Feeds:
Posts
Comments

Archive for the ‘World Bank’ Category

When I wrote last month about the Green New Deal, I warned that it was cronyism on steroids.

Simply stated, the proposal gives politicians massive new powers to intervene and this would be a recipe for staggering levels of Solyndra-style corruption.

Well, the World Bank has some new scholarly research that echoes my concerns. Two economists investigated the relationship with the regulatory burden and corruption.

Empirical studies such as Meon and Sekkat (2005) and De Rosa et al. (2010) show that corruption is more damaging for economic performance at higher levels of regulation or lower levels of governance quality. …Building on the above literature, in this paper, we use firm-level survey data on 39,732 firms in 111 countries collected by the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys between 2009 and 2017 to test the hypothesis that corruption impedes firm productivity more at higher levels of regulation. …estimate the model using sample weighted OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) regression analysis.

And what did they discover?

We find that the negative relationship between corruption and productivity is amplified at high levels of regulation. In fact, at low levels of regulation, the relationship between corruption and productivity is insignificant. …we find that a 1 percent increase in bribes that firms pay to get things done, expressed as the share of annual sales, is significantly associated with about a 0.9 percent decrease in productivity of firms at the 75th percentile value of regulation (high regulation). In contrast, at the 25th percentile value of regulation (low regulation), the corresponding change is very small and statistically insignificant, though it is still negative. …after we control for investment, skills and raw materials, the coefficients of the interaction term between corruption and regulation became much larger… This provides support for the hypothesis that corruption is more damaging for productivity at higher levels of regulation.

Lord Acton famously wrote that “power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.”

Based on the results from the World Bank study, we can say “regulation corrupts, and added regulation corrupts additionally.”

Not very poetic, but definitely accurate.

Figure 4 from the study shows this relationship.

Seems like we need separation of business and state, not just separation of church and state.

This gives me a good excuse to recycle this video I narrated more than 10 years ago.

P.S. Five years ago, I cited a World Bank study showing that tax complexity facilitates corruption. Which means a simple and fair flat tax isn’t merely a way of achieving more prosperity, it’s also a way of draining the swamp.

The moral of the story – whether we’re looking at red tape, taxes, spending, trade, or any other issue – is that smaller government is the most effective way of reducing sleaze and corruption.

Read Full Post »

A couple of weeks ago, I used a story about a local tax issue in Washington, DC, to make an important point about how new tax increases cause more damage than previous tax increases because “deadweight losses” increase geometrically rather than arithmetically.

Simply stated, if a tax of X does Y amount of damage, then a tax of 2X will do a lot more damage than 2Y.

This is the core economic reason why even left-leaning international bureaucracies agree that class-warfare taxes are so destructive. When you take a high tax rate and make it even higher, the damage grows exponentially.

As such, I was very interested to see a new study on this topic from the World Bank. It starts by noting that higher tax rates are the wrong way to address fiscal shortfalls.

…studies have used the narrative approach for individual or multi-country analyses (in all cases, focusing solely on industrial economies, and mostly on industrial European countries). These studies find large negative tax multipliers, ranging between 2 and 5. This recent consensus pointing to large negative tax multipliers, especially in industrial European countries, naturally entails important policy prescriptions. For example, as part of a more comprehensive series of papers focusing on spending and tax multipliers, Alesina, Favero, and Giavazzi (2015) point that policies based upon spending cuts are much less costly in terms of short run output losses than tax based adjustments.

The four authors used data on value-added taxes to investigate whether higher tax rates did more damage or less damage in developing nations.

A natural question is whether large negative tax multipliers are a robust empirical regularity… In order to answer this highly relevant academic and policy question, one would ideally need to conduct a study using a more global sample including industrial and, particularly, developing countries. …This paper takes on this challenge by focusing on 51 countries (21 industrial and 30 developing) for the period 1970-2014. …we focus our efforts on building a new series for quarterly standard value-added tax rates (henceforth VAT rates). …We identify a total of 96 VAT rate changes in 35 countries (18 industrial and 17 developing).

The economists found that VAT increases did the most damage in developing nations.

…when splitting the sample into industrial European economies and the rest of countries, we find tax multipliers of 3:6 and 1:2, respectively. While the tax multiplier in industrial European economies is quite negative and statistically significant (in line with recent studies), it is about 3 times smaller (in absolute value) and borderline statistically significant for the rest of countries.

