Regular readers know that I’m a big fan of tax competition because politicians are less likely to misbehave if the potential victims of plunder have the ability to escape across borders.
Here is an excerpt from a superb article by Allister Heath, one of the U.K.’s best writers on economic and business issues.
In a modern, global and open world, states have to compete for people. Weirdly, that is something that a large number of commentators have failed to recognise… They assume implicitly that governments remain quasi-monopolies, as was the case throughout most of human history, with citizens mere subjects forced to put up with poor public services, high taxes, crime, misgovernment and a poor quality of life. Yet the reality is that there is now more competition than ever between governments for human capital, with people – especially the highly skilled and the successful – more footloose and mobile than ever before. This is true both within the EU, where freedom of movement reins, and globally. …competition between governments is as good for individuals as competition between firms is for consumers. It keeps down tax rates, especially on labour and capital, which is good for growth and job creation; states need to produce better services at the cheapest possible cost. And if governments become too irritating or incompetent, it allows an exit strategy. It is strange how pundits who claim to want greater competition in the domestic economy – for example, in banking – are so afraid of competition for people between states, decrying it as a race to the bottom. Yet monopolies are always bad, in every sphere of human endeavour, breeding complacency, curtailing innovation and throttling progress. …Globalisation is not just about buying cheap Chinese goods: it also limits the state’s powers to over-tax or over-control its citizens.
For those who haven’t seen them before, here are a couple of my videos that elaborate on these critical issues.
First, here’s a video on tax competition, which includes some well-deserved criticism of international bureaucracies and high-tax nations that are seeking to create global tax cartels.
Here’s a video that makes a powerful economic case for tax havens.
But this is not just an economic issue. Here’s a video that addresses the moral issues and explains why tax havens play a critical role in protecting people subject to persecution by venal governments – as well as people living in nations plagued by crime and instability.
And last but not least, this video punctures some of the myths promoted by the anti-tax haven advocates of global tax cartels.
By the way, since the main purpose of this post is to draw your attention to the superb analysis of a British writer, I may as well close by drawing your attention to a couple of speeches by Dan Hannan, a British member of the European Parliament. In a remarkably limited time, he explains what this battle is all about.
[…] post-2009 tax hikes were enabled by a weakening of tax competition, which underscores why it is so important to preserve the right of jurisdictions to maintain competitive tax […]
[…] the past couple of decades, I’ve been warning (over and over and over and over again) that politicians want to curtail tax competition so that it will be easier for them to […]
[…] another example of why tax competition is such an important force for economic liberalization. It punishes governments that are too greedy and gives taxpayers a chance to protect their property […]
[…] certainly a big fan of making governments compete with each other, but even I didn’t realize how jurisdictional rivalry gave us […]
[…] cited other tax haven-related research and analysis from the United Kingdom, most notably from Allister Heath, Dan Hannan, Philip Booth, Godfrey Bloom, and Mark […]
[…] moral of the story is that BVI (and other so-called tax havens) should be applauded, not […]
[…] is one of the reasons I’m such a big fan of tax competition. I don’t want politicians to think that endless tax increases are a way of postponing the […]
[…] competition is a way of discouraging this self-destructive behavior. Politicians are less likely to over-tax and over-spend if they know that jobs and investment can migrate from high-tax nations to low-tax jurisdictions […]
[…] shared great analysis in support of low-tax jurisdictions from top-flight financial writers such as Allister Heath and Pierre […]
[…] That’s music to my ears! […]
[…] British Business Writer Explains: Thanks to Tax Competition and Tax Havens, the Greed of the Politic… […]
[…] certainly a big fan of making governments compete with each other, but even I didn’t realize how jurisdictional rivalry gave us […]
[…] moral of the story is that BVI (and other so-called tax havens) should be applauded, not […]
[…] of which is quite consistent with my view that centralization is the enemy of liberty. We need to make governments compete with each other. And when that happens, we’re more likely to get good […]
[…] augment the internal constraint of a spending cap with the external constraint of tax competition. Bluntly stated, destructive tax policies will be less likely when politicians are afraid that […]
[…] scandal is simply another chapter in the never-ending war by high-tax governments against tax competition, fiscal sovereignty, and financial […]
[…] scandal is simply another chapter in the never-ending war by high-tax governments against tax competition, fiscal sovereignty, and financial […]
[…] scandal is simply another chapter in the never-ending war by high-tax governments against tax competition, fiscal sovereignty, and financial […]
[…] to know. This is simply another chapter in the never-ending war by high-tax governments against tax competition, fiscal sovereignty, and financial […]
[…] state borders. That insulates politicians (though not fully since there are varying amounts of tax competition between nations, both for investment and people) from the consequences of their reckless […]
[…] very opposed to so-called tax havens, for instance, because they don’t want there to be any constraints on the ability of governments to impose higher tax burdens. Yet it’s quite common to discover that these folks who want higher taxes for you and me have […]
[…] appreciate tax havens for many reasons, mostly having to do with the importance of having some sort of external […]
[…] appreciate tax havens for many reasons, mostly having to do with the importance of having some sort of external […]
[…] They encourage other nations to adopt better fiscal policy because of tax competition. […]
[…] They encourage other nations to adopt better fiscal policy because of tax competition. […]
[…] These are the principles that explain why I like tax reform, why I promote the Laffer Curve, and why I advocate for tax competition. […]
[…] one of the reasons why I favor tax havens and federalism. Simply stated, politicians are less likely to do bad things when they know economic activity can escape to places with better […]
[…] more information, here’s my video series on tax competition and tax […]
[…] more information, here’s my video series on tax competition and tax […]
[…] Which nations are money laundering centers (hint, not tax havens). […]
[…] But this is exactly why politicians shouldn’t be allowed to tax beyond their borders. We want tax competition in order to limit the greed of the political class. […]
[…] encourage other nations to adopt better fiscal policy because of tax […]
[…] The United States is way ahead of Europe. The only three nations close to us include Norway, which has the good fortune of major oil fields, and Luxembourg and Switzerland, which have the advantage of being tax havens. […]
[…] written about this topic many times and warned about the risks of letting unsavory governments have access to personal information, but […]
[…] written about this topic many times and warned about the risks of letting unsavory governments have access to personal information, but […]
[…] governments. Simply stated, there’s very strong evidence that decentralization means more tax competition, and when governments are forced to compete for jobs and investment, the economy is less likely to […]
[…] particularly like that he recognizes the power of tax competition as an argument for better tax policy. Taxpayers win when Texas and Louisiana compete to have less […]
[…] Which nations are money laundering centers (hint, not tax havens). […]
[…] I’d like to think he’s knowledgeable about the benefits of tax competition because he’s watched my videos or read my writings, but the real story is that he lived through and personally experienced the […]
[…] like to think he’s knowledgeable about the benefits of tax competition because he’s watched my videos or read my writings, but the real story is that he lived through and personally experienced the […]
[…] because I’m a huge fan of tax competition, I get even happier when I find out that bloated governments are in trouble because people are […]
[…] the topic, such as this editorial by Pierre Bessard from Switzerland’s Liberales Institut and this column by Allister Heath of England’s City AM business […]
[…] because I’m a huge fan of tax competition, I get even happier when I find out that bloated governments are in trouble because people are […]
[…] tax policy is so suicidal and why Texas is growing so rapidly. As I’ve said many times before, tax competition is a critical way of disciplining profligate governments and rewarding jurisdictions with more responsible fiscal […]
[…] I like tax havens for the simple reason that we need some ways of restraining the greed of the political class. […]
[…] I like tax havens for the simple reason that we need some ways of restraining the greed of the political class. […]
[…] you to share them widely, I also hope that you can utilize my educational videos on topics such as tax competition, government spending, and the Laffer Curve. Not everything can be explained in a […]
[…] another example of why tax competition is such an important force for economic liberalization. It punishes governments that are too greedy and gives taxpayers a chance to protect their property […]
[…] readers know that one of my main goals is to preserve and promote tax competition as a means of restraining the greed of the political class. Heck, I almost wound up in a Mexican jail because of my work defending low-tax […]
[…] readers know that one of my main goals is to preserve and promote tax competition as a means of restraining the greed of the political class. Heck, I almost wound up in a Mexican jail because of my work defending low-tax […]
[…] need tax havens in order to impose at least a tiny bit of restraint on the greed of the political class. These low-tax jurisdictions aren’t a sufficient […]
[…] And let’s not forget that global regulation also would be a vehicle for more red tape since politicians wouldn’t have to worry about economic activity migrating to jurisdictions with more sensible policies – just as tax harmonization is a vehicle for higher taxes. […]
[…] goes without saying that I’m always ready to defend tax havens when statists are seeking to undermine tax competition, financial privacy, and fiscal […]
[…] And if they’re smart, they already cut out the middleman and directly placed their savings in one of these low-tax jurisdictions. That way, they’re not only at much less risk of a bank collapse, but they also have greater ability to protect their assets from the venal and incompetent tax-hungry political elite. […]
[…] encourage other nations to adopt better fiscal policy because of tax […]
[…] encourage other nations to adopt better fiscal policy because of tax […]
[…] Which nations are money laundering centers (hint, not tax havens). […]
[…] the report also endorses tax competition as a means of restraining the burden of government […]
[…] argued on many occasions that tax competition is an important mechanism for restraining the greed of the political class. But even in my most optimistic moments, I realize that it’s a necessary but not sufficient […]
[…] But this is exactly why politicians shouldn’t be allowed to tax beyond their borders. We want tax competition in order to limit the greed of the political class. […]
[…] I often argue that we need to preserve tax competition and tax havens in order to limit the greed of the political class. […]
[…] further information, I highly recommend the writings of Allister Heath andPierre […]
[…] Which nations are money laundering centers (hint, not tax havens). […]
[…] Which nations are money laundering centers (hint, not tax havens). […]
[…] 4. The Internet sales tax cartel being promoted by Art and various politicians requires that governments have the ability to tax sales that tax place outside their borders. That’s an assault of sovereignty, particularly since out-of-state merchants will be coerced into being tax collectors for a distant government. This is the same dangerous ideology that is used by high-tax governments to promote global anti-tax competition policies. […]
[…] hope that my contribution is a good addition to the powerful analysis of experts such as Allister Heath and Pierre […]
[…] Simply stated, it is very difficult for governments to impose and enforce confiscatory tax rates when investors and entrepreneurs can shift their economic activity to jurisdictions with better tax …. Particularly if those nations have strong policies on financial privacy, thus making it difficult […]
[…] hope that my contribution is a good addition to the powerful analysis of experts such as Allister Heath and Pierre […]
[…] hope that my contribution is a good addition to the powerful analysis of experts such as Allister Heath and Pierre […]
[…] I’m the self-appointed defender of low-tax jurisdictions in Washington, this caught my attention. Thomas Jefferson wasn’t joking when he warned that “eternal […]
[…] I’m the self-appointed defender of low-tax jurisdictions in Washington, this caught my attention. Thomas Jefferson wasn’t joking when he warned that “eternal […]
[…] should be considered Part II of the OECD’s anti-tax competition project. Part I was the attack on so-called tax havens, which began back in the mid- to […]
[…] is like tax harmonization. It always means a heavier burden of government, not a lighter burden. Low-tax jurisdictions are badgered and harassed to make their tax systems worse so that fiscal hell-holes such as France don’t face […]
[…] Which nations are money laundering centers (hint, not tax havens). […]
[…] particularly like that he recognizes the power of tax competition as an argument for better tax policy. Taxpayers win when Texas and Louisiana compete to have less […]
[…] particularly like that he recognizes the power of tax competition as an argument for better tax policy. Taxpayers win when Texas and Louisiana compete to have less […]
[…] The debacle in France helps explain why we should celebrate tax competition. The fact that entrepreneurs can migrate to nations with better (or less worse) tax systems is a […]
[…] P.S. At least Jack Lew has now shown us that it’s perfectly fine to invest in the Cayman Islands and benefit from tax competition. […]
[…] insult to injury, I’m not rich, so I don’t have the ability to directly benefit from tax competition by moving to a zero-income-tax state such as Florida or […]
[…] And if they’re smart, they already cut out the middleman and directly placed their savings in one of these low-tax jurisdictions. That way, they’re not only at much less risk of a bank collapse, but they also have greater ability to protect their assets from the venal and incompetent tax-hungry political elite. […]
[…] another example of why tax competition is such an important force for economic liberalization. It punishes governments that are too greedy and gives taxpayers a chance to protect their property […]
[…] you get a “teaching moment” in Washington, and we now have an excellent opportunity to educate lawmakers about the “offshore” world because President Obama’s nominee to be Treasury Secretary has been caught with his hand in […]
[…] often, you get a “teaching moment” in Washington, and we now have an excellent opportunity to educate lawmakers about the “offshore” world because President Obama’s nominee to be Treasury Secretary has been caught with his hand in the […]
[…] you get a “teaching moment” in Washington, and we now have an excellent opportunity to educate lawmakers about the “offshore” world because President Obama’s nominee to be Treasury Secretary has been caught with his hand in […]
[…] encourage other nations to adopt better fiscal policy because of tax […]
[…] encourage other nations to adopt better fiscal policy because of tax […]
[…] written about the benefits of tax competition between nations. Well, this story shows the perverse impact of welfare competition between […]
[…] written about the benefits of tax competition between nations. Well, this story shows the perverse impact of welfare competition between […]
[…] written about the benefits of tax competition between nations. Well, this story shows the perverse impact of welfare competition between […]
[…] previous posts, I put together tutorials on the Laffer Curve, tax competition, and the economics of government […]
You actually make it seem really easy along with your presentation however I find this topic to be actually something
that I feel I’d never understand. It sort of feels too complex and very huge for me. I’m looking forward to your next put up, I will try to get the hold of it!
[…] another example of why tax competition is such an important force for economic liberalization. It punishes governments that are too greedy and gives taxpayers a chance to protect their property […]
[…] But I guess that’s not too surprising. Along with their tax-free colleagues at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the European Commission has been trying to undermine tax competition and make it easier for nations to impose bad tax policy. […]
[…] I’m a selfless person and a bit of an expert on tax havens, I hereby offer Laetitia my services to help with her tax […]
[…] tax policy is so suicidal and why Texas is growing so rapidly. As I’ve said many times before, tax competition is a critical way of disciplining profligate governments and rewarding jurisdictions with more responsible fiscal […]
[…] policy is so suicidal and why Texas is growing so rapidly. As I’ve said many times before, tax competition is a critical way of disciplining profligate governments and rewarding jurisdictions with more responsible fiscal […]
[…] another example of why tax competition is such an important force for economic liberalization. It punishes governments that are too greedy and gives taxpayers a chance to protect their property […]
[…] another example of why tax competition is such an important force for economic liberalization. It punishes governments that are too greedy and gives taxpayers a chance to protect their property […]
[…] it fails to make an obvious causal link. As I have repeatedly noted in my writings about tax competition and tax havens, taxpayers need places to hide their money in order to curtail the ability and […]
[…] based on what I wrote about him last year. We clashed the most, arguing about everything from tax havens to the size of government. Interestingly, we both said nice things about Sweden, but I was focusing […]
[…] But it also happens to be one of the world’s richest nations according to World Bank data, in part because it is a very good tax haven. […]
[…] But it also happens to be one of the world’s richest nations according to World Bank data, in part because it is a very good tax haven. […]
[…] since you know my favorite issue is tax competition, you’ll understand why I like these two short speeches by UKIP MEP Godfrey […]
[…] But it also happens to be one of the world’s richest nations according to World Bank data, in part because it is a very good tax haven. […]
[…] But it also happens to be one of the world’s richest nations according to World Bank data, in part because it is a very good tax haven. […]
[…] since you know my favorite issue is tax competition, you’ll understand why I like these two short speeches by UKIP MEP Godfrey […]
[…] would be a terrible development, but governments are sympathetic to such schemes since they view tax competition as a constraint on their ability to pursue redistribution and thus a limit on their efforts to buy votes with other people’s […]
[…] other words, it’s not just a matter of tax competition and tax havens (though you know how I feel about those […]
[…] previous posts, I put together tutorials on the Laffer Curve, tax competition, and the economics of government […]
[…] Bessard of Switzerland and Allister Heath of the United Kingdom are among the world’s best analysts on global tax issues. But Philip […]
[…] Obama threw around that make-believe number in the 2008 campaign, as seen in this video. But as shown in the final video of this post, the $100 billion figure was concocted out of thin air by a former John Kerry staffer, who […]
[…] than four years ago, as part of my efforts to promote and protect tax competition, fiscal sovereignty, and financial privacy, I narrated this video explaining the economic benefits of so-called tax […]
[…] Instead, I’m in the Bailiwick of Jersey, which is a UK dependent territory off the coast of France. Jersey is a so-called tax haven, which I applaud because it helps encourage better tax policy in less enlightened parts of the globe. […]
[…] than four years ago, as part of my efforts to promote and protect tax competition, fiscal sovereignty, and financial privacy, I narrated this video explaining the economic benefits of so-called tax […]
[…] than four years ago, as part of my efforts to promote and protect tax competition, fiscal sovereignty, and financial privacy, I narrated this video explaining the economic benefits of so-called tax […]
[…] forest. By highlighting the perfectly legal nature of Romney’s investments and commenting on the valuable role of tax havens in the global economy, I’ve neglected the main argument, which is that people have a right to do whatever they want […]
[…] more money out of the income tax. We don’t know if that’s because of the Laffer Curve, tax competition, electoral resistance, or all of the above. But we can say with considerable confidence that the […]
[…] opined about this issue many times, usually from a fiscal policy perspective, explaining that governments are less likely to be oppressive when they know that people (or their […]
[…] opined about this issue many times, usually from a fiscal policy perspective, explaining that governments are less likely to be oppressive when they know that people (or their […]
[…] I’m probably the foremost defender of tax havens in the United States, I tend to get a lot of press inquiries whenever something happens that brings attention to these […]
[…] I’m probably the foremost defender of tax havens in the United States, I tend to get a lot of press inquiries whenever something happens that brings attention to these […]
[…] all the issues we discussed, but when I was pontificating about the benefits of tax competition(are you surprised ?), he assured me that he felt the same way, only he wanted to make sure it was “fair tax […]
[…] all the issues we discussed, but when I was pontificating about the benefits of tax competition (are you surprised?), he assured me that he felt the same way, only he wanted to make sure it was “fair tax […]
[…] certainly a big fan of making governments compete with each other, but even I didn’t realize how jurisdictional rivalry gave us […]
[…] certainly a big fan of making governments compete with each other, but even I didn’t realize how jurisdictional rivalry gave us […]
[…] certainly a big fan of making governments compete with each other, but even I didn’t realize how jurisdictional rivalry gave us […]
[…] certainly a big fan of making governments compete with each other, but even I didn’t realize how jurisdictional rivalry gave us […]
[…] certainly a big fan of making governments compete with each other, but even I didn’t realize how jurisdictional rivalry gave us […]
[…] Allister is the author of this great article explaining why tax competition and tax havens are so important and valuable in the global economy. […]
[…] big advocate of tax competition, fiscal sovereignty, and financial privacy (read Pierre Bessard and Allister Heath to understand why these issues are […]
[…] The government’s grotesque treatment of Mr. Wajsfelner is part of the overall attack on tax competition. Heaven forbid people have the freedom to benefit from better tax policy in other jurisdictions! […]
[…] yet the German political spectrum is so tilted to the left that they want tax harmonization (a spectacularly bad idea) and more […]
[…] the other hand, the video deals with one of my favorite topics and also involves one of my favorite […]
[…] And if they’re smart, they already cut out the middleman and directly placed their savings in one of these low-tax jurisdictions. That way, they’re not only at much less risk of a bank collapse, but they also have greater ability to protect their assets from the venal and incompetent tax-hungry political elite. […]
[…] previous posts, I put together tutorials on the Laffer Curve, tax competition, and the economics of government […]
[…] previous posts, I put together tutorials on the Laffer Curve, tax competition, and the economics of government […]
[…] Luxembourg, which also is an outlier because it is a tiny nation that also serves as a tax haven (a very admirable policy, to be […]
[…] or France on the issue of whether fiscal sovereignty and financial privacy should be undermined to help high-tax nations impose their bad tax laws on an extraterritorial basis. Rate this:Share this:PrintEmailFacebookTwitterMoredeliciousDiggFarkLinkedInRedditStumbleUponLike […]
[…] close out this discussion, statists prefer worldwide taxation because it undermines tax competition. This is because, under worldwide taxation, individuals and companies have no ability to escape […]
[…] that are even close are Luxembourg, which is a tiny nation that also serves as a tax haven (a very admirable policy, to be sure), and Norway, which is a special case because of oil […]
[…] I’m a big defender of tax havens and tax competition, I noted that the assumptions in the report were very dodgy. As the Wall Street Journal noted, […]
[…] I’m a big defender of tax havens and tax competition, I noted that the assumptions in the report were very dodgy. As the Wall Street Journal noted, […]
[…] I’m a big defender of tax havens and tax competition, I noted that the assumptions in the report were very dodgy. As the Wall Street Journal noted, […]
[…] is why all of us should be very happy that tax havens exist. Imagine how high taxes would be if politicians didn’t have to worry that people had escape […]
[…] forest. By highlighting the perfectly legal nature of Romney’s investments and commenting on the valuable role of tax havens in the global economy, I’ve neglected the main argument, which is that people have a right to do whatever they want […]
[…] By highlighting the perfectly legal nature of Romney’s investments and commenting on the valuable role of tax havens in the global economy, I’ve neglected the main argument, which is that people have a right to do whatever they want […]
[…] Obama threw around that make-believe number in the 2008 campaign, as seen in this video. But as shown in the final video of this post, the $100 billion figure was concocted out of thin air by a former John Kerry staffer, who […]
[…] is why all of us should be very happy that tax havens exist. Imagine how high taxes would be if politicians didn’t have to worry that people had escape […]
[…] arguments about why tax competition and tax havens are desirable, I urge you to peruse the work of Allister Heath and Pierre […]
[…] The final point about “global financial governance” is worth emphasizing. While it is true that nothing good has ever happened because of a G-20 summit, some bad things have occurred – most notably the big push a couple of years ago to attack low-tax jurisdiction as part of a campaign by high-tax governments to cripple tax competition and facilitate higher tax burdens. […]
[…] tax policy” is nothing more than a deceptive way of saying tax harmonization, which would mean an end to tax competition, thus achieving a long-held goal of Europe’s political […]
[…] policy” is nothing more than a deceptive way of saying tax harmonization, which would mean an end to tax competition, thus achieving a long-held goal of Europe’s political […]
[…] to you (or at least seems like a reasonably hypothesis), I invite you to read some writings by Allister Heath of the United Kingdom and Pierre Bessard of Switzerland. Rate this:Share […]
[…] based on what I wrote about him last year. We clashed the most, arguing about everything from tax havens to the size of government. Interestingly, we both said nice things about Sweden, but I was focusing […]
[…] harmonization. To understand why financial privacy and fiscal sovereignty are desirable, watch the four-part video series at this post. Rate this: Share this:PrintEmailFacebookTwitterMoredeliciousDiggFarkLinkedInRedditStumbleUponLike […]
[…] based on what I wrote about him last year. We clashed the most, arguing about everything from tax havens to the size of government. Interestingly, we both said nice things about Sweden, but I was focusing […]
[…] you to share them widely, I also hope that you can utilize my educational videos on topics such as tax competition, government spending, and the Laffer Curve. Not everything can be explained in a picture. Rate […]
[…] the tax rates that are high? Those of you who have followed my writings on international tax policy already know the answer to that question. Rate this: Share this:PrintEmailFacebookTwitterMoredeliciousDiggFarkLinkedInRedditStumbleUponLike […]
[…] IRS regulation means we’ve suffered an unfortunate defeat in this battle. So if we care about promoting good policy and restraining the greed of the political class, we need to redouble our efforts. Rate this: Share […]
[…] the exception of a few top-notch thinkers such as Pierre Bessard and Allister Heath, there are very few people in Europe who can intelligently analyze public policy, particularly with […]
[…] especially when augmented by the strong human rights laws of tax havens, nations will face some pressure to move their policies closer to Hong Kong and away from France. That’s something worth protecting and promoting, not something to be stamped out by high-tax […]
[…] competition, as I have explained to the point of being a nuisance, is an important restraint on the greed of the political class. Simply stated, politicians are less like to over-tax and over-spend if they know that geese with […]
[…] competition, as I have explained to the point of being a nuisance, is an important restraint on the greed of the political class. Simply stated, politicians are less like to over-tax and over-spend if they know that geese with […]
[…] wise and astute Englishmen. If you want a good defense of tax competition and tax havens, read what Allister Heath wrote last year. Rate this: Share this:PrintEmailFacebookTwitterMoredeliciousDiggFarkLinkedInRedditStumbleUponLike […]
[…] By the way, for more information about the value of tax competition and financial privacy, click this link. […]
[…] Tax Organization” whenever you see that term), tax competition will be undermined and politicians will respond by increasing tax burdens. This is why nations such as France have been pushing this scheme, of course, and why left-wing […]
[…] British Business Writer Explains: Thanks to Tax Competition and … Mar 20, 2011 … British Business Writer Explains: Thanks to Tax Competition and Tax Havens, the Greed of the … […]
[…] an article by Allister Heath in Cityam (H/T Daniel Mitchell) he talks about the steady outflow of people and wealth from […]