I routinely (some would say repetitively) argue that the burden of government spending is a drag on the economy because labor and capital are being misallocated via the political process.
My message is that we need to reduce the size of the public sector, even if we do it in a very gradual way by imposing some sort of spending cap that fulfills the Golden Rule requirement of having government grow slower than the productive sector of the economy.
That being said, a modest short-run agenda doesn’t mean we shouldn’t have bold long-run goals.
So while I’m glad the Tea Party has helped restrain government spending in the past two years, that’s just an interim step.
And I’m all in favor of bringing federal government spending back down to about 18 percent of GDP, which is where it was when Bill Clinton left office.
But why stop there? Wouldn’t it be better to dramatically shrink the public sector?
That approach certainly would be consistent with what our Founders wanted and with the first 150 years of our nation’s history.
I shared some remarkable data last year showing that the public sector used to be very small. Not just in the United States, but other nations as well.
Indeed, government spending (at all levels) consumed less than 10 percent of economic output in the world’s leading nations in 1870. And even as late as 1913, the public sector only consumed an average of about 12 percent of GDP in those major western nations.
So why has government become much larger in the past 100 years? The answer, as shown by this remarkable chart prepared by Vito Tanzi, the former Director of Fiscal Affairs at the International Monetary Fund, is that the welfare state has exploded.
As you can see from the table, there was almost no welfare state at the beginning of the 1900s, and redistribution spending was minimal even as late as 1930.
But welfare-state outlays, referred to as “social transfers” in the table, have ballooned over the past eight decades. And if you’re a glutton for bad news, you should also understand that BIS, OECD, and IMF data predict major long-run troubles because entitlement programs are going to become an even bigger burden in the future.
In other words, we’re already in a deep hole because the welfare state has radically expanded, and that hole will become much deeper in almost all nations in the absence of genuine entitlement reform and effective caps on so-called discretionary spending.
Fortunately, we can make progress. Perhaps not in the next couple of years with Obama in the White House, but spending caps and entitlement reform are possible at some point in the near future.
Simply stated, the ongoing fiscal crisis in Europe is causing more and more people to understand that we can’t remain on the current path.
Our ultimate goal, however, should be shrinking government even further by restoring the Constitution’s limit on the size and scope of the federal government.
Maybe I’m a Pollyanna, but I’m glad to be at the Cato Institute where I can strive every day for this vision of a freer and more prosperous America.
P.S. We should undo the welfare state not only because that reform would be good for taxpayers, but also because the so-called War on Poverty is bad for poor people. Redistribution creates long-run dependency because of a poverty trap that makes it more difficult to climb the economic ladder. If we really want to help the less fortunate, private charity does a far better job – and Americans (unlike Europeans) still have the genuine compassion that exists when you spend your own money.
P.P.S. If you want a humorous look at genuine compassion, Libertarian Jesus has some wise advice.
[…] has a relatively small welfare state compared to other OECD nations. Heck, the United States had no welfare state back in the […]
[…] you can see, rapid growth began well before 1900. Before income taxes. Before the welfare state. And long before anything resembling […]
[…] you can see, rapid growth began well before 1900. Before income taxes. Before the welfare state. And long before anything resembling […]
[…] we know from history that Western nations grew rapidly in the 1800s and early 1900s when there was no welfare state and the public sector consumed only about 10 percent of economic […]
[…] we know from history that Western nations grew rapidly in the 1800s and early 1900s when there was no welfare state and the public sector consumed only about 10 percent of economic […]
[…] wasn’t until the mid-1960s that the welfare state exploded in size (aided and abetted by the imposition of value-added […]
[…] What the authors overlook, however, is that the (relatively) rich countries in Western Europe became rich when the burden of government was very small. […]
[…] For purposes of today’s column, I want to focus on the last half of the interview. I point out that a handful of nations began to escape poverty, largely back in the 1800s, when the fiscal burden of government was very small. […]
[…] if you want to see more charts to confirm this data, click here, here, and […]
[…] if you want to see more charts to confirm this data, click here, here, and […]
[…] the second chart shows that this near-miraculous improvement occurred before those nations had welfare states or any other forms of redistribution […]
[…] the second chart shows that this near-miraculous improvement occurred before those nations had welfare states or any other forms of redistribution […]
[…] this was a period when there was no welfare state. Redistribution was virtually nonexistent. Not even in […]
[…] this was a period when there was no welfare state. Redistribution was virtually nonexistent. Not even in […]
[…] also some historical analysis showing how the burden of government used to be relatively […]