Here’s a chart showing the comparison.

Now here’s the part that merits close attention.

The study confirms that the deadweight loss of VAT hikes is higher in developed nations because the initial tax burden is higher.

Based on different types of macroeconomic models (which in turn rely on different mechanisms), the output effect of tax changes is expected to be small at low initial levels of taxation but exponentially larger when initial tax levels are high. Therefore, the distortions and disincentives imposed by taxation on economic activity are directly, and non-linearly, related to the level of tax rates. By the same token, for a given level of initial tax rates, larger tax rate changes have larger tax multipliers. …In line with theoretical distortionary and disincentive-based arguments, we find, using our novel worldwide narrative, that the effect of tax changes on output is indeed highly non-linear. Our empirical findings show that the tax multiplier is essentially zero under relatively low/moderate initial tax rate levels and more negative as the initial tax rate and the size of the change in the tax rate increase. …This evidence strongly supports distortionary and disincentive-based arguments regarding a nonlinear effect of tax rate changes on economic activity…the economy will inevitably suffer when taxes are increased at higher initial tax rate levels.

What makes these finding especially powerful is that value-added taxes are less destructive than income taxes on a per-dollar-raised basis.

So if taking a high VAT rate and making it even higher causes a disproportionate amount of economic damage, then imagine how destructive it is to increase top income tax rates.

P.S. The fact that a VAT is less destructive than an income tax is definitely not an argument for enacting a VAT. That would be akin to arguing that it would be fun to break your wrist because that wouldn’t hurt as much as the broken leg you already have.

I’ve even dealt with people who actually argue that a VAT isn’t economically destructive because it imposes the same tax on current consumption and future consumption. I agree with them that it is a good idea to avoid double taxation of saving and investment, but that doesn’t change the fact that a VAT increases the wedge between pre-tax income and post-tax consumption.

And that means less incentive to earn income in the first place.

Which is confirmed by the study.

Panels A and B in Figure 18 show the relationship between the VAT rate a and the perceived effect of taxes on incentives to work and invest, respectively, for a sample of 123 countries for the year 2014. Supporting our previous findings, the relationship is highly non-linear. While the perceived effect of taxes on the incentives to work and invest barely changes as VAT rates increase at low/moderate levels (approximately until the VAT rate reaches 14 percent), it falls rapidly for high levels of VAT rates.

Here’s the relevant chart from the report.

The moral of the story is that all tax increases are misguided, but class-warfare taxes wreak the most economic havoc.

P.S. Not everyone understands this common-sense observation. For instance, the bureaucrats at the Congressional Budget Office basically argued back in 2010 that a 100 percent tax rate was the way to maximize growth.

Read Full Post »

There was a book last decade by Thomas Frank, What’s the Matter with Kansas?, that asked why lower-income voters in the state didn’t vote for greater levels of redistribution.

The author claimed these voters were sidetracked by cultural issues, which may very well be part of the story. I like to think that these Kansans also were motivated by ethics and that they realized it would be wrong to use government coercion to take money from other people.

And maybe, unlike the folks at the IMF, they were not motivated by envy and they realized that high taxes and more redistribution would make them worse off over time because of the negative impact on overall prosperity.

Well, it appears that the folks in Kansas aren’t that different from people in India, Morocco, Nigeria, Mexico, and South Africa. At least that’s the takeaway from some new research that Christopher Hoy wrote about for the World Bank. Here’s the issue he investigated.

Social commentators and researchers struggle to explain why, despite growing inequality in many countries around the world,  there is often relatively limited support among poorer people for policies where they are set to benefit (such as increases in cash transfers or in the minimum wage). …Conventional theories of preferences for redistribution, such as the Meltzer-Richard Hypothesis, imply that if poor people were made aware they were relatively poorer than most other people in their country, they would become more supportive of redistribution. Yet there is little empirical evidence that evaluates this prediction. …empirical evidence is needed to understand how poorer people’s misperceptions of their relative position in the national income distribution effects their support for redistribution.

Here’s the methodology he used.

I conducted the first cross country survey experiment on preferences for redistribution in the developing world… The experiment involved over 16,000 respondents in five developing countries that make up almost 25% of the global population (India, Nigeria, Mexico, South Africa and Morocco). …To test whether informing poor people of their relative position in the national income distribution makes them more supportive of redistribution, I randomly allocate half of the respondents in each country to be told which quintile their household belongs to in the national income distribution (based upon their reported household income and the number of household members). …After the treatment they were asked if they thought the gap between the rich and poor was too large and whether the government was responsible for closing this gap.

