When debating and discussing the 2008 financial crisis, there are two big questions. And the answers to these questions are important because the wrong “narrative” could lead to decades of bad policy (much as a mistaken narrative about the Great Depression enabled bad policy in subsequent decades).
- What caused the crisis to occur?
- What should policy makers have done?
In a new video for Prager University, Nicole Gelinas of the Manhattan Institute succinctly and effectively provides very valuable information to help answer these questions. Particularly if you want to understand how the government promoted bad behavior by banks and created the conditions for a crisis.
Here are some further thoughts on the issues raised in the video.
Deregulation didn’t cause the financial crisis – Nicole explained that banks got in trouble because of poor incentives created by previous bailouts, not because of supposed deregulation. As she mentioned, their “risk models” were distorted by assumptions that some financial institutions were “too big to fail.”
But that’s only part of the story. It’s also important to recognize that easy-money policies last decade created too much liquidity and that corrupt subsidies and preferences for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac steered much of that excess liquidity into the housing sector. These policies helped to create the bubble, and many financial institutions became insolvent when that bubble burst.
TARP wasn’t necessary to avert a meltdown – Because the video focused on how the “too big to fail” policy created bad incentives, there wasn’t much attention to the topic of what should have happened once big institutions became insolvent. Defenders of TARP argued that the bailout was necessary to “unfreeze” financial markets and prevent an economic meltdown.
But here’s the key thing to understand. The purpose of TARP was to bail out big financial institutions, which also meant protecting big investors who bought bonds from those institutions. And while TARP did mitigate the panic, it also rewarded bad choices by those big players. As I’ve explained before, using the “FDIC-resolution” approach also would have averted the panic. In short, instead of bailing out shareholders and bondholders, it would have been better to bail out depositors and wind down the insolvent institutions.
Bailouts encourage very bad behavior – There’s a saying that capitalism without bankruptcy is like religion without hell, which is simply a clever way of pointing out that you need both profit and loss in order for people in the economy to have the right set of incentives. Bailouts, however, screw up this incentive structure by allowing private profits while simultaneously socializing the losses. This creates what’s known as moral hazard.
I’ve often used a simple analogy when speaking about government-created moral hazard. How would you respond if I asked you to “invest” by giving me some money for a gambling trip to Las Vegas, but I explained that I would keep the money from all winning bets, while financing all losing bets from your funds? Assuming your IQ is at least room temperature, you would say no. But our federal government, when dealing with the financial sector, has said yes.
Good policy yields short-run pain but long-run gain – In my humble opinion, Nicole’s most valuable insight is when she explained the long-run negative consequences of the bailouts of Continental Illinois in 1984 and Long-Term Capital Management in 1998. There was less short-run pain (i.e., financial instability) because of these bailouts, but the avoidance of short-run pain meant much more long-run pain (i.e., the 2008 crisis).
Indeed, this “short termism” is a pervasive problem in government. Politicians often argue that a good policy is unfeasible because it would cause dislocation to interest groups that have become addicted to subsidies. In some cases, they’re right about short-run costs. A flat tax, for instance, might cause temporary dislocation for some sectors such as housing and employer-provide health insurance. But the long-run gains would be far greater – assuming politicians can be convinced to look past the next election cycle.
Let’s close by re-emphasizing a point I made at the beginning. Narratives matter.
For decades, the left got away with the absurd statement that the Great Depression “proved” that capitalism was unstable and destructive. Fortunately, research in recent decades has helped more and more people realize that this is an upside-down interpretation. Instead, bad government policy caused the depression and then additional bad policy during the New Deal made the depression longer and deeper.
Now we have something similar. Leftists very much want people to think that the financial crisis was a case of capitalism run amok. They’ve had some success with this false narrative. But the good news is that proponents of good policy immediately began explaining the destructive role of bad government policy. And if Nicole’s video is any indication, that effort to prevent a false narrative is continuing.
P.S. The Dodd-Frank bill was a response to the financial crisis, but it almost certainly made matters worse. Here’s what Nicole wrote about that legislation.
[…] It’s the fact that this bailout will make future bailouts more likely. […]
[…] It’s the fact that this bailout will make future bailouts more likely. […]
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[…] IMF’s bureaucrats seem to think “moral hazard” is a good thing rather than a bad […]
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[…] P.P.S. For more on government-created moral hazard, click here. […]
[…] P.P.S. For more on government-created moral hazard, click here. […]
[…] to say, I don’t like bailouts. And a bailout that enables more government spending seems especially […]
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[…] Start with the article’s title, since it would be more accurate to say that the IMF’s bailout policies encourage fires. […]
[…] Start with the article’s title, since it would be more accurate to say that the IMF’s bailout policies encourage fires. […]
[…] Start with the article’s title, since it would be more accurate to say that the IMF’s bailout policies encourage fires. […]
[…] Starting with the article’s title, since it would be more accurate to say that the IMF’s bailout policies encourage fires. […]
[…] that profits are laudable – but only if they are earned in the free market and not because of bailouts, subsidies, protectionism, or a tilted playing […]
[…] and self-serving analysis. Much of that shoddy output is driven by privileged groups seeking bailouts, subsidies, protectionism, or a tilted playing […]
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[…] services) or the result of something bad (some people grabbing undeserved loot thanks because of bailouts, subsidies, protectionism, industrial policy, and […]
[…] services) or the result of something bad (some people grabbing undeserved loot thanks because of bailouts, subsidies, protectionism, industrial policy, and […]
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[…] bailouts actually undermine that goal give the country’s awful politicians an excuse to postpone necessary […]
[…] I’ve shared two videos (here and here) for those who want more information about how bailouts encourage “moral hazard.” And […]
[…] I’ve shared two videos (here and here) for those who want more information about how bailouts encourage “moral […]
[…] P.S. If you want more information on the economic damage caused by bailouts, watch this video and this video. […]
[…] international bureaucracy is the “Johnny Appleseed” of moral hazard, using bailouts to reward profligate governments and imprudent […]
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[…] Simply stated, we should minimize moral hazard. […]
[…] right lesson is that bailouts are bad economic policy and immoral as […]
[…] Needless to say, the answer should be a resounding no. […]
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[…] have included the caveat that this isn’t true if government is tilting the playing field. Bailouts, protectionism, subsidies, and other forms of cronyism enable the politically well-connected to […]
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[…] P.S. You can enjoy other great videos from Prager University by clicking here, here, here, here, here, and here. […]
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[…] only in danger when government puts its thumb on the scale with handouts, subsidies, restrictions, bailouts, regulations, licensing, mandates, and other forms of intervention. Because when government rigs […]
Reblogged this on a political idealist..
Most bad decisions can be traced to choosing small immediate satisfaction over much much bigger longer term reward.
So just as good policy leads to short term pain but long term big gain, the opposite is also true:
Bad policy can lead to short term gain and much much bigger long term loss, or forgone growth is a more accurate description.
The Faustian deal of choosing short term small gain over long term big gain is typically practiced by a majority of voter lemmings.
So when the crisis hit, government officials panicked thinking that something really bad may happen during their terms (which is totally understandable from a political incentives standpoint), and thought that massive intervention would likely patch up things softening a bit the short term pain in exchange for a much bigger long term loss.
Now we have had three years of confirmation on the the long term loss. Not only long term, but likely permanent and irreversible. Once regulation goes up, history shows that it is most often permanent. Worse, the distortion it creates will likely bring new problems to be patched up with even more regulation.
Meanwhile we are experiencing the loss as a more permanent lower growth trendline, now perpetually compounding every year. Not only is this poised to be permanent but the outlook is also worsening as the population is poised to address the growing malaise with even more regulation and a desire to collectively take control of mote and more of the economy. The road to sefdom is paved with naïveté and lofty intellectual thoughts which deny humanity’s basic selfishness.
This is all water under the bridge at this point.
At half the average world growth trendline, Americans are fast losing their prosperity leadership position in the world, and are fast headed towards becoming a middle income country.
They will not wake up in time.