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Archive for the ‘Monetary Policy’ Category

Having been exposed to scholars from the Austrian school as a graduate student, I have a knee-jerk suspicion that it’s not a good idea to rely on the Federal Reserve for macroeconomic tinkering.

In this interview from yesterday, I specifically warn that easy money can lead to economically harmful asset bubbles.

 

Since I don’t pretend to be an expert on monetary policy, I’ll do an appeal to authority.

Claudio Borio of the Bank for International Settlements is considered to be one of the world’s experts on the issue.

Here are some excerpts from a study he recently wrote along with three other economists. I especially like what they wrote about the risks of looking solely at the price level as a guide to policy.

The pre-crisis experience has shown that, in contrast to common belief, disruptive financial imbalances could build up even alongside low and stable, or even falling, inflation. Granted, anyone who had looked at the historical record would not have been surprised: just think of the banking crises in Japan, the Asian economies and, going further back in time, the US experience in the run-up to the Great Depression. But somehow the lessons had got lost in translation… And post-crisis, the performance of inflation has repeatedly surprised. Inflation…has been puzzlingly low especially more recently, as a number of economies have been reaching or even exceeding previous estimates of full employment. …the recent experience has hammered the point home, raising nagging doubts about a key pillar of monetary policymaking. …Our conclusion is that…amending mandates to explicitly include financial stability concerns may be appropriate in some circumstances.

Here’s a chart showing that financial cycles and business cycles are not the same thing.

The economists also point out that false booms instigated by easy money can do a lot of damage.

Some recent work with colleagues sheds further light on some of the possible mechanisms at work (Borio et al (2016)). Drawing on a sample of over 40 countries spanning over 40 years, we find that credit booms misallocate resources towards lower-productivity growth sectors, notably construction, and that the impact of the misallocations that occur during the boom is twice as large in the wake of a subsequent banking crisis. The reasons are unclear, but may reflect, at least in part, the fact that overindebtedness and a broken banking system make it harder to reallocate resources away from bloated sectors during the bust. This amounts to a neglected form of hysteresis. The impact can be sizeable, equivalent cumulatively to several percentage points of GDP over a number of years.

Here’s a chart quantifying the damage.

And here’s some more evidence.

In recent work with colleagues, we examined deflations using a newly constructed data set that spans more than 140 years (1870–2013), and covers up to 38 economies and includes equity and house prices as well as debt (Borio et al (2015)). We come up with three findings. First, before controlling for the behaviour of asset prices, we find only a weak association between deflation and growth; the Great Depression is the main exception. Second, we find a stronger link with asset price declines, and controlling for them further weakens the link between deflations and growth. In fact, the link disappears even in the Great Depression (Graph 4). Finally, we find no evidence of a damaging interplay between deflation and debt (Fisher’s “debt deflation”; Fisher (1932)). By contrast, we do find evidence of a damaging interplay between private sector debt and property (house) prices, especially in the postwar period. These results are consistent with the prevalence of supply-induced deflations.

I’ll share one final chart from the study because it certainly suggest that the economy suffered less instability when the classical gold standard was in effect before World War I.

I’m not sure we could trust governments to operate such a system today, but it’s worth contemplating.

P.S. I didn’t like easy money when Obama was in the White House and I don’t like it with Trump in the White House. Indeed, I worry the good economic news we’re seeing now could be partly illusory.

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Being a policy wonk in a political town isn’t easy. I care about economic liberty while many other people simply care about political maneuvering. And the gap between policy advocacy and personality politics has become even larger in the Age of Trump.

One result is that people who should be allies periodically are upset with my columns. Never Trumpers scold me one day and Trump fanboys scold me the next day. Fortunately, I have a very simple set of responses.

  • If you would have loudly cheered for a policy under Reagan but oppose a similar policy under Trump, you’re the problem.
  • If you would have loudly condemned a policy under Obama but support a similar policy under Trump, you’re the problem.

Today, we’re going to look at an example of the latter.

The New York Times reported today on Trump’s advocacy of easy-money Keynesianism.

President Trump on Friday called on the Federal Reserve to cut interest rates and take additional steps to stimulate economic growth… On Friday, he escalated his previous critiques of the Fed by pressing for it to resume the type of stimulus campaign it undertook after the recession to jump-start economic growth. That program, known as quantitative easing, resulted in the Fed buying more than $4 trillion worth of Treasury bonds and mortgage-backed securities as a way to increase the supply of money in the financial system.