And here are some of the results.

People tend to think they are in the middle of the income distribution, regardless of whether they are rich or poor. …poor people who perceived themselves to be in the bottom two quintiles of the distribution were between 15 to 28 percentage points more likely to prefer lower levels of inequality than poor people who perceived themselves to be in the top two quintiles. …Surprisingly, telling poor people that they are poorer than they thought makes them less concerned about the gap between the rich and poor in their country…there was no effect from the treatment on these people’s support for the government to close the gap between the rich and poor.

Here’s a chart showing how people became less sympathetic to government-coerced redistribution after learning more about their own economic status.

The author speculates on possible reasons for these results.

A plausible channel that is causing this effect is people using their own living standard as a ‘benchmark’ for what they consider acceptable for others. …people…realise two points. Firstly, there are fewer people in their country with a living standard they considered to be relatively poor than they had thought. Secondly, what they had considered to be an ‘average’ living standard (their own standard of living) is actually relatively poor compared to other people in their country. I show how both of these points would lead people to respond by being less likely to be concerned about the gap between the rich and poor in their country. …there are opposing channels through which poorer people’s preferences for redistribution respond to information about their relative position. On the one hand, poorer people may be more supportive if they are set to benefit from redistribution. However, on the other hand they may be less supportive if they are less concerned about the absolute living standard of people who are relatively poor.

These are all plausible answers.

Though I have the same questions about this research as I did about Frank’s book. Do people in these five developing nations have any level of moral aversion to redistribution and/or do they understand (at least implicitly) that a tax-and-redistribute model is a recipe for national economic decline?

Perhaps a more practical way of looking at the issue is to ask whether lower-income people care most about economic growth or economic inequality.

Many of the professional left, including the ideologues at the IMF, are fixated on the latter and they’re willing to hurt the poor if the rich suffer even greater harm (in other words, Margaret Thatcher was right about their motives).

By contrast, I strongly suspect the average lower-income person is far more interested in more prosperity for their family and far less concerned about the prosperity of the rich family on the other side of town. They presumably are unaware of the powerful Chinese data on poverty reduction and inequality, but they instinctively understand that a rising tide lifts all boats.

Read Full Post »

I don’t like writing about deficits and debt because I don’t want to deflect attention from the more important underlying problem of excessive government spending.

Indeed, I constantly explain that spending is what diverts resources from the productive sector of the economy, regardless of whether outlays are financed by taxes or borrowing. This is why a spending cap is far and away the best rule for fiscal policy.

That being said, red ink does matter when politicians incur so much debt that investors (i.e., the folks in the private sector who buy government debt) decide that a government no longer is trustworthy. And when that happens, interest rates climb because investors insist on getting a higher return to compensate for the risk of default.

And if things really deteriorate, a government may default (i.e., no longer make promised payments) and investors obviously will refuse to lend any more money. That’s basically what happened in Greece.

Sadly, most governments have not learned from Greece’s mistakes. Indeed, government debt in Europe is now significantly higher than it was before the 2008 recession.

This suggests that there will be another fiscal crisis when the next recession occurs. Italy presumably will be the big domino to fall, though there are many other nations in Europe that could get in trouble.

But the problems of excessive spending and excessive debt are not limited to Europe. Or Japan.

The World Bank has a new report that shows that red ink is a growing problem in the rest of the world. More specifically, the report is about “fiscal space,” which some see as a measure of budgetary flexibility but I interpret as an indicator of budgetary vulnerability. Here’s how it is defined in the report.

…fiscal space is simply defined as the availability of budgetary resources to conduct effective fiscal policy. …some studies define it as the budgetary room to create and allocate funding for a certain purpose without threatening a sovereign’s financial position. …Debt service capacity is a critical component of fiscal space. It has multiple dimensions, including financing needs that are related to budget positions and debt rollover, access to liquid markets, resilience to changes in market valuations of debt, and the coverage of contingent liabilities. …Market participants’ perceptions of sovereign risk reflect and, in turn, influence an economy’s ability to tap markets and service its obligations. Thus, fiscal space can function as an essential instrument of macroeconomic risk management.