[…] also some historical analysis showing how the burden of government used to be relatively […]
[…] and achieved high levels of state capacity – when they had very small governments (and no redistribution programs) back in the 1800s and early […]
[…] total social welfare spending in Germany was less than 20 percent of GDP for the first few decades after World War II, considerably less than social welfare spending today […]
[…] also some historical analysis showing how the burden of government used to be relatively […]
[…] also some historical analysis showing how the burden of government used to be relatively […]
[…] also some historical analysis showing how the burden of government used to be relatively […]
[…] as noted in the video, income tax enabled a massive expansion in the burden of government […]
[…] video was about developing nations having the right to copy the economic model (no income tax and no welfare state) that enabled North American and Western Europe to become rich in the 1800s. Sadly, I don’t […]
[…] That’s true for the United States. And it’s true for Western Europe. […]
[…] That’s true for the United States. And it’s true for Western Europe. […]
[…] lots of capital and generated lots of wealth back in the 1800s and early 1900s when the burden of government was very small and taxes were very low. If some of the capital from that period is still generating returns (and […]
[…] accumulated lots of capital and generated lots of wealth back in the 1800s and early 1900s when the burden of government was very small and taxes were very low. If some of the capital from that period is still generating returns (and […]
[…] accumulated lots of capital and generated lots of wealth back in the 1800s and early 1900s when the burden of government was very small and taxes were very low. If some of the capital from that period is still generating returns (and […]
[…] growth in the 1800s. Our prosperity was more a result of no income tax, no welfare state, and no intrusive regulatory/administrative […]
[…] It’s worth noting that Europe became a relatively prosperous part of the world before governments adopted punitive income taxes and created big welfare states. […]
[…] We’re copying Western Europe. […]
[…] We’re copying Western Europe. […]
[…] made the leap to industrial prosperity in the 1800s and early 1900s – at a time when they had no welfare states and very low fiscal burdens (indeed most of them didn’t have any income taxes during that […]
[…] prosperity – The western world became rich in the 1800s and early 1900s when there was very small government and no income taxes. That’s the path a few sensible jurisdictions want to copy […]
[…] prosperity – The western world became rich in the 1800s and early 1900s when there was very small government and no income taxes. That’s the path a few sensible jurisdictions want to copy […]
[…] path to prosperity – The western world became rich in the 1800s and early 1900s when there was very small government and no income taxes. That’s the path a few sensible jurisdictions want to copy today so they can […]
[…] to prosperity – The western world became rich in the 1800s and early 1900s when there was very small government and no income taxes. That’s the path a few sensible jurisdictions want to copy today so they […]
[…] this was a period when there was no welfare state. Redistribution was virtually nonexistent. Not even in […]
[…] P.S. Other developed nations basically have made the same fiscal mistake as the United States. Nations in Western Europe and Japan also used to have very small governments. Once the welfare state began, however, economic liberty morphed into bloated welfare states. […]
[…] (Some of them say the Nordic nations and other countries in Western Europe are relatively rich, and that’s true, but I point out that those jurisdictions became rich in the 1800s and early 1900s when government was very small.) […]
[…] capital (infrastructure, etc). In reality, though, the vast majority of government spending is for the ever-expanding social welfare state and the accompanying […]
[…] we didn’t have an income tax or a welfare state, there were other forms of intervention, as illustrated by the video, as well as lots of […]
[…] rejected socialism by getting rid of price controls and allowing markets to flourish (the video overstated the degree to which a welfare state was imposed). But that was the exception to the rule. The world […]
[…] Mises showed back in 1920 that genuine socialism (rather than Nordic-style redistributionism, which didn’t even exist back then) was not feasible in part because governments have no rational way of setting prices and […]
[…] Mises showed back in 1920 that genuine socialism (rather than Nordic-style redistributionism, which didn’t even exist back then) was not feasible in part because governments have no rational way of setting prices and […]
[…] Compared to most of the world, Japan is a rich country. But it’s important to understand that Japan became rich when the burden of government was very small and there was no welfare state. […]
[…] that actually happened for a couple of decades after World War II, but then many European nations expanded welfare states in the 1960s and 1970s, while the U.S. for more economic freedom under both Ronald Reagan and Bill Clinton in the 1980s […]
[…] Here’s the data on the history of redistribution spending in developed […]
[…] government was very small. It didn’t have an income tax until 1902, and the welfare state was tiny until the 1960s. And I then explain that Sweden’s economic performance has been inversely […]
[…] for western nations to become rich in the 1800s when government was very small and there was no welfare state. Yet it […]
[…] (Some of them say the Nordic nations and other countries in Western Europe are relatively rich, and that’s true, but I point out that those jurisdictions became rich in the 1800s and early 1900s when government was very small.) […]
[…] (Some of them say the Nordic nations and other countries in Western Europe are relatively rich, and that’s true, but I point out that those jurisdictions became rich in the 1800s and early 1900s when government was very small.) […]
[…] why did the United States and Western Europe become rich in the 1800s, back when governments only consumed about 10 percent of economic […]
[…] notice that the jurisdictions with high scores for government efficiency are all places with (by modern standards) small […]
[…] means the 1800s and early 1900s for nations in North America and Western […]
[…] Simply stated, Otto Brøns-Petersen’s video shows that the admirable outcomes in that country are the result of laissez-faire markets and the bad outcomes are the result of the welfare state imposed beginning in the 1960s. […]
[…] this was a period when there was no welfare state. Redistribution was virtually nonexistent. Not even in […]
[…] And, yes, that does include some Northern European welfare states (though, if I wrote the column, I would have noted that those nations became rich before welfare states were adopted). […]
[…] is due to free markets and a history of small government, but the imposition of big welfare states starting in the 1960s has weakened the region’s economic […]
[…] my favorite examples are from North America and Western Europe. If you look at the historical data, nations in the western world evolved from agricultural poverty to middle-class prosperity in the […]
[…] There was virtually no welfare state in OECD nations prior to the 1930s and very small welfare states until the 1960s. For what […]
[…] taxes didn’t cause growth in the 1800s. Our prosperity was more a result of no income tax, no welfare state, and no intrusive regulatory/administrative […]
[…] development where it can afford a welfare state. Western nations didn’t travel down that path until the 1930s, after they already reached a certain level of development and could afford to hamstring their […]
[…] I give speeches about modern welfare states, I’ll often cite grim data from the IMF, BIS, and OECD about the very depressing fiscal […]
[…] I give speeches about modern welfare states, I’ll often cite grim data from the IMF, BIS, and OECD about the very depressing fiscal […]
[…] Tanzi’s table, which I first shared five years ago. And I’ve circled in red the 1880-1930 data to underscore that there was virtually no […]
[…] Tanzi’s table, which I first shared five years ago. And I’ve circled in red the 1880-1930 data to underscore that there was virtually no […]
[…] graph was the “western world’s most depressing chart” because it showed the dramatic increase in the burden of government spending for redistribution […]
[…] numbers are very similar to the table I shared from Vito Tanzi back in 2013, which isn’t surprising since Professor Peter Lindert is the underlying source for […]
[…] numbers are very similar to the table I shared from Vito Tanzi back in 2013, which isn’t surprising since Professor Peter Lindert is the underlying source […]
[…] the fact that government used to be very small in the industrialized world (indeed, that’s one of the big reasons why today’s rich nations got that […]
[…] important, he either ignores or is unaware of the research showing that nations such as France, Denmark, and Finland became rich when government spending was […]
[…] Por supuesto, es verdad que hay naciones ricas que tienen gobiernos grandes, pero todos esos países se hicieron ricos en el siglo XIX, cuando los gobiernos eran muy pequeños y los programas sociales públicos básicamente no existían. […]
[…] It’s true, of course, that there are rich nations that have big governments, but all of those countries became rich in the 1800s when government was very small and welfare state programs were basically nonexistent. […]
[…] It’s true, of course, that there are rich nations that have big governments, but all of those countries became rich in the 1800s when government was very small and welfare state programs were basically nonexistent. […]
[…] It’s true, of course, that there are rich nations that have big governments, but all of those countries became rich in the 1800s when government was very small and welfare state programs were basically nonexistent. […]
[…] the policies that allowed the United States and other western nations to become rich, such as no income tax and very small government, the IMF wants to fatten the coffers of a corrupt and ineffective public […]
[…] Not by libertarian standards. Not by historical standards. […]
[…] Not by libertarian standards. Not by historical standards. […]
[…] That bad news in the story was that the welfare state was expanding at a rapid pace in the United States. The good news is that the overall fiscal burden of those programs was still comparatively low. At least compared to other industrialized countries (though depressingly high by historical standards). […]
[…] capital (infrastructure, etc). In reality, though, the vast majority of government spending is for the ever-expanding social welfare state and the accompanying […]
[…] capital (infrastructure, etc). In reality, though, the vast majority of government spending is for the ever-expanding social welfare state and the accompanying […]
[…] samo ga guše. Sve danas razvijene zemlje su se obogatile dok su imale vrlo mali državni aparat i gotovo zanemarive razine redistrubucije, a niti jedna zemlja u povijesti se nije obogatila zbog visokih poreza i velike javne potrošnje. […]
[…] successful western countries all became rich when government was very small. Indeed, there was almost no redistribution spending in the western world as late as 1930. Yes, those nations generally adopted expensive and debilitating welfare states […]
[…] the government so starved of revenue that Costa Rico can’t replicate the formula – a public sector consuming about 10 percent of economic output – that enabled the […]
[…] What I should be saying instead is that demographic changes are forcing us to recognize that we have a crisis of bad public policy. To be more specific, the entitlement state has become too large. […]
[…] And I periodically will write about how I wish we still had the very small federal government envisioned by the Founding Fathers (and which largely existed up until the 1920s). […]
[…] le monde occidental est passé de la pauvreté à la prospérité dans les années 1800 alors que la part de l’État dans l’économie était très faible, en moyenne moins de 10% du […]
[…] a good answer to either question. Many leftists point to certain European welfare states, but I debunk that claim by pointing out that those nations became rich when government was very small (about 10 percent […]
[…] a good answer to either question. Many leftists point to certain European welfare states, but I debunk that claim by pointing out that those nations became rich when government was very small (about 10 percent of […]
[…] instance, the western world went from poverty to prosperity in the 1800s when government was very small, averaging less than 10 percent of economic […]
[…] in Sweden was smaller than it was in the United States. And as late as 1970, Sweden still had less redistribution spending than America had in […]
[…] is chock full of substantive information. Consider, for instance, this chart showing that there was almost no redistribution spending in the western world as late as […]
[…] participants actually believe their own rhetoric. I’ve shared with some of the folks the empirical data showing the western world became rich in the 1800s when fiscal burdens were very modest. But […]
[…] P.S. Italy didn’t have any sort of permanent income tax until 1864. Indeed, most modern nations didn’t impose these punitive levies until the late 1800s and early 1900s. The United States managed to hold out until that awful dreary day in 1913. It’s worth noting that the U.S. and other nations managed to become rich and prosperous prior to the adoption of those income taxes. And it’s also worth noting that the rapid growth of the 18th century occurred when the burden of government spending was very modest and there was almost no redistribution spending. […]
[…] tijekom šezdesetih i pogotovo sedamdesetih (pazite, još 1970.-e je, kao udio u BDP-u, Švedska trošila znatno manje na socijalne transfere nego što d…, koje su kao nekakav primjer “neoliberalnog kapitalizma”), uslijed nesretnih okolnosti, […]
[…] This is a jaw-dropping assertion in part because most of the world’s rich nations became prosperous back in the 1800s and early 1900s when government spending consumed only about 10 percent of economic output. […]
[…] important, he either ignores or is unaware of the research showing that nations such as France, Denmark, and Finland became rich when government spending was […]
[…] the so-called progressive income tax did lead to the modern welfare state. And the modern welfare state, when combined with demographic change, is threatening immense […]
[…] now look at the numbers. Pay special attention to the period between 1960 and 1980, which is when the welfare state exploded in many of the countries (aided and abetted by the value-added […]
[…] now look at the numbers. Pay special attention to the period between 1960 and 1980, which is when the welfare state exploded in many of the countries (aided and abetted by the value-added […]
[…] from Professor Olle Kranz showing that Sweden became a rich nation during a free-market era when government was relatively small. And as you can see from his chart (I added the parts in red), this is also when per-capita […]
[…] in Sweden was smaller than it was in the United States. And as late as 1970, Sweden still had less redistribution spending than America had in […]
[…] in Sweden was smaller than it was in the United States. And as late as 1970, Sweden still had less redistribution spending that America had in […]
[…] adoption of high taxes and big welfare states (particularly an explosion in the burden of government spending starting in the 1960s) weakened economic […]
[…] – very small government, trivial or nonexistent income taxes, very modest regulation – that existed in those nations back in the 1800s and early 1900s. That’s when America and other western countries made the […]
[…] – very small government, trivial or nonexistent income taxes, very modest regulation – that existed in those nations back in the 1800s and early 1900s. That’s when America and other western countries made the […]
[…] was significantly smaller than what Hong Kong has today. Heck, nations such as France and Sweden also had very small governments in the 1800s, which is when the western world became […]
[…] was significantly smaller than what Hong Kong has today. Heck, nations such as France and Sweden also had very small governments in the 1800s, which is when the western world became […]
[…] there was very little income redistribution until the […]
[…] And at the time, there was virtually no redistribution. Not only in the United States, but in other developed nations as well. […]
[…] And at the time, there was virtually no redistribution. Not only in the United States, but in other developed nations as well. […]