I criticized these policies under Obama, over and over and over again.

If I suddenly supported this approach under Trump, that would make me a hypocrite or a partisan.

I’m sure I have my share of flaws, but that’s not one of them.

Regardless of whether a politician is a Republican or a Democrat, I don’t like Keynesian fiscal policy and I don’t like Keynesian monetary policy.

Simply stated, the Keynesians are all about artificially boosting consumption, but sustainable growth is only possible with policies that boost production.

There are two additional passages from the article that deserve some commentary.

First, you don’t measure inflation by simply looking at consumer prices. It’s quite possible that easy money will result in asset bubbles instead.

That’s why Trump is flat-out wrong in this excerpt.

“…I personally think the Fed should drop rates,” Mr. Trump said. “I think they really slowed us down. There’s no inflation. I would say in terms of quantitative tightening, it should actually now be quantitative easing. Very little if any inflation. And I think they should drop rates, and they should get rid of quantitative tightening. You would see a rocket ship. Despite that, we’re doing very well.”

To be sure, many senior Democrats were similarly wrong when Obama was in the White House and they wanted to goose the economy.

Which brings me to the second point about some Democrats magically becoming born-again advocates of hard money now that Trump is on the other side.

Democrats denounced Mr. Trump’s comments, saying they showed his disregard for the traditional independence of the Fed and his desire to use its powers to help him win re-election. “There’s no question that President Trump is seeking to undermine the…independence of the Federal Reserve to boost his own re-election prospects,” said Senator Ron Wyden of Oregon, the top Democrat on the Finance Committee.

Notwithstanding what I wrote a few days ago, I agree with Sen. Wyden on this point.

Though I definitely don’t recall him expressing similar concerns when Obama was appointing easy-money supporters to the Federal Reserve.

To close, here’s what I said back in October about Trump’s Keynesian approach to monetary policy.

I also commented on this issue earlier this year. And I definitely recommend these insights from a British central banker.

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Back in January, I spoke with Cheddar about market instability and put much of the blame on the Federal Reserve. Simply stated, I fear we have a bubble thanks to years and years (and years and years) of easy money and artificially low interest rates.

To be sure, I also noted that there are other policies that could be spooking financial markets.

But I do think monetary policy is the big threat. Mistakes by the Fed sooner or later cause recessions (and the false booms that are the leading indicator of future downturns).

Mistakes by Congress, by contrast, “merely” cause slower growth.

In this next clip from the interview, I offer guarded praise to the Fed (not my usual position!) for trying to unwind the easy-money policies from earlier this decade and therefore “normalize” interest rates (i.e., letting rates climb to the market-determined level).

For those interested in the downside risks of easy money, I strongly endorse these cautionary observations from a British central banker.

My modest contribution to the discussion was when I mentioned in the interview that we wouldn’t be in the tough position of having to let interest rates climb if we didn’t make the mistake of keeping them artificially low. Especially for such a long period of time.

My motive for addressing this topic today is that Robert Samuelson used his column in the Washington Post to launch an attack against Steve Moore.

Stephen Moore does not belong on the Federal Reserve Board… Just a decade ago, the U.S. and world economies suffered the worst slumps since World War II. What saved us then were the skilled interventions of the Fed under Chairman Ben S. Bernanke… Do we really want Moore to serve as the last bulkhead against an economic breakdown? …as a matter of prudence, we should assume economic reverses. If so, the Fed chief will become a crisis manager. That person should not be Stephen Moore.

I’ve been friends with Steve for a couple of decades, so I have a personal bias.

That being said, I would be arguing that Samuelson’s column is problematic for two reasons even if I never met Steve.

  • First, he doesn’t acknowledge that the crisis last decade was caused in large part by easy-money policy from the Fed. Call me crazy, but I hardly think we should praise the central bank for dousing a fire that it helped to start.
  • Second, he frets that Steve would be bad in a crisis, which presumably is a time when it might be appropriate for the Fed to be a “lender of last resort.”* But he offers zero evidence that Steve would be opposed to that approach.

