the chart’s title, the cumulative shortfall over the next 75 years is nearly $48 trillion. That’s a lot of money, even by Washington standards.
And with each passing year, the problem seems to worsen. The 75-year shortfall was $44.7 trillion according to the 2020 report and $42.1 trillion according to the 2019 report.
I’ll conclude by observing that today’s column focuses on the big-picture fiscal problems with Social Security.
But let’s not forget the program’s second crisis, which is the fact that Americans are deprived of the ability to enjoy much higher levels of retirement income.
P.P.S. I once made a $16 trillion dollar mistake on national TV when discussing Social Security’s shaky finances.
P.P.P.S. Much of the news coverage about the Trustees Report has focused on the year the Social Security Trust Fund supposedly runs out of money. But this is sloppy journalism since the Trust Fund has nothing but IOUs (as illustrated by this joke).
If I was required to put it all in one sentence (sort of), here’s the most important thing to understand about fiscal policy.
This does not mean, by the way, that we should be anarcho-capitalists and oppose all government spending.
But it does mean that all government spending imposes a burden on the economy and that politicians should only spend money to finance “public goods” that generate offsetting benefits.
I’m motivated to address this topic because Philip Klein wrote a column for National Review about Biden’s new spending. He points out that this new spending is bad, regardless of whether it is debt-financed or tax-financed.
As Democrats race toward squandering another $4.1 trillion — perhaps with some Republican help — we are being told over and over how the biggest stumbling block is figuring out how the new spending will be “paid for.” …Senator Joe Manchin (D., W.Va.), who is trying to maintain his image as a moderate, insisted that he doesn’t believe the spending should be passed if it isn’t fully financed. “Everything should be paid for,” Manchin has told reporters. …Republican members of the bipartisan group have also made similar comments. …But it is folly to consider massive amounts of new spending to be “responsible” as long as members of Congress come up with enough taxes to raise… At some point in the next few weeks, Democrats (and possibly Republicans) will announce that they have reached a deal on some sort of major spending compromise. They will claim that it is fully paid for, and assert that it is fiscally responsible. But there is nothing responsible about adding trillions in new obligations at a time when the nation is already heading for fiscal catastrophe.
Klein is correct.
Biden’s spending binge will be just as damaging to prosperity if it is financed with taxes rather than financed by debt.
The key thing to realize is that we’ll have less growth if more of the economy’s output is consumed by government spending.
Giving politicians and bureaucrats more control over the allocation of resources is a very bad idea (as even the World Bank, OECD, and IMF have admitted).