[…] And at the time, there was virtually no redistribution. Not only in the United States, but in other developed nations as well. […]
[…] and Sweden, though they never have a good response when you point out that: a) these nations became rich when government was very small, and b) they compensate for today’s bad fiscal policy with ultra-free market policies in […]
[…] Italy had less redistribution than the United States as late as […]
[…] It wasn’t until the 1960s that nations such as Denmark and Sweden adopted big welfare states. And, not coincidentally, […]
[…] wasn’t until the 1960s that nations such as Denmark and Sweden adopted big welfare states. And, not coincidentally, […]
[…] wasn’t until the 1960s that nations such as Denmark and Sweden adopted big welfare states. And, not coincidentally, […]
[…] similar to the data I shared back in 2013 for the simple reason that we’re both citing the superb work of Vito […]
[…] Very depressing numbers, particularly when you consider that European nations used to have small governments with very little redistribution. […]
[…] P.S. Other developed nations basically have made the same fiscal mistake as the United States. Nations in Western Europe and Japan also used to have very small governments. Once the welfare state began, however, economic liberty morphed into bloated welfare states. […]
[…] Very depressing numbers, particularly when you consider that European nations used to have small governments with very little redistribution. […]
[…] Kao udio u BDP-u, izdaci za državne socijalne benefite u većini zapadnih “kapitalističkih” zemalja iznose bar oko 20%, dok su npr. prije Drugog svjetskog rata, malo gdje iznosili više od 3%. […]
[…] Pogledajmo onda što je sa socijalnim transferima i njihovim udjelom u nacionalnom dohotku (izvor): […]
[…] are the problem, creating perverse incentives for long-term dependency. To be more specific, the country’s extravagant welfare state acts as flypaper, preventing people from climbing in the ladder of […]
[…] be more specific, the country’s extravagant welfare state acts as flypaper, preventing people from climbing in the ladder of […]
[…] be more specific, the country’s extravagant welfare state acts as flypaper, preventing people from climbing in the ladder of […]
[…] all, the rich nations of the western world all became prosperous back in the 1800s and early 1900s when the burden of government was tiny, smaller even than the public sector in Hong Kong […]
[…] And he makes the absolutely essential point that western nations became rich when government was very small and there was virtually no redistribution. […]
Obama would never stop spending if ever given the chance.
[…] The Rise (and Upcoming Fall) of the Welfare State in the Western World […]
I don’t like this way of reasoning. The us more compassionate than europe? This is self congratory.
How about this: if you spend more than 55% of what you earn on taxes and still over 5% on charity you are a good guy, despite the government.
The best long term gift one can give the poor and less productive, as well as future generations, is economic liberation into a high growth trendline. Growth is the exponential factor that must eventually, arithmetically, dwarf all other linear factors, such as redistribution — not to mention that high growth means, amongst other things, that the eventual cure for cancer etc. might be found in 2045 rather than 2065 — and there are a vast number of lives under that integral.
But higher growth and the relatively unadulterated effort-reward curves it requires are a long term gift. In the short term, redistribution at the polls is the path to short-term immediate and myopic relief. Hence the western world decline will continue, and likely accelerate, as desperate voters, losing their once top of the world standard of living, increase their dependency to the immediate relief of redistribution. The vicious cycle has closed in most western democracies, hence their sub-par growth is now relentlessly compounding the standard of living of their citizens into worldwide averagedom. But it was voters themselves who chose this path.
The trick now is to spot early those very few democracies that will escape. That is especially true and urgent for Americans where, in a gross and aberrant departure from their founding principles, politicians have uniquely closed the emigration safety valves with worldwide taxation and continued coercive tethering of expatriates to a largely irrelevant motherland — all this with apparent approval from a majority of voters. While a small issue now, I anticipate that this will play a large role in the coming few decades of American Europeanization and decline. Closing the safety valves of emigration ie. going against fundamental realities with legislative gimmicks will only make the eventual decline all the more explosive (implosive is perhaps a better term).
Thank you for your writing, speaking and activity. I humbly ask that you lead the way in not calling government “public”. You write government spending yet also write “public sector”. The government is what is voted in and for the public interest, yet the public sector is really corporate America where shares are sold are in the public market. The private sector are small companies as corporations and sole proprietorships and the like. Another example of this is how liberals and democrats often confuse health care with health insurance. Michael
Great article! I think the US gets a double whammy because of our world wild military actions! Has anyone created a similar chart but from the war angle?
To control govt and really shrink it we’d need to handle both.