And what is “effective fiscal policy”?

From the World Bank’s misguided perspective, it’s the ability to engage in Keynesian spending.

Countries with ample fiscal space can use stimulus measures more extensively.

But let’s set aside that anti-empirical assertion.

I found the report useful (though depressing) because it had data showing how debt levels have increased, especially in emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs).

Fiscal space improved during 2000−07, but has shrunk around the world since the global financial crisis. …debt sustainability indicators, including government debt and fiscal sustainability gaps, have deteriorated in at least three-quarters of countries in the world. …and perceptions of market participants on sovereign credit risks have worsened. …Since 2011, fiscal space has shrunk in EMDEs. …fiscal deficits widened to 3 to 5 percent of GDP in 2016, on average… Government debt has risen to 54 percent of GDP, on average, in 2017. …EMDEs need to shore up fiscal positions to prevent sudden spikes in financing costs… Fiscal space has been shrinking in EMDEs since the global financial crisis. It needs to be strengthened.

Here is a set of charts from the report, showing both developed nations (red lines) and developing nations (yellow lines). The top-left chart shows debt climbing for EMDEs and the bottom-right chart shows debt ratings dropping for EMDEs.

The EMDEs have lower debt levels, but their debt is rated as more risky because poorer nations don’t have a very good track record of dealing with recessions and fiscal crises (would you lend money to Argentina?).

In any event, the yellow lines in the top-left chart and bottom-right chart are both headed in the wrong directions.

The bottom line? It won’t just be European welfare states that get in trouble when there’s another recession.

By the way, the report from the World Bank offers some policy advice. Some of it potentially good.

Pension reforms could…support fiscal credibility and generate long-term fiscal gains… credible and well-designed institutional mechanisms can help support fiscal discipline and strengthen fiscal space. …Fiscal rules impose numerical constraints on budgetary aggregates—debt, overall balance, expenditures.

But most of it bad.

Fiscal sustainability could be improved by increasing the efficiency of revenue collection… Measures to strengthen revenue collection could include broadening tax bases to remove loopholes for higher-income households or profitable corporates. In countries with high levels of informality, taxing the informal sector—for example, by promoting a change in payment methods to non-cash transaction and facilitating collective action by informal sector associations—could help raise revenues directly, as well as indirectly… In EMDEs, reforms to broaden revenue bases and strengthen tax administration can generate revenue gains.

At the risk of stating the obvious, the problem in developing nations is bad government policy, not insufficient revenue in the hands of politicians.

P.S. I included the caveat that some of the recommendations were “potentially good” since the report didn’t specify the type of pension reform or the type of fiscal rule. I like to think the authors were referring to personal retirement accounts and spending caps, but it’s not clear.

P.P.S. The IMF subsidizes and encourages bad fiscal policy with bailouts. Fortunately, there is a much more sensible approach.

Read Full Post »

When asked to pick the worst international bureaucracy, I generally respond as follows.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) or Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) should be at the top of the list. Both of those bureaucracies aggressively push statist policies designed to give governments more power over people. I have mixed feelings about which one deserves to be called the worst bureaucracy.

Next on my list are the United Nations (UN) and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). Many people are surprised the UN isn’t higher on the list, but I point out that the organization generally is very ineffective. Meanwhile, the EBRD is relatively unknown, but I have total disdain for its cronyist business model (basically a global version of the Export-Import Bank).

At the bottom of my list is the World Bank (WB). I don’t have knee-jerk hostility to the WB, in part because the bureaucrats historically have their hearts in the right place (reducing poverty) and even occasionally support the right policies (social security reform and regulatory relief).

Nonetheless, I was disappointed earlier this year to learn that the Trump Administration decided to give more money to the World Bank.

The Trump administration is backing a $13 billion increase in funding for the World Bank… The change…will allow the bank to increase lending to poor-country clients… The U.S. is the only country with veto power over any changes in bank structure, so funding increases cannot proceed without Washington’s support. …The shift to U.S. support for more funding at the Bank took some European governments by surprise, said Suma Chakrabarti, president of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, a London-based multilateral bank lending in Europe, the Middle East and North Africa. He said in an interview Thursday that the capital increase is “very good news,” since it would help efforts to reduce global poverty. …Mr. Mnuchin said he would work with Congress to secure approval for the U.S. contribution, a step that has in the past proved challenging.

Hopefully it will prove impossible rather than challenging to get approval for more funding (though I haven’t been following the issue, so maybe Republicans in Congress already have okayed an expansion).

Assuming the decision hasn’t yet been made, I have some evidence showing why the World Bank doesn’t deserve more funding.

And not merely because aid is not the route to prosperity. Consider the misguided advice that the World Bank is pushing on Romania.

The Romanian government should…consider switching the flat income tax to a progressive tax, said World Bank chief economist for Europe and Central Asia, Hans Timmer. …The World Bank representative…referred to the flat tax rate…, stating that they should think about whether this system is still appropriate. The World Bank’s advice would be to rethink the entire labor market taxation system in coordination with other countries in the region, and not just make small changes. ”We can not tell you what the solution is, but you need to analyze everything, including the single tax, and whether you’d be better off implementing a progressive tax system, meaning those who earn more pay more,” Timmer said.

This is horrible advice. The flat tax is very conducive to prosperity and Romania needs fast growth to help offset the damage caused by decades of communist enslavement.

Moreover, there are problems with corruption in Romania and the World Bank has admitted that tax complexity facilitates corruption.

Given Mr. Timmer’s misguided musings, I may need to get a new version of my cartoon about international bureaucracies. Especially since the World Bank once produced a study giving nations higher grades for having more oppressive tax systems.

P.S. In fairness, the WB has produced some good work on government spending, dependency, financial regulation, and free markets.

P.P.S. And I especially like the World Bank’s comparison of Chile and Venezuela.

Read Full Post »

I explained last year that there is an inverse relationship between government efficiency and the size of government.

And Mark Steyn made the same point, using humor, back in 2012.

Interestingly, we have some unexpected allies.

In a recently released study, two economists for the World Bank decided to investigate the effectiveness of government spending.

Governments of developing countries typically spend resources equivalent to between 15 and 30 percent of GDP. Hence, small changes in the efficiency of public spending could have a significant impact on GDP and on the attainment of the government’s objectives. The first challenge faced by stakeholders is measuring efficiency. This paper attempts such quantification and verifies empirical regularities in the cross country-variation in the efficiency scores.

So they calculated how much different governments were spending and the results that were being achieved.

Using two different methodologies, here’s what they found for health spending and life expectancy.

The goal, of course, is to get good results (to be higher on the vertical axis) without having to spend a lot of money (in other words, try to be farther left on the horizontal axis).

And here are the numbers for education quality and education spending.

The economist then crunched all the numbers to determine the relationship between spending and outcomes.

The results may surprise some people.

Government expenditure (GOVEXP) is negatively associated with efficiency scores in education (Tables 14 a and b). This result is robust to changes in the output indicator selected. In the output efficiency case, the impact is ambiguous specially when the PISA Math and Science scores are the output indicators (Table 14 b). In health (Tables 15 a and b), the negative association is present in both input and output efficiency. In infrastructure, the expenditure variables (GOVEXP and PUBGFC10PC) are negative in the six output indicators that are used (Table 16a).23 There is a robust trade-off between size of expenditure and efficiency. …The share of public financing within the total (sum of public and private) is robustly associated with lower efficiency scores.

But here’s another surprise.

These World Bank results are not an outlier.

The European Central Bank has two separate studies (here and here) that conclude smaller government is more effective.

And the International Monetary Fund found that decentralized government is more efficient.

P.S. Don’t forget that this competency argument for small government is augmented by the economic argument for small government.

Read Full Post »

To be blunt, I don’t think the World Bank should exist. We don’t need an international bureaucracy to promote economic development in poor nations. Particularly since the policies that we know will work – free markets and small government – oftentimes are hindered by intervention from multilateral institutions such as the World Bank.

For example, I’ve spent the past few days in Vanuatu, where I’ve been fighting against the adoption of an income tax, and I’ve been repeatedly told that the World Bank is one of the groups (along with the Australian Tax Office) urging the adoption of this anti-growth levy. It is both depressing and upsetting that outsiders are seeking to hinder growth in this poor nation, but what really galls me is that World Bank bureaucrats (like their colleagues at other international bureaucracies) are exempt from paying any income tax.

All this being said, my general philosophical hostility (and, in Vanuatu, targeted genuine anger) toward the World Bank doesn’t preclude me from admitting when the bureaucracy does good work. It has played a positive role in helping some nations set up private retirement systems, and it has produced research warning about the link between corruption and complicated tax systems.

Perhaps most laudable, the World Bank every year publishes Doing Business, an index that dispassionately measures the degree to which government policy imposes costs on those who create and operate companies. Indeed, it was just two months ago that I wrote about the most recent issue (mostly to grouse that America is falling in the rankings, so thanks Obama).

All of which puts me in a strange position, because although I have written that the World Bank is my “least despised international bureaucracy,” I never thought I would dedicate an entire column to defending its work.

But a friend formerly known as the Princess of the Levant sent me an article by José Antonio Ocampo and Edmund Fitzgerald, which attacks Doing Business for…gasp…encouraging tax competition.

Since I’m a knee-jerk defender of tax competition (and bearing in mind that the enemy of your enemy is sometimes your friend), I feel obliged to jump into the debate and defend the World Bank’s report.

Here’s the basic argument of Ocampo and Fitzgerald.

…there is a serious flaw in the report’s formula: the way it treats corporate taxation. …The problem is that “regulatory burden,” according to Doing Business, includes…promoting budget-straining tax competition among countries… This may sound like an argument for overhauling Doing Business’ “paying taxes” indicator. But what is really needed is for Doing Business to drop that indicator altogether…when it comes to the paying taxes indicator, the report has things all wrong. Indeed, it runs counter to the global consensus on the need for effective international cooperation to ensure equitable collection of tax revenues, including measures to limit tax avoidance by multinationals and other private firms. A race to the bottom in corporate taxation will only hurt poor people and poor countries. If Doing Business is to live up to its own slogan, “equal opportunity for all,” it should abandon the tax indicator altogether.

Wow. I find it remarkable that leftists openly argue in favor of suppressing information on tax policy because of their ideological hostility to tax competition.

For all intents and purposes, they’re admitting that taxes do matter.

The article also makes some other assertions that deserve a bit of attention. Most notably, the authors repeat the silly claim by some leftists that the way to get more growth is with a bigger government financed by higher taxes.

…taxes that are necessary to fund public infrastructure and basic social services – both of which are critical to enhance growth and employment. Even the report recognizes that, for most economies, taxes are the main source of the government revenues needed to fund “projects related to health care, education, public transport, and unemployment benefits, among others.”

Yet if it’s true that big government stimulates growth, why did the world’s richest nations become rich when government was very small and taxes were largely nonexistent?

Ocampo and Fitzgerald somehow want people to believe that if a little bit of government spending is associated with good economic results, then this somehow means a lot of government must be associated with better economic results.

Maybe somebody should introduce them to the concepts of diminishing returns and negative returns. And once they master those concepts, they’ll be ready to learn about the Rahn Curve. Heck, there’s even a World Bank study I can recommend for them.

Though the authors do raise one semi-decent point. Some of the taxes paid by companies actually are borne by workers. Ocampo and Fitzgerald don’t seem to understand how this works since they jumble together some taxes that are borne by labor with other that are borne by capital, but there is a kernel of truth in their argument.

Doing Business exaggerates the tax burden on companies. For one thing, it considers all the kinds of taxes firms might pay – not just corporate income tax. Specifically, the report’s estimates for “total tax rate as a proportion of profits” include taxes for employees’ health insurance and pensions; property and property transfers; dividends, capital gains, and financial transactions; and public services like waste collection and infrastructure. Those are taxes that should be categorized as social contributions or service charges.

Having bent over backwards to say something nice about their article, let’s now close by highlighting the most preposterous assertion in their piece.

They basically reject the entire field of microeconomics and the underlying principles of price theory – not to mention reams of academic evidence – by denying that tax rates have any impact on behavior.

…the assumption underpinning it – that low corporate taxation promotes growth – does not withstand scrutiny. Research conducted by the International Monetary Fund and others indicates that tax competition does not promote productive investment worldwide.

Remarkable. They even think citing the IMF somehow strengthens their case, when that’s actually more akin to citing Dr. Kevorkian.

P.S. Just in case anyone is worried that this pro-Doing Business column means I’m getting soft on the World Bank, rest assured that I will never be a fan of a bureaucracy that equates higher taxes with a good report card. But I’ll always be the first to admit when an international bureaucracy does good work.

Read Full Post »

Older Posts »

%d bloggers like this: