Regular readers know that I’m a big fan of tax competition because politicians are less likely to misbehave if the potential victims of plunder have the ability to escape across borders.
Here is an excerpt from a superb article by Allister Heath, one of the U.K.’s best writers on economic and business issues.
In a modern, global and open world, states have to compete for people. Weirdly, that is something that a large number of commentators have failed to recognise… They assume implicitly that governments remain quasi-monopolies, as was the case throughout most of human history, with citizens mere subjects forced to put up with poor public services, high taxes, crime, misgovernment and a poor quality of life. Yet the reality is that there is now more competition than ever between governments for human capital, with people – especially the highly skilled and the successful – more footloose and mobile than ever before. This is true both within the EU, where freedom of movement reins, and globally. …competition between governments is as good for individuals as competition between firms is for consumers. It keeps down tax rates, especially on labour and capital, which is good for growth and job creation; states need to produce better services at the cheapest possible cost. And if governments become too irritating or incompetent, it allows an exit strategy. It is strange how pundits who claim to want greater competition in the domestic economy – for example, in banking – are so afraid of competition for people between states, decrying it as a race to the bottom. Yet monopolies are always bad, in every sphere of human endeavour, breeding complacency, curtailing innovation and throttling progress. …Globalisation is not just about buying cheap Chinese goods: it also limits the state’s powers to over-tax or over-control its citizens.
For those who haven’t seen them before, here are a couple of my videos that elaborate on these critical issues.
First, here’s a video on tax competition, which includes some well-deserved criticism of international bureaucracies and high-tax nations that are seeking to create global tax cartels.
Here’s a video that makes a powerful economic case for tax havens.
But this is not just an economic issue. Here’s a video that addresses the moral issues and explains why tax havens play a critical role in protecting people subject to persecution by venal governments – as well as people living in nations plagued by crime and instability.
And last but not least, this video punctures some of the myths promoted by the anti-tax haven advocates of global tax cartels.
By the way, since the main purpose of this post is to draw your attention to the superb analysis of a British writer, I may as well close by drawing your attention to a couple of speeches by Dan Hannan, a British member of the European Parliament. In a remarkably limited time, he explains what this battle is all about.
[...] an article by Allister Heath in Cityam (H/T Daniel Mitchell) he talks about the steady outflow of people and wealth from [...]
[...] British Business Writer Explains: Thanks to Tax Competition and … Mar 20, 2011 … British Business Writer Explains: Thanks to Tax Competition and Tax Havens, the Greed of the … [...]
[...] Tax Organization” whenever you see that term), tax competition will be undermined and politicians will respond by increasing tax burdens. This is why nations such as France have been pushing this scheme, of course, and why left-wing [...]
[...] By the way, for more information about the value of tax competition and financial privacy, click this link. [...]
[...] wise and astute Englishmen. If you want a good defense of tax competition and tax havens, read what Allister Heath wrote last year. Rate this: Share this:PrintEmailFacebookTwitterMoredeliciousDiggFarkLinkedInRedditStumbleUponLike [...]
[...] competition, as I have explained to the point of being a nuisance, is an important restraint on the greed of the political class. Simply stated, politicians are less like to over-tax and over-spend if they know that geese with [...]
[...] competition, as I have explained to the point of being a nuisance, is an important restraint on the greed of the political class. Simply stated, politicians are less like to over-tax and over-spend if they know that geese with [...]
[...] especially when augmented by the strong human rights laws of tax havens, nations will face some pressure to move their policies closer to Hong Kong and away from France. That’s something worth protecting and promoting, not something to be stamped out by high-tax [...]
[...] the exception of a few top-notch thinkers such as Pierre Bessard and Allister Heath, there are very few people in Europe who can intelligently analyze public policy, particularly with [...]
[...] IRS regulation means we’ve suffered an unfortunate defeat in this battle. So if we care about promoting good policy and restraining the greed of the political class, we need to redouble our efforts. Rate this: Share [...]
[...] the tax rates that are high? Those of you who have followed my writings on international tax policy already know the answer to that question. Rate this: Share this:PrintEmailFacebookTwitterMoredeliciousDiggFarkLinkedInRedditStumbleUponLike [...]
[...] you to share them widely, I also hope that you can utilize my educational videos on topics such as tax competition, government spending, and the Laffer Curve. Not everything can be explained in a picture. Rate [...]
[...] based on what I wrote about him last year. We clashed the most, arguing about everything from tax havens to the size of government. Interestingly, we both said nice things about Sweden, but I was focusing [...]
[...] harmonization. To understand why financial privacy and fiscal sovereignty are desirable, watch the four-part video series at this post. Rate this: Share this:PrintEmailFacebookTwitterMoredeliciousDiggFarkLinkedInRedditStumbleUponLike [...]
[...] based on what I wrote about him last year. We clashed the most, arguing about everything from tax havens to the size of government. Interestingly, we both said nice things about Sweden, but I was focusing [...]
[...] to you (or at least seems like a reasonably hypothesis), I invite you to read some writings by Allister Heath of the United Kingdom and Pierre Bessard of Switzerland. Rate this:Share [...]
[...] policy” is nothing more than a deceptive way of saying tax harmonization, which would mean an end to tax competition, thus achieving a long-held goal of Europe’s political [...]
[...] tax policy” is nothing more than a deceptive way of saying tax harmonization, which would mean an end to tax competition, thus achieving a long-held goal of Europe’s political [...]
[...] The final point about “global financial governance” is worth emphasizing. While it is true that nothing good has ever happened because of a G-20 summit, some bad things have occurred – most notably the big push a couple of years ago to attack low-tax jurisdiction as part of a campaign by high-tax governments to cripple tax competition and facilitate higher tax burdens. [...]
[...] arguments about why tax competition and tax havens are desirable, I urge you to peruse the work of Allister Heath and Pierre [...]
[...] is why all of us should be very happy that tax havens exist. Imagine how high taxes would be if politicians didn’t have to worry that people had escape [...]
[...] Obama threw around that make-believe number in the 2008 campaign, as seen in this video. But as shown in the final video of this post, the $100 billion figure was concocted out of thin air by a former John Kerry staffer, who [...]
[...] By highlighting the perfectly legal nature of Romney’s investments and commenting on the valuable role of tax havens in the global economy, I’ve neglected the main argument, which is that people have a right to do whatever they want [...]
[...] forest. By highlighting the perfectly legal nature of Romney’s investments and commenting on the valuable role of tax havens in the global economy, I’ve neglected the main argument, which is that people have a right to do whatever they want [...]
[...] is why all of us should be very happy that tax havens exist. Imagine how high taxes would be if politicians didn’t have to worry that people had escape [...]
[...] I’m a big defender of tax havens and tax competition, I noted that the assumptions in the report were very dodgy. As the Wall Street Journal noted, [...]
[...] I’m a big defender of tax havens and tax competition, I noted that the assumptions in the report were very dodgy. As the Wall Street Journal noted, [...]
[...] I’m a big defender of tax havens and tax competition, I noted that the assumptions in the report were very dodgy. As the Wall Street Journal noted, [...]
[...] that are even close are Luxembourg, which is a tiny nation that also serves as a tax haven (a very admirable policy, to be sure), and Norway, which is a special case because of oil [...]
[...] close out this discussion, statists prefer worldwide taxation because it undermines tax competition. This is because, under worldwide taxation, individuals and companies have no ability to escape [...]
[...] or France on the issue of whether fiscal sovereignty and financial privacy should be undermined to help high-tax nations impose their bad tax laws on an extraterritorial basis. Rate this:Share this:PrintEmailFacebookTwitterMoredeliciousDiggFarkLinkedInRedditStumbleUponLike [...]
[...] Luxembourg, which also is an outlier because it is a tiny nation that also serves as a tax haven (a very admirable policy, to be [...]
[...] previous posts, I put together tutorials on the Laffer Curve, tax competition, and the economics of government [...]
[...] previous posts, I put together tutorials on the Laffer Curve, tax competition, and the economics of government [...]
[...] And if they’re smart, they already cut out the middleman and directly placed their savings in one of these low-tax jurisdictions. That way, they’re not only at much less risk of a bank collapse, but they also have greater ability to protect their assets from the venal and incompetent tax-hungry political elite. [...]
[...] the other hand, the video deals with one of my favorite topics and also involves one of my favorite [...]
[...] yet the German political spectrum is so tilted to the left that they want tax harmonization (a spectacularly bad idea) and more [...]
[...] The government’s grotesque treatment of Mr. Wajsfelner is part of the overall attack on tax competition. Heaven forbid people have the freedom to benefit from better tax policy in other jurisdictions! [...]
[...] big advocate of tax competition, fiscal sovereignty, and financial privacy (read Pierre Bessard and Allister Heath to understand why these issues are [...]
[...] Allister is the author of this great article explaining why tax competition and tax havens are so important and valuable in the global economy. [...]
[...] certainly a big fan of making governments compete with each other, but even I didn’t realize how jurisdictional rivalry gave us [...]
[...] certainly a big fan of making governments compete with each other, but even I didn’t realize how jurisdictional rivalry gave us [...]
[...] certainly a big fan of making governments compete with each other, but even I didn’t realize how jurisdictional rivalry gave us [...]
[...] certainly a big fan of making governments compete with each other, but even I didn’t realize how jurisdictional rivalry gave us [...]
[...] certainly a big fan of making governments compete with each other, but even I didn’t realize how jurisdictional rivalry gave us [...]
[...] all the issues we discussed, but when I was pontificating about the benefits of tax competition (are you surprised?), he assured me that he felt the same way, only he wanted to make sure it was “fair tax [...]
[...] all the issues we discussed, but when I was pontificating about the benefits of tax competition(are you surprised ?), he assured me that he felt the same way, only he wanted to make sure it was “fair tax [...]
[...] I’m probably the foremost defender of tax havens in the United States, I tend to get a lot of press inquiries whenever something happens that brings attention to these [...]
[...] I’m probably the foremost defender of tax havens in the United States, I tend to get a lot of press inquiries whenever something happens that brings attention to these [...]
[...] opined about this issue many times, usually from a fiscal policy perspective, explaining that governments are less likely to be oppressive when they know that people (or their [...]
[...] opined about this issue many times, usually from a fiscal policy perspective, explaining that governments are less likely to be oppressive when they know that people (or their [...]
[...] more money out of the income tax. We don’t know if that’s because of the Laffer Curve, tax competition, electoral resistance, or all of the above. But we can say with considerable confidence that the [...]
[...] forest. By highlighting the perfectly legal nature of Romney’s investments and commenting on the valuable role of tax havens in the global economy, I’ve neglected the main argument, which is that people have a right to do whatever they want [...]
[...] than four years ago, as part of my efforts to promote and protect tax competition, fiscal sovereignty, and financial privacy, I narrated this video explaining the economic benefits of so-called tax [...]
[...] than four years ago, as part of my efforts to promote and protect tax competition, fiscal sovereignty, and financial privacy, I narrated this video explaining the economic benefits of so-called tax [...]
[...] Instead, I’m in the Bailiwick of Jersey, which is a UK dependent territory off the coast of France. Jersey is a so-called tax haven, which I applaud because it helps encourage better tax policy in less enlightened parts of the globe. [...]
[...] than four years ago, as part of my efforts to promote and protect tax competition, fiscal sovereignty, and financial privacy, I narrated this video explaining the economic benefits of so-called tax [...]
[...] Obama threw around that make-believe number in the 2008 campaign, as seen in this video. But as shown in the final video of this post, the $100 billion figure was concocted out of thin air by a former John Kerry staffer, who [...]
[...] Bessard of Switzerland and Allister Heath of the United Kingdom are among the world’s best analysts on global tax issues. But Philip [...]
[...] previous posts, I put together tutorials on the Laffer Curve, tax competition, and the economics of government [...]
[...] other words, it’s not just a matter of tax competition and tax havens (though you know how I feel about those [...]
[...] would be a terrible development, but governments are sympathetic to such schemes since they view tax competition as a constraint on their ability to pursue redistribution and thus a limit on their efforts to buy votes with other people’s [...]
[...] since you know my favorite issue is tax competition, you’ll understand why I like these two short speeches by UKIP MEP Godfrey [...]
[...] But it also happens to be one of the world’s richest nations according to World Bank data, in part because it is a very good tax haven. [...]
[...] But it also happens to be one of the world’s richest nations according to World Bank data, in part because it is a very good tax haven. [...]
[...] since you know my favorite issue is tax competition, you’ll understand why I like these two short speeches by UKIP MEP Godfrey [...]
[...] But it also happens to be one of the world’s richest nations according to World Bank data, in part because it is a very good tax haven. [...]
[...] But it also happens to be one of the world’s richest nations according to World Bank data, in part because it is a very good tax haven. [...]
[...] based on what I wrote about him last year. We clashed the most, arguing about everything from tax havens to the size of government. Interestingly, we both said nice things about Sweden, but I was focusing [...]
[...] it fails to make an obvious causal link. As I have repeatedly noted in my writings about tax competition and tax havens, taxpayers need places to hide their money in order to curtail the ability and [...]
[...] another example of why tax competition is such an important force for economic liberalization. It punishes governments that are too greedy and gives taxpayers a chance to protect their property [...]
[...] another example of why tax competition is such an important force for economic liberalization. It punishes governments that are too greedy and gives taxpayers a chance to protect their property [...]
[...] policy is so suicidal and why Texas is growing so rapidly. As I’ve said many times before, tax competition is a critical way of disciplining profligate governments and rewarding jurisdictions with more responsible fiscal [...]
[...] tax policy is so suicidal and why Texas is growing so rapidly. As I’ve said many times before, tax competition is a critical way of disciplining profligate governments and rewarding jurisdictions with more responsible fiscal [...]
[...] I’m a selfless person and a bit of an expert on tax havens, I hereby offer Laetitia my services to help with her tax [...]
[...] But I guess that’s not too surprising. Along with their tax-free colleagues at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the European Commission has been trying to undermine tax competition and make it easier for nations to impose bad tax policy. [...]
[...] another example of why tax competition is such an important force for economic liberalization. It punishes governments that are too greedy and gives taxpayers a chance to protect their property [...]
You actually make it seem really easy along with your presentation however I find this topic to be actually something
that I feel I’d never understand. It sort of feels too complex and very huge for me. I’m looking forward to your next put up, I will try to get the hold of it!
[...] previous posts, I put together tutorials on the Laffer Curve, tax competition, and the economics of government [...]
[...] written about the benefits of tax competition between nations. Well, this story shows the perverse impact of welfare competition between [...]
[...] written about the benefits of tax competition between nations. Well, this story shows the perverse impact of welfare competition between [...]
[...] written about the benefits of tax competition between nations. Well, this story shows the perverse impact of welfare competition between [...]
[...] encourage other nations to adopt better fiscal policy because of tax [...]
[...] encourage other nations to adopt better fiscal policy because of tax [...]
[...] you get a “teaching moment” in Washington, and we now have an excellent opportunity to educate lawmakers about the “offshore” world because President Obama’s nominee to be Treasury Secretary has been caught with his hand in [...]
[...] often, you get a “teaching moment” in Washington, and we now have an excellent opportunity to educate lawmakers about the “offshore” world because President Obama’s nominee to be Treasury Secretary has been caught with his hand in the [...]
[...] you get a “teaching moment” in Washington, and we now have an excellent opportunity to educate lawmakers about the “offshore” world because President Obama’s nominee to be Treasury Secretary has been caught with his hand in [...]
[...] another example of why tax competition is such an important force for economic liberalization. It punishes governments that are too greedy and gives taxpayers a chance to protect their property [...]
[...] And if they’re smart, they already cut out the middleman and directly placed their savings in one of these low-tax jurisdictions. That way, they’re not only at much less risk of a bank collapse, but they also have greater ability to protect their assets from the venal and incompetent tax-hungry political elite. [...]
[...] insult to injury, I’m not rich, so I don’t have the ability to directly benefit from tax competition by moving to a zero-income-tax state such as Florida or [...]
[...] P.S. At least Jack Lew has now shown us that it’s perfectly fine to invest in the Cayman Islands and benefit from tax competition. [...]
[...] The debacle in France helps explain why we should celebrate tax competition. The fact that entrepreneurs can migrate to nations with better (or less worse) tax systems is a [...]
[...] particularly like that he recognizes the power of tax competition as an argument for better tax policy. Taxpayers win when Texas and Louisiana compete to have less [...]
[...] particularly like that he recognizes the power of tax competition as an argument for better tax policy. Taxpayers win when Texas and Louisiana compete to have less [...]
[...] Which nations are money laundering centers (hint, not tax havens). [...]
[...] is like tax harmonization. It always means a heavier burden of government, not a lighter burden. Low-tax jurisdictions are badgered and harassed to make their tax systems worse so that fiscal hell-holes such as France don’t face [...]
[...] should be considered Part II of the OECD’s anti-tax competition project. Part I was the attack on so-called tax havens, which began back in the mid- to [...]
[...] I’m the self-appointed defender of low-tax jurisdictions in Washington, this caught my attention. Thomas Jefferson wasn’t joking when he warned that “eternal [...]
[...] I’m the self-appointed defender of low-tax jurisdictions in Washington, this caught my attention. Thomas Jefferson wasn’t joking when he warned that “eternal [...]
[...] hope that my contribution is a good addition to the powerful analysis of experts such as Allister Heath and Pierre [...]
[...] hope that my contribution is a good addition to the powerful analysis of experts such as Allister Heath and Pierre [...]
[...] Simply stated, it is very difficult for governments to impose and enforce confiscatory tax rates when investors and entrepreneurs can shift their economic activity to jurisdictions with better tax …. Particularly if those nations have strong policies on financial privacy, thus making it difficult [...]
[...] hope that my contribution is a good addition to the powerful analysis of experts such as Allister Heath and Pierre [...]
[...] 4. The Internet sales tax cartel being promoted by Art and various politicians requires that governments have the ability to tax sales that tax place outside their borders. That’s an assault of sovereignty, particularly since out-of-state merchants will be coerced into being tax collectors for a distant government. This is the same dangerous ideology that is used by high-tax governments to promote global anti-tax competition policies. [...]
[...] Which nations are money laundering centers (hint, not tax havens). [...]
[...] Which nations are money laundering centers (hint, not tax havens). [...]
[...] further information, I highly recommend the writings of Allister Heath andPierre [...]
[...] I often argue that we need to preserve tax competition and tax havens in order to limit the greed of the political class. [...]
[...] But this is exactly why politicians shouldn’t be allowed to tax beyond their borders. We want tax competition in order to limit the greed of the political class. [...]
[…] argued on many occasions that tax competition is an important mechanism for restraining the greed of the political class. But even in my most optimistic moments, I realize that it’s a necessary but not sufficient […]
[…] the report also endorses tax competition as a means of restraining the burden of government […]