For what it’s worth, I actually worry Steve would be too willing to go along with an easy-money approach. Indeed, I look forward to hectoring him in favor of hard money if he gets confirmed.

But this column isn’t about a nomination battle in DC. My role is to educate on public policy.

So let’s close by reviewing some excerpts from a column in the Wall Street Journal highlighting the work of Claudio Borio at the Bank for International Settlements.

In a 2015 paper Mr. Borio and colleagues examined 140 years of data from 38 countries and concluded that consumer-price deflation frequently coincides with healthy economic growth. If he’s right, central banks have spent years fighting disinflation or deflation when they shouldn’t have, and in the process they’ve endangered the economy more than they realize. “By keeping interest rates very, very, very low,” he warns, “you are contributing to the buildup of risks in the financial system through excessive credit growth, through excessive increases in asset prices, that at some point have to correct themselves. So what you have is a financial boom that necessarily at some point will turn into a bust because things have to adjust.” …It’s not that other economists are blind to financial instability. They’re just strangely unconcerned about it. “There are a number of proponents of secular stagnation who acknowledge, very explicitly, that low interest rates create problems for the future because they’re generating all these financial booms and busts,” Mr. Borio says. Yet they still believe central banks must set ultralow short-term rates to support economic growth—and if that destabilizes the financial system, it’s the will of the economic gods.

Amen. I also recommend this column and this column for further information on how central bankers are endangering prosperity.

P.S. For a skeptical history of the Federal Reserve, click here. If you prefer Fed-mocking videos, click here and here.

P.P.S. I fear the European Central Bank has the same misguided policy. To make matters worse, policy makers in Europe have used easy money as an excuse to avoid the reforms that are needed to generate real growth.

P.P.P.S. Samuelson did recognize that defeating inflation was one of Reagan’s great accomplishments.

*For institutions with liquidity problems. Institutions with solvency problems should be shut down using the FDIC-resolution approach.

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When Trump imposes protectionist trade barriers, he doesn’t realize that the harm imposed on other nations is matched by damage to the U.S. economy.

As I warn in this interview, something similar could happen if the federal government convinces other nations to reject the dollar because they no longer want to acquiesce to the extraterritorial imposition of U.S. laws.

This is a wonky issue, but the bottom line is that the United States benefits enormously because the rest of the world uses the dollar.

The best article I can recommend was published earlier this year by the Cayman Financial Review. It’s a good tutorial on the issue and it explains why the United States enjoys an “exorbitant privilege” because the dollar is the world’s reserve currency.

A reserve currency is a currency that governments hold in their foreign exchange reserves to settle international claims and intervene in foreign exchange markets. …Governments overwhelmingly choose one currency – the U.S. dollar… U.S. dollar-denominated assets comprised 63.79 percent of disclosed foreign exchange reserves… The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) reported that 88 percent of all foreign exchange transactions in 2016 involve the U.S. dollar on one side. …In 2014, 51.9 percent of international trade by value and 49.4 percent of international trade by volume of transactions were invoiced in U.S. dollars. …Major internationally traded commodities such as oil are priced in U.S. dollars. …The status of the U.S. dollar as the world’s reserve currency and the resulting foreign demand for U.S. dollars creates what French Finance Minister Valéry Giscard d’Estaing described in 1965 as an “exorbitant privilege” for the United States. …While difficult to measure, empirical studies suggest the privilege is worth about ½ percent of U.S. GDP (or roughly $100 billion) in a normal year.

And Peter Coy’s column for Bloomberg does a good job of explaining why the rest of the world is tempted to abandon the dollar.

America’s currency makes up two-thirds of international debt and a like share of global reserve holdings. Oil and gold are priced in dollars, not euros or yen. …threats to be cut off from the dollar-based global payments system strike terror into the likes of Iran, North Korea, and Russia. …Political leaders who once accepted the dollar’s hegemony, grudgingly or otherwise, are pushing back. …In March, China challenged the dollar’s dominance in the global energy markets with a yuan-denominated crude oil futures contract. …French Finance Minister Bruno Le Maire told reporters in August that he wants financing instruments that are “totally independent” of the U.S. …This disturbance in the force isn’t good news for the U.S. …As it is now, when trouble breaks out, investors flood into U.S. markets seeking refuge, oddly enough even when the U.S. itself is the source of the problem, as it was in last decade’s global financial crisis. …The most immediate risk to the dollar is that the U.S. will overplay its hand on financial sanctions, particularly those against Iran and countries that do business with Iran. …European leaders, in response to what they perceive as an infringement on their sovereignty, are openly working on a payments system that would enable their companies to do business with Iran without getting snagged by the U.S. Treasury Department and its powerful Office of Foreign Assets Control. …dissatisfaction with the dollar’s dominance…is only mounting. …Lew said in 2016, “the more we condition use of the dollar and our financial system on adherence to U.S. foreign policy, the more the risk of migration to other currencies and other financial systems in the medium term grows.”

Here’s some of what I said on the issue of sanctions in a different interview.

But notice that it’s not just sanctions.

The rest of the world is irritated by FATCA and other aspects of extraterritorial taxation.

Other nations also are irked by the pointless imposition of “know your customer” rules and other anti-money laundering policies that impose heavy costs without having any impact on actual criminal behavior.

Anyhow, let’s review some additional analysis, starting with this editorial from the Wall Street Journal.

More than any recent U.S. President, Mr. Trump is willing to use economic leverage for coercive diplomacy. He’s now targeting Turkey… Turkey is vulnerable because of Mr. Erdogan’s economic mismanagement. In the runup to June elections, he blew out the fisc on entitlements and public works. …As tempting as sanctions often are, they should be used sparingly and against the right targets. They make sense against genuine rogue states like Iran and North Korea, as well as to show Vladimir Putin that there are costs… But sanctions against allies should be used only in rare cases. They would also be less risky if they weren’t piled on top of Mr. Trump’s tariff war. …If Mr. Trump is determined to use coercive economic diplomacy, including tariffs and sanctions, then the Treasury will have to be ready to deal with the collateral financial damage.

Writing for Real Money, Mike Norman is very worried.

The United States is increasingly using sanctions as a form of warfare. …It’s a form of soft warfare that targets a country’s economy and its ability to transact business and safeguard its financial wealth in today’s dollar-based economy. Do you know what the result of these sanctions will be? The dollar will get crushed. Something like 80% of all international transactions take place in dollars. The global financial system rests on a dollar architecture. That includes funds transfer, clearing, payments, etc. …How long do you think the rest of the world will operate under such a risk? A risk that at any moment if you fall out of favor with the fools in Washington your entire economy and lifeline to the world’s financial system can be shut down? That is too much risk. No country and no citizen wants that risk hanging over them.

Professor Barry Eichengreen expresses similar concerns in a column for Project Syndicate.

…the Trump administration is eroding the dollar’s global role. Having unilaterally reimposed sanctions on Iran, it is threatening to penalize companies doing business with the Islamic Republic by denying them access to US banks. The threat is serious because US banks are the main source of dollars used in cross-border transactions. …In response to the Trump administration’s stance, Germany, France, and Britain, together with Russia and China, have announced plans to circumvent the dollar, US banks, and US government scrutiny. …This doesn’t mean that foreign banks and companies will shun the dollar entirely. US financial markets are large and liquid and are likely to remain so. US banks operate globally. …But in an era of US unilateralism, they will want to hedge their bets. …there will be less reason for central banks to hold dollars in order to intervene in the foreign exchange market and stabilize the local currency against the greenback. …In threatening to punish Europe and China, Trump is, ironically, helping them to achieve their goals. Moreover, Trump is squandering US leverage.

And Michael Maharrey elaborates on the warning signs in a column for FEE.

…the U.S….weaponizes the U.S. dollar, using its economic dominance as both a carrot and a stick. …”enemies” can find themselves locked out of the global financial system, which the U.S. effectively controls using the dollar. …It utilizes the international payment system known as SWIFT…the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication. …SWIFT and dollar dominance give the U.S. a great deal of leverage over other countries. …China, Russia, and Iran, have taken steps to limit their dependence on the dollar and have even been working to establish alternative payment systems. A growing number of central banks have been buying gold as a way to diversify their holdings away from the greenback. …even traditional U.S. allies have grown weary of American economic bullying. On Sept. 24, the E.U. announced its plans to create a special payment channel to circumvent U.S. economic sanctions… De-dollarization of the world economy would likely perpetuate a currency crisis in the United States, and it appears a movement to dethrone the dollar is gaining steam.

All of the above articles could be considered the bad news.

So I’ll share one small bit of good news from Coy’s column. The one thing that may save the dollar is that there aren’t any good alternatives.

The best thing the dollar has going for it is that its challengers are weak. The euro represents a monetary union… Italy’s recent woes are only the latest challenge to the euro zone’s durability. China is another pretender to the throne. But China’s undemocratic leadership is wary of the openness to global trade and capital flows that having a widely used currency requires.

I agree. Indeed, I wrote way back in 2010 and 2011 that the euro lost a lot of credibility when the European Central Bank surrendered its independence and took part in the bailouts of Europe’s welfare states.

So why jump from the dollar to the euro, especially since Europe will be convulsed by additional fiscal crises when the next recession occurs?

That being said, the moral of today’s column is that the crowd in Washington shouldn’t be undermining the attractiveness of the dollar. Here’s a chart to give you some idea of what’s been happening.

P.S. I want to close with a point about trade deficits. It turns out that being the world’s reserve currency requires a trade deficit. That was explained in the Cayman Financial Review column.

A significant part of the U.S. current account deficit and the U.S. trade deficit (whether measured as goods and services or as goods only) is attributable to the U.S. dollar’s status as the world’s reserve currency. Even if every country in the world were to practice free trade and not to engage in any currency manipulation, the United States would still record persistent current account deficits so long as the U.S. dollar remains the world’s reserve currency.

Likewise, here’s the relevant portion from the Real Money column.

Since most of of the world’s commerce is denominated in dollars and because oil was priced in dollars, it necessitated that the rest of the world ran trade surpluses with the U.S. in order to get dollars. Therefore, our trade deficits were an expression of high demand for dollars, not vice-versa. …We never understood, or at least our policy makers never understood, that we had the better part of the deal. When the rest of the world labors for low wages to build finished goods that they send to us for our paper currency, that is a benefit to us, not a cost.

Last but not least, here are excerpts from Peter Coy’s column.

…for the U.S. to supply dollars to the rest of the world, it must run trade deficits. Trading partners stash the dollars they earn from exports in their reserve accounts instead of spending them on American goods and services. …the U.S. gets what amounts to a permanent, interest-free loan from the rest of the world when dollars are held outside the U.S. As Eichengreen points out, it costs only a few cents for the U.S. Bureau of Engraving and Printing to produce a $100 bill, but other countries have to pony up $100 worth of actual goods and services to obtain one.

I share all these excerpts to reinforce my oft-made point that there is nothing wrong with a trade deficit. Not only does it represent a financial surplus (formerly known, and still often referred to, as a capital surplus), it also reflects the benefit the U.S. enjoys from having the dollar as a reserve currency.

P.P.S. This issue also reinforces my oft-made point that laws should not extend beyond borders.

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I periodically explain that you generally don’t get a recession by hiking taxes, adding red tape, or increasing the burden of government spending. Those policies are misguided, to be sure, but they mostly erode the economy’s long-run potential growth.

If you want to assign blame for economic downturns, the first place to look is monetary policy.

When central banks use monetary policy to keep interest rates low (“Keynesian monetary policy,” but also known as “easy money” or “quantitative easing”), that can cause economy-wide distortions, particularly because capital gets misallocated.

And this often leads to a recession when this “malinvestment” gets liquidated.

I’ve made this point in several recent interviews, and I had a chance to make the same point yesterday.

By the way, doesn’t the other guest have amazing wisdom and insight?

But let’s not digress.

Back to the main topic, I’m not the only one who is worried about easy money.

Desmond Lachman of the American Enterprise Institute is similarly concerned.

Never before have the world’s major central banks kept interest rates so low for so long as they have done over the past decade. More importantly yet, never before have these banks increased their balance sheets on anything like the scale that they have done since 2008 by their aggressive bond-buying programmes. Indeed, since 2008, the size of the combined balances sheet of the Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank, the Bank of Japan and the Bank of England has increased by a mind-boggling US$10tn. …in recent years, if anything central bank monetary policy might have been overly aggressive. By causing global asset price inflation as well as the serious mispricing and misallocation of global credit, the seeds might have been sown for another Lehman-style economic and financial market crisis down the road. …the all too likely possibility that, by having overburdened monetary policy with the task of stabilizing output, advanced country governments might very well have set us up for the next global boom-bust economic cycle.

If you want the other side of the issue, the Economist is more sympathetic to monetary intervention.

And if you want a very learned explanation of the downsides of easy money, I shared some very astute observations from a British central banker back in 2015.

The bottom line is that easy money – sooner or later – backfires.

By the way, here’s a clip from earlier in the interview. Other than admitting that economists are lousy forecasters, I also warned that the economy is probably being hurt by Trump’s protectionism and his failure to control the growth of spending.

P.S. The “war on cash” in many nations is partly driven by those who want the option of easy money.

P.P.S. I worry that politicians sometimes choose to forgo good reforms because they hope easy money can at least temporarily goose the economy.

P.P.P.S. Easy money is also a tool for “financial repression,” which occurs when governments surreptitiously confiscate money from savers.

P.P.P.P.S. Maybe it’s time to reconsider central banks?

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Happy New Year!

We listed yesterday the good and bad policy developments of 2017, so now let’s speculate about potential victories and defeats in 2018.

Here are two things I hope will happen this year.

  • Welfare reform – If my friends and contacts on Capitol Hill are feeding my accurate information, we may see a bigger and better version of the 1996 welfare reform in 2018. The core concept would be to abolish the dozens of means-tested programs (i.e., redistribution programs targeted at low-income people) in Washington and replace them with a “block grant.” This could be good news for federal taxpayers if the annual block grant is designed to grow slowly. And it could be good news for poor people since state government would then have the ability and flexibility to design policies that help liberate recipients from government dependency.
  • Collapse of Venezuela – Given the disastrous deterioration of the Venezuelan economy, it’s difficult to envision how the Maduro dictatorship can survive the year. Yes, I know the regime is willing to use the military to suppress any uprising, but I suspect hungry and desperate people are more likely to take chances. My fingers are crossed that the corrupt government is overthrown and Venezuela becomes another Chile (hopefully without a transition period of military rule).

Here are two things I fear may happen in 2018.

  • Pulling out of NAFTA – America dodged a bullet in 2017. Given Trump’s protectionist instincts, I worried he would do something very dangerous on trade. But pain deferred is not the same thing as pain avoided. The President has made some very worrisome noises about NAFTA and it’s possible he may use executive authority to scrap a deal that has been good for the United States.
  • A bad version of Brexit – Given the statist mindset in Brussels and the continent’s awful demographics, voting to leave the European Union was the right decision for our British friends. Simply stated, it makes no sense to stay on a sinking ship, even if it sinking slowly. But the net benefits of Brexit depend on whether the United Kingdom seizes the moment and adopts pro-growth policies such as tax cuts and free-trade pacts. Sadly, those good reforms don’t appear likely and it appears instead that the feckless Tory leadership will choose to become a satellite member of the EU, which means living under the thumb of Brussels and paying for harmonization, bureaucratization, and centralization. The worst possible outcome in the short run, though at least the U.K. is better positioned to fully extricate itself in the future.

I’m adding a new feature to my hopes-and-fears column this year.

These are issues where I think it’s likely that something consequential may occur, but I can’t figure out whether I should be optimistic or pessimistic. I sort of did this last year, listing Obamacare reform and Italian fiscal crisis as both hopes and fears.

It turns out I was right to be afraid about what would happen with Obamacare and I was wrong (or too early) to think something would happen with Italy.

Here are three things that could be consequential in 2018, but I can’t figure out whether to be hopeful or fearful.

  • Infrastructure reform or boondoggle – I put an “infrastructure boondoggle” as one of my fears last year, but the President and Congress postponed dealing with the issue. But it will be addressed this year. I’m still afraid the result may be a traditional pile of pork-barrel spending, but it’s also possible that legislation could be a vehicle for market-based reform.
  • Normalization of monetary policy – I try to stay clear of monetary policy, but I also recognize that it’s a very important issue. Indeed, if I was to pick the greatest risk to the economy, it’s that easy-money policies (such as artificially low interest rates) have created a bubble. And bursting bubbles can be very messy, as we learned (or should have learned) in 2008. The Federal Reserve supposedly is in the process of “normalizing” monetary policy. I very much hope they can move in the right direction without rattling markets and/or bursting bubbles.
  • A China bubble – Speaking of macroeconomic risks, I’m very glad that China has partially liberalized and I’m ecstatic that reform has dramatically reduced severe poverty, but I also worry that the government plays far too large a role in the banking sector and interferes far too much in the allocation of capital. I’m guessing this eventually leads to some sort of hiccup (or worse) for the Chinese economy, and all I can do is cross my fingers and hope that the government responds with additional liberalization rather than the bad policies being advocated by the OECD and IMF.

By the way, I fully expect the Democrats to sweep the 2018 elections. And since the Party is now much farther to the left than it used to be, that could lead to very bad news in 2019 – particularly if Trump unleashes his inner Nixon.

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I’m rather frustrated about the lack of real results from the Republicans in Washington.

Yet Trump and some GOPers want to take credit for a rising stock market, as if that is some sort of positive reaction to their non-accomplishments.

As you can see from this interview, I don’t completely reject this hypothesis. After all, stock values are a reflection of the market’s expectations of future after-tax profits. So if investors think that good reforms – such as a lower corporate tax rate – are going to happen, then it makes sense that the value of financial assets will increase.

By the way, I can’t resist commenting on the claim from the Economic Policy Institute that the stock market is a “meaningless indicator” that has nothing to do with the well-being of workers.

That’s nonsense. Assuming we’re looking at genuine and durable increases in stock values (rather than a bubble), that’s a reflection of a growing economy, which translates into more income for workers.

In the language of economists, capital and labor are complimentary goods. More of one increases the value of the other. Which is why I told the folks at Politifact that it’s good for workers in the long run when financial assets become more valuable since that presumably means more investment.

Dan Mitchell, a scholar at the libertarian Cato Institute, agreed that “capital and labor compete for shares of income in the short run.” Over the long term, however, “there is no trade-off between corporate profits and labor income,” he said.

But let’s focus on the bigger issue of whether Trump deserves any credit for the stock market’s performance.

Ira Stoll, writing for the New York Sun, shares some very appropriate caveats.

The stock market, in other words, is like a lot of things: politicians want to take credit for it when news is good, but absolve themselves of responsibility when news is bad. One might hope for a more consistent perspective from journalists or from independent research organizations. Imagine, say, an election-day to election-day presidential job-performance dashboard that included data on measures such as stock market performance, the value of the dollar, job creation, unemployment, labor force participation, and real GDP growth. It can indeed be hard to isolate a president’s influence on all these things from other variables, such as, say, the composition of Congress. Should Mr. Obama or President Clinton get credit for the stock market booms in their terms? Or should the Republican Congresses under which they occurred? How does one accurately account for the period between the election and inauguration, when stock market gains may reflect anticipated improvements, but growth results measure existing budgets and policies?

Having given lots of reasons to be cautious, Stoll nonetheless thinks investors are buoyed by the pro-growth parts of Trump’s agenda.

…steps Mr. Trump takes — reducing regulation or slowing the growth of it, reducing corporate income tax rates, allowing more energy exploration — will outweigh any negatives. In other words, there’s a decent case that Mr. Trump does deserve at least some credit for the stock market gains.

I don’t have any objection to this analysis.

Though allow me to add another caveat to the list. As I explained when discussing the same topic back in March (see final interview) and indirectly suggested in the above interview, Trump is playing a risky game.

What if the stock market is artificially inflated because of the Fed’s easy-money policy? If that’s the case, there almost certainly will be a correction and stock values will drop.

This won’t be Trump’s fault, but he’ll then be very vulnerable when opponents argue that he should be blamed. As the old saying goes, live by the sword, die by the sword.

In my humble opinion, politicians (at least the ones who support good policy on net, and I still don’t know whether Trump is in this category) should argue for good policy because that will lead to higher per-capita income over time.

And they also should say, in the interests of accuracy, that it generally takes time to see good results.

Consider the lesson of the Reagan years. The first couple of years were a bit bumpy, both because some of Reagan’s good reforms – particularly the tax cuts – were slowly phased in and because some short-run pain was inevitable as inflation was brought under control (an overlooked and very beneficial achievement). But once his policies kicked in, the economic results were very positive